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INTRODUCTION
For over twenty-five years the federal government has established
the basic goals and controls of our nation's environmental policy.'
These federal goals and controls have recently come under serious
1. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1157-78 (1995).
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attack as unnecessary, excessive, inefficient, and poorly prioritized.'
Arguments over specific federal environmental policies have been
recast and expanded into generic challenges to the very concept of
federal regulation. These attacks are ofteimounted under the banner
of "states' rights" or "federalism."3
Partly in response to these attacks, Congress and the President
have reduced funding for federal standard setting, implementation,
oversight, and enforcement Congress and the President also have
begun to repeal substantive federal environmental requirements' and
2. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 9 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Hazardous
Materials and on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong.
(1995) (statement of Donald Schregardus, Director of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency),
available in 1995 WL 39674, USTESTIMONY' database (February 1, 1995) ("I[There needs to
be a fundamental reevaluation of how environmental decisions are made and priorities are set
.... [An independent study] identified more effective tools to achieve the expected goals [to
reduce toxic chemicals in the Great Lakes] at only 10 percent of the cost of the EPA
proposal."); Hearings on S. 290 and S. 343 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and
the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Turner T.
Smith, Jr., Hunton & Williams), available in 1995 WL 74642, USTESTIMONY database
(February 24, 1995) ("Too often, in the field of environmental legislation at least, Congress has
seen an environmental harm, and like King Canute, has simply ordered that it cease. Too
seldom has it seen that the harm is only the end result of 'market failure' and sought the best
way to address that failure .... When the real problem is understood, more subtle, but more
fundamental legislative solutions may be found.").
3. See Carol M. Browner, Partners in Protecting the Public, WASH. POST, May 30, 1994,
at A15 ("A vocal group whose impact may be to undermine federal protection of public health
and natural iesources ... would confuse us into believing that the basic concept of federal-state
partnership is itself to blame-rather than the imperfect implementation of that partnership or
the natural difficulties of setting standards in a pluralistic society."). See generally Edward L.
Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV.
903, 910-14, 948 (1994) (defining federalism as the right of a state to adopt policies contrary to
federal norms and arguing that federalism claims are often an unprincipled strategy to promote
particular substantive results).
4. For example, the Fiscal Year (FY) 1996 appropriations for the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency ultimately provided funds that were slightly below FY95 levels. See Omnibus
Consolidated Recissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(funding for environmental programs and management); The Balanced Budget Downpayment
Act of 1996, I, Pub. L. No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 26,37 (providing funding as indicated in H.R. 2099,
104th Cong. (1996)). Earlier, the President had vetoed a bill to fund the EPA at almost $1
billion dollars less than the FY95 levels. Until the dispute was resolved, EPA operated under
a series of continuing resolutions that provided substantially less than full FY95 level funding.
See, e.g., Emergency Supplemental Appropriations For Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-19,109 Stat. 194. See generally Superfund Sites Shutting Down as Congress, President
Unable to Agree on Seven-Year Plan, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1591, 1592 (Jan.5, 1996).
5. For example, Congress extended the deadline under the Clean Air Act in late 1995 for
states to establish strict vehicle inspection programs. Congress also "removed the requirement
for large companies in.severely polluted cities to organize employee car pools. EPA also
reduced efforts to carry out various requirements. See Gary Lee, Compromising on Clean Air
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have adopted barriers to enacting new federal environmental
provisions that shift the costs of environmental protection to states.
6
At the same time as the political branches are "devolving" power
to the states, the Supreme Court is rediscovering limits on powers.
vested in the federal government by the U.S. Constitution. In 1992,
the Court found that Congress lacks the power under the Interstate
Commerce Clause7 to compel states to legislate.8 In 1995, the Court
found limits on the private conduct that Congress may regulate by
exercising Interstate Commerce Clause power.9 In 1996, the Court
found that Congress lacks the power to authorize citizens to sue
unconsenting states in federal courts when states violate federal laws
enacted under the Interstate Commerce Clause.' ° In 1997, the Court
AcL Under Republican Pressur4 EPA Reduces Enforcement Efforts, WASH. POST, Feb. 21,1996,
at Al (final ed.).
6. In early 1995, Congress and the President enacted the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified at various sections of 2 U.S.C.) (creating
procedural hurdles that make it more difficult for Congress and federal agencies to adopt new
legislation and to promulgate new rules that shift the costs of implementing federal policies to
states, localities, and regulated entities).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems
of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J.
1196, 1243-46 (1977) (stating that environmental legislation is typically grounded on Interstate
Commerce Clause power, but could be based on liberty or property interests protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, on the Necessary and
Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, or on the implementing power of the Fourteenth
Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
8. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992). Nevertheless, Congress
may direct states to legislate when Congress exercises power pursuant to other provisions of the
Constitution. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (upholding directives to states to
legislate under the implementing clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5); cf New York, 505 U.S. at 155-56 (the Tenth Amendment provides a rule of
construction regarding powers vested by the Constitution but does not itself impose limits on
federal power); Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1415-17 (9th Cir. 1995),' cert.
denied 116 S.Ct. 815 (1996) (upholding the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973(gg)(1)-(10)(1994), in which Congress directed states to provide voter registration forms
to driving license applicants, under power vested in Congress to regulate federal elections by
U.S. CONST. art. I, section 4; refusing to reach whether that statute unconstitutionally impinged
on state sovereignty to regulate state elections).
9. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995) (finding substantive limits on the
scope of power conveyed to Congress under the Interstate Commerce Clause); cf. John P.
Dwyer, The Commerce Clause and the Limits of Congressional Authority to Regulate the
Environment, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10421 (Aug. 1995) (arguing that Lopez is likely
to have little effect on federal environmental legislation).
10. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1123-32 (1996) (finding that
the Eleventh Amendment, U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI, prevents Congress from waiving state
sovereign immunity from citizen suits when legislating under the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S.
CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). In Seminole Tribe, the Court found the Interstate Commerce Clause
Spring 1997]
DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM
may hold that Congress lacks the power to direct state officials to
execute federal policies imposed under Interstate Commerce Clause
power.1"
This article explains why these turbulent winds of anti-federal
sentiment should not wholly uproot federal environmental regulatory
policy.'2 Federal environmental laws were originally adopted and
currently may be defended on numerous theoretical grounds. Federal
environmental regulation may be warranted where federal regulatory
power exists because: (1) it is more efficient than state regulation at
achieving specified goals; (2) it regulates ,pollution across state
borders; (3) it prevents states from reducing social welfare in response
to competition for industry; (4) it more properly takes environmental
interests into account than state political processes; and (5) it codifies
moral rights.13  Although recent academic criticism has posed
substantial challenges to some of these traditional rationales,14 this
and the Indian Commerce Clause indistinguishable in this regard, and overruled its earlier
decision under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989). Nevertheless, the Court did not remove from Congress power to authorize the federal
government to sue states and for citizens to sue state officials to prevent violations of federal
laws. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S.CL at 1131 n.14, 1133 & n.17. But the court limited citizen
injunctive suits against state officials when expressly precluded by the federal law or impliedly
precluded by provision in the federal law of a detailed enforcement scheme. See Seminole Tribe,
116 S.Ct. at 1132-33.
11. See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the interim
provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924, 925A (Supp.
V 1993), which require state law enforcement officers to enforce a federally mandated
background check on prospective gun purchasers, against a Tenth Amendment challenge), cert.
granted sub nor. Printz v. U.S., 116 S.Ct. 2521 (1996).
12. Although this article focuses on environmental policy and American federalsim, the
analysis applies broadly to intergovernmental relations. But cf. George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 331, 338, 339 & n. 18 (1994). (defining "subsidiarity" as the "notion that ictions should
be taken at the lowest level of government at which particular objectives can adequately be
achieved."); Centesimus annus § 4, quoted in CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 460 (1994)
("[A] community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of
a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions.").
13. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1211-20.
14. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-
to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
Professor Revesz has claimed that supporters of existing federal laws should bear the burden
to prove the validity of application of the traditional rationales. Id. at 1212-13 (arguing that
proponents of federal regulation need to prove validity of "race-to-the-bottom" claims); id. at
1223 (arguing that proponents need to establish "that the state political processes in fact
undervalue the benefits of environmental protection, or overvalue the corresponding costs,
whereas the calculus at the federal 'level is more accurate."). Although Professor Revesz
acknowledges that federal regulation may be justified to prevent interstate externalities, he
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article demonstrates that each of these bases for federal environmen-
tal regulation remains theoretically valid. The application of the
theoretical rationales, however, requires the political resolution of
conflicts over value.
In particular, this article responds to the common claim that
federal regulation decreases social welfare by preventing states and
localities from tailoring regulatory requirements to their citizens'
preferences. This claim is normally grounded upon a particular
economic conception of value - the willingness of individuals to pay
for goods or services - employed by some legal analysts.' 6 In the
real world of political action, however, broader conceptions of value
are invariably employed by citizens and by the government officials
they elect.'
7
argues that externalities alone cannot explain or justify the stringent uniform requirements of
federal environmental law. Id at 1224-25, 1226 & nn. 53-54.
15. See Revesz, supra note 14, at 1226 & n.54, 1245 (arguing that a state's regulatory and
fiscal costs, reflected in lost wage income for citizens and in lost sources of tax revenue, may
exceed the benefit of imposing federal controls); Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The
Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone? 14 J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 1997) (describing
"welfare-reducing federal homogenizing legislation," which purportedly deprives states and
localities of beneficial normative diversity by coercing or imposing regulatory controls that are
not tailored to the state's determination of costs and benefits).
16. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 15 (quoting JAMES M. BUCHANON & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:. LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 92 (1962) (defining social welfare "in terms of the voluntary preferences of the
individuals as revealed by their behavior")); J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES
88-93 (1968) (discussing the economic conception of improving social welfare by increasing the
diversity among locales in regard to living conditions and governmental policies). It is important
to note that many economists long-ago rejected neo-classical economic conceptions and
acknowledge that values must be observed through other means than market behaviors. But
neoclassical conceptions exert a tenacious hold on legal theory. See Peter P. Swire, The Race
to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions
In Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67, 94-95 (1996) ("Environmental law is largely
defined by the very factors that are assumed away in [neoclassical economic] models, such as
interstate externalities, deep public choice problems, and intractable theoretical and practical
obstacles to measuring the social utility of environmental regulations .... [Legal analysts] may
slide too easily from conclusions within the context of... stylized modelfs] to claims about the
real world . ... fM]odest changes in initial assumptions can make competition among
jurisdictions no longer efficient.").
17. Value depends on "socially shared understanding" rather than on the revealed
preferences of individuals in economic markets. Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and
Commensurability, 43 DUKE LJ. 56, 66 (1993); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS 18 (1970) ("decisions balancing lives against money or convenience cannot be purely
monetary ones, so the market method is never the only one used."); Mark Sagoff, Economic
Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393,1411-12 (1981) (public preferences for
environmental quality "do not involve desires or wants [measured by willingness to pay], but
opinions or beliefs.").
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When national evaluative norms are employed," federal
regulation is more likely than state or local regulation to increase
social welfare." Tailoring requirements to local preferences will not
necessarily increase social welfare, because such tailoring prevents
citizens located outside a state from satisfying their preferences for in-
state regulation.' Even when the evaluative norms are based
exclusively on willingness-to-pay, tailoring to local preferences may
reduce social welfare.21 Further, if federal regulation codifies moral
rights, the argument that federal regulation reduces social welfare may
18. I shall refer to "evaluative norms" to describe whatever in practice provides the shared
- or imposed - understanding of value that is applied to political and legal decisions. See
Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 913 n.50 (discussing the distinction between instrumental and
normative justifications for federalism). National evaluative norms are the measures of value
implicitly adopted when preemptive federal legislation is enacted. National evaluative norms
may not necessarily be shared by a majority of the nation's citizenry. In federalism disputes, the
national evaluative norms are not shared by particular states. Agreement over the measures of
value may be a necessary but missing precondition to reasoned analysis of regulatory options
and federalism disputes. Cf. Lester B. Lave, Introduction, in QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
IN REGULATION 1, 5 (Lester B. Lave ed., 1982) [hereinafter QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT]
("many hold the cynical view that regulation is power politics, with the winners imposing their
will on the losers .... Whether the balancing [of the measure of benefits and costs] is implicit
or explicit .... [absent quantitative risk estimates] regulation is reduced to guesses based on
what are called prudent judgments. These guesses uncover and exacerbate value conflicts ....
and the inherent differences in values inevitably lead to maximal conflict.").
19. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 935 ("Social welfare is not greater in a federal
system unless one can show that the states, operating separately, will produce a statistically
higher level of good policies than the central government... It becomes demonstrably wrong
... [if] good policy [is defined] through a national decision-making process.").
20. Cf. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 592
(1996) (tailoring policies to local needs and desires reduces abilities to protect property rights
and to limit transjurisdictional pollution to an efficient level). Similarly, providing a variety of
jurisdictions with differing social and regulatory conditions may not increase social welfare,
because individuals are relatively immobile -and cannot migrate in order to increase their
satisfaction. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal
Republic, 89 J. POL. ECON. 152, 155 (1981) (individuals' preferences, as opposed to those of
firms, are more typically expressed in political processes than by moving among jurisdictions).
21. The willingness-to-pay conception assumes that there is no direct basis to compare the
degree of utility that individuals derive from satisfying their preferences. Because out-of-state
citizens are excluded from the state's political "market," there is no way to determine whether
out-of-state citizens would pay more to satisfy their preferences for in-state regulation than in-
state citizens would pay to avoid'such regulation. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 15 (as the
proportion of the group whose approval is required for decision increases, the costs of reaching
a decision increase; only unanimous decision rules assure increases in welfare because "no
interpersonal utility calculations need be made"); Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk
Management, Risk Assessment and Risk Management In Regulatory Decision-Making: Draft
Report For Public Review And Comment 54 (draft of June 13, 1996) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter Regulatory Decision-Making] ("Deciding how different groups should be weighted
for equity in economic analysis would be highly value-laden.").
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simply be irrelevant. 2  Although valid arguments may be made
against federal regulation, these arguments may not in any way
suggest the need to return policymaking to the states. 
3
Part I of this article describes the constitutional framework
applicable to federalism disputes. If federal power exists to regulate
private conduct, states may regulate only because the Congress has
allowed them to do so. National political processes thus resolve
conflicts in which the citizens of different states attempt to impose
their values on each other. In these processes, federal legislators
imperfectly aggregate and weigh these values. The political resolution
of value conflicts is subject to continuous revision through the
enactment or repeal of federal legislation.
Part II evaluates the traditional rationales for federal environ-
mental regulation in light of the disputed values typically presented
by federalism disputes. These disputed values include the relative
efficiency, accountability, and risks of federal or state regulation and
implementation. Resolution of the underlying value conflicts often
predetermines the results of comparative analyses of the benefits and
costs of federal or state regulation. 4 -Data may be insufficient to
determine the relative merit of federal or state implementation of
specified policies.
Part III discusses how Congress enacted various provisions of the
federal Clean Air Act ' to achieve specified goals. Congress imposed
22. See Rubin & Freely, supra note 3, at 913 (once deontological rights are recognized, their
status is independent of instrumental justifications); but see William K. Jones, A Theory of Social
Norms, 1994 U. ILL L. REV. 545, 593 (1994) ("If we follow a rights theory, we may have a
world in which all rights are respected, and perhaps one in which inequality has been banished,
but it may be a world in which all share equally in a society of desperation and despair.").
Mainstream American legal theory does not recognize positive individual rights as primary
requirements and duties of government. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
x-xi (1977) (arguing that individual rights to protection from government "are prior to the rights
created by explicit legislation").
23. See Esty, supra note 20, at 637 ("While we might all agree that the current structure of
regulation produces undesirable results, [recent academic criticism] does next to nothing to
show that the source of the problem is the federalness of the regulations.") (emphasis in
original).
24. Cf. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate Aspects of Interstate
Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 151-52 (1996) (federalism policy scholarship
should address the wide range of differences among states that affect the efficient provision of
goods and services); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and
the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1424-33 (1996) (academic theory is
coalescing around comparative analyses of institutions as a means to evaluate the concepts of
efficiency and fairness).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
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measures based upon all of the traditional rationales advanced for
federal regulation.26 Further, Congress adopted varying approaches
to implement the federal requirements. Congress wholly preempted
state regulation and relied exclusively upon the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to develop and to enforce the control of
emissions from mobile sources; relied presumptively upon states to
develop and to implement controls to meet federal ambient standards
for certain ubiquitous pollutants; and relied presumptively upon EPA
to develop and to implement controls for pollutants from new
stationary sources and for highly toxic air pollutants.
Part III then briefly traces the implementation history of these
provisions.27 The analysis demonstrates how EPA and states have
repeatedly failed to achieve the goals specified by Congress.28 State
and local resistance to national values has shaped implementation by
states and by EPA of the federal environmental laws.29 The generali-
26. Significantly, many of these rationales are ignored or disparaged in the academic
literature. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1183, 1191 & n.32, 1220 (1995) (citing legislative history that supports additional rationales
to those noted and arguing that interstate. externalities were not a "significant concern" to
Congress in 1970); Revesz, supra note 14, at 1224 n.40 ("there is no evidence that the normative
component of the public choice argument played an important role in shaping the statutory
scheme"); but see Stewart, supra note 7, at 1218-19 (elements of "federal pollution control
legislation in the early 1970s ... reflect the nonutilitarian moral and sacrificial aspects of
environmental policy.").
27. The present analysis builds upon the prior work of, inter alia, Professors Richard
Stewart, Peter Menell, John Dwyer, Craig Oren, and Robert Percival. See, e.g., Stewart, supra
note 7; Dwyer, supra note 26; PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW & POLICY (1994); John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOL. L.Q.
233 (1990); Craig N. Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus
Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1988); Percival, supra note 1; ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY (1992). See generally
Environmental Federalism Symposium, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141-1690 (1995).
28. Similar stories may be told regarding the failure to achieve the goals of other federal
environmental regulatory statutes. See, e.g., John P.C. Fogerty, A Short History of Federal Water
Pollution Control Law, in CLEAN WATER DESKBOOK 5-20 (Envtl. L. Inst. ed., 1991); Lawrence
R. Liebsman & Elliott P. Laws, The Water Quality Act of 1987, in CLEAN WATER DESKBOOK
21-42 (Envtl. L. Inst. ed., 1991); Randolph L. Hill, An Overview ofRCRA: The "Mind-Numbing"
Provisions of the Most "Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10254, 10255-63 (May 1991).
29. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 15 (disproportionate blocking power in the U.S. Senate
provides small-population states with greater abilities to affect any federal policies that are
enacted, redistributes wealth from larger to smaller population states, and discriminates against
racial minorities possessing identifiably distinct interests); Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1216-19,1224
(concluding from the history of implementing the Clean Air Act that state autonomy is
inevitable and that "widespread dissatisfaction - manifested in the time-honored 'go-slow'
approach - will bring EPA and even Congress to the bargaining table."). State regulation or
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ty of the present analysis precludes any resolution of whether
presumptive reliance on federal or state regulation or implementation
has been more efficient or effective. But the analysis demonstrates
the high regulatory, litigation, and opportunity costs incurred when
Congress fails adequately to compel states or EPA to implement
federal policies. The analysis thus suggests that Congress should
repeal the goals that it does not require to be attained and should
more effectively compel attainment of the goals that it does not
repeal.
Finally, Part IV reconsiders existing federal environmental goals
in light of the theory and practice of environmental federalism. After
a quarter of a century of experience, most Americans apparently
prefer to retain federal environmental regulation and to impose
additional, costly preemptive federal requirements? But we lack the
ability to discern whether these citizens honestly and intelligently
ascribe to these professed values." Challenges to federal environmen-
tal regulation thus reflect political battles for the hearts and minds of
the citizenry. The federal judiciary plays a disproportionate role in
this shaping of public values. Federal judges must determine whether
the requirements contained in preemptive federal legislation are real
or symbolic. Because significant impediments exist to enacting or
repealing legislation, the value judgments of federal judges are rarely
overturned. The merits of these judgments, however, can only be
assessed by resolving the underlying value conflicts. By explicitly
addressing the moral bases for political decisionmaking, participants
in the national .political drama may finally get to the heart of the
implementation thus may be the quid pro quo for federal legislators to enact statutes that
preempt state regulatory prerogatives.
30. See Greg Easterbrook, Environmental Moderation is on the Horizon, WASH. POST, July
17-23, 1995, at 20 (National Weekly ed.)("78 percent [of respondents] say.., the government
should 'do whatever it takes to protect the environment'); Regulatory Decision-Making, supra
note 21, at v, 11 ("Public-opinion polls have consistently shown strong support throughout the
United States for effective environmental stewardship... 80% of Americans... do not want
government to do less about risks to health and the environment than it does currently .... );
Percival, supra note 1, at 1144 & n.14 (citing polling data demonstrating greater public support
for federal than for state environmental regulation).
31. The polling data ,does not identify the level of public comprehension of federal
environmental goals or the costs and benefits associated with federal statutes. The data also fail
to indicate whether a majority of voters in a majority of states support federal environmental
regulation. Nevertheless, the data strongly and consistently indicate that a "supermajority" of
the national voting public continues to support preserving and even expanding the traditional
federal role in protecting the environment.
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matter and thus may conduct more reasoned - or at least more civil
- debate.32
I. NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESSES RESOLVE VALUE CONFLICTS
AMONG THE CITIZENS OF DIFFERENT STATES
A.. The Constitutional Framework
Citizens of a particular state lack a constitutional entitlement
(states' rights) to impose within state borders their preferences for
standards of environmental quality?3 In the Revolutionary War, the
citizens of American states rejected the British concept of Parliamen-
tary sovereignty, which denied states the legal right to be free from
central control. But by adopting the Constitution, the citizens of
individual states relinquished state sovereignty that had been created
under the Articles of Confederation and replaced it with the
sovereignty of a "unitary" nation 4  The Constitution thus contains
the Supremacy Clause and does not require the consent of all states
for its amendment.
Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress may entirely preempt
state regulation of private conduct affecting the environment.36
32. See Robert F. Nagel, The Term Limits Dissent: What Nerve, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 843,845-
47, 855 (1996) (deploring the exaggerated rhetoric in federalism disputes; rejecting claims made
by Professors Rubin & Feeley regarding a unitary public and national decisionmaking because
no preemptive federal legislation may exist and because the Supreme Court is often willing to
overturn legislative decisions).
33. In theory, preferences for regulation reflected in federal laws are likely to have been
held by a majority of federal citizens. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 15 (legislators formally
representing as little as 11 percent of the population may prevent a vote on legislation). If a
majority of citizens 'in each state originally supported the federal quality standards, and if it were
appropriate to limit regulation to the preferences of citizens of particular states, there would
have been little need for federal legislation. Because of the substantial blocking power of
minority states, however, one cannot infer from the existence of federal legislation that a
majority of the nation's citizens continue to support federal goals. Similarly, one cannot infer
from existing state laws that a majority of state citizens support those laws or oppose federal
laws.
34. This conception was reflected in the requirement for ratification of the Constitution by
"metalegal" conventions of the people. See U.S. CONST. art. VII; Akhil R. Amar, Of
Soveieignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425,1435,1445-47,1455-61,1462 & nn.161-63 (1987).
35. See U.S. CONST. art. V; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Amar, supra note 34, at 1455-62.
36. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174 (1992)
("[w]here federal regulation of private activity is within the scope of the Commerce Clause, we
have recognized the ability of Congress to offer states .the choice of regulating that activity
according to federal 'standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.").
Supremacy clause preemption may be expressed in or implied by legislation or may result from
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Alternately, Congress may preserve state regulation from some forms
of preemption.37 The only current limits on the power of Congress to
regulate private conduct are that the Constitution must have vested
power in Congress to address the conduct" and that the policies
imposed by Congress must be reasonable means to accomplish
legitimate ends.39 In addition, Congress cannot order states to
particular conflicts of state laws with the application of federal law. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7416
(1994); Hines v. Davidovitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-69 (1941). Federal spending conditions also may
induce states to regulate or to refrain therefrom. The federal spending power is broader than
federal regulatory power. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987); Lynn A.
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1191, 1931 & nn. 98-100,
1962 & nn. 244-246 (1995) (conditional funding provided under the Spending Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, may induce states to adopt policies.that are otherwise beyond federal
power to impose; the Supreme Court has failed to provide content to its doctrine that federal
spending conditions cannot be "unduly coercive"); cf. Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 881-82
(4th Cir. 1996) (denying federal highway funds for state failures to submit approvable plans to
implement federal permit programs does nct rise to the level of "outright coercion").
37. Federal and state courts may find state regulatory activities that discriminate against or
unduly burden interstate commerce to be preempted. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3;
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (discriminatory state regulation); Pike v. Bruce
Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (burdensome state regulation). Congress may legislate to
authorize such preempted state measures. See White v. Mass. Council of Construction
Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983). See generally Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market
in Solid Waste: Trade-Offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy,
73 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1546-60 (1995) (analyzing competing policies to address nonhazardous
wastes and recommending that Congress cure such preemption by pre-approving compacts under
the Compacts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3).
38. See supra notes 7, 9 and accompanying text. Because state law is the source of
entitlements for citizens to engage in activities that affect the environment, the Fourteenth
Amendment implementing power might provide a basis for federal laws that protect
environmental "rights" that are beyond Interstate Commerce Clause power. See David
Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REv.
1223,1265 (1985). See generally Guido Calabresi & Bernard Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (discussing
the nature of legal entitlements).
39. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface. Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,276 (1981)
(holding that Congress possesses power to regulate private conduct to protect the environment
if any rational basis may be imputed for finding that the conduct affects interstate commerce and
if the means is reasonably adapted to that end); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(federal legislative classifications and measures regarding economic activities are subject only
to rational basis review under the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONsT. amend. V, which
incorporates equal protection concepts); but cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938) (systematic victimization by majority interests that effectively prevents equal
representation of minority individuals may infringe justiciable rights). The swing votes in United
States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), claimed that their concurrence did not repeal prior case
law. See id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (the Court's past decisions "are within the fair
ambit of the Court's practical conception of commercial regulation and are not called in question
by our decision today."); cf. ild. at 1650 & n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("many believe that it is
too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past").
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legislate (and possibly to administer) some federal policies 'and
Congress may not authorize citizens to sue unconsenting states for
violations of those policies.' °
States cannot avoid the preemptive effects of federal legislation
by unilateral secession.4' Because their forebears signed onto the
Constitution, state citizens must live with their national citizenship.42
In contrast to states, Indian tribes may not have ceded sovereignty to
the federal government when entering into treaties or may have
imposed through treaties special obligations on the fe'deral govern-
ment.43 As a result, tribes and their members may have stronger
claims to maintaining diverse social and governmental policies than
states and their citizens do.'
Within the domain of regulatory power vested in Congress by the
Constitution, the idea of "states' rights" is thus a popular illusion.
Like their citizens, states must participate in national political
processes to influence the regulatory requirements that will apply
40. See supra notes 8, 10, 11, and accompanying text; Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling and rejecting as not justiciable the standard
adopted in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845, 852, 854 (1976), that federal
legislation is invalid only if it regulates the "States as States," addresses matters that are
indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty," and impairs the States' ability "to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional functions"); New York, 505 U.S. at 183-86 (rejecting challenges
brought under the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4, to conditional federal spdnding
and backup federpl regulation; simultaneously refusing to hold that disputes under the
Guarantee Clause are justiciable).
41. International law provides the rights of self-determination (secession) only to "peoples."
Louis HENKIN, ET AL.INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 302-08 (3d ed. 1993).
To qualify as a "people," it is normally thought a necessary but not sufficient condition for
individuals with a distinctive cultural identity to live within a distinct geographic territory. See
id. Notwithstanding substantial regional differences, the American population does not comprise
distinct peoples. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 944, 947 (any historically unique state
cultures have given way to a national culture).
42. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 15 (discussing the supermajoritarian enactment
requirements for amendments specified in U.S. CONsi. art. V; discussing other barriers to
amending the Constitution by various means, including popular revolt). See generally ALBERT
0. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, OROANIZA-
TIONS, AND STATES (1970).
43. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving To Themselves: Treaties and the Powers Of Indian
Tribes, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 963, 966-76 (1996);.Robert Williams, The People of the States Where
They Are Found Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies: The Indian Side of the Story of Indian
Rights and Federalism, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 981, 984-97 (1996).
44. This is particularly true to the extent that imposition of values threatens tribal culture.
See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of
Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge 94 (1996) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author) (describing the ability of tribes'to establish their systems of governance
as depending on preservation of cultural integrity).
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within their jurisdiction.4' Historically, the Supreme Court exercised
power under Article IlI of the Constitution to protect the states and
their citizens from the harms caused by the regulatory policies
adopted by citizens of other states. 6  But Congress has largely
preempted the judicial role in regard to transboundary environmental
disputes.47
Congress inconsistently has prevented citizens of particular states
from imposing their values on the citizens of other states' and has
authorized federal officials to impose the values of citizens of
particular states on other states.49  The question posed for environ-
mental federalism disputes is whether Congress should preempt state
diversity and impose the values of the citizens of particular states on
the citizens of other states or should allow the citizens of different
states to impose their values on each other. In making this decision,
Congress must consider the competing "interests" of the citizens of
the different states.50 For purposes of further analysis, I assume that
45. States as "juridical" entities participate in national legislative processes because Senate
representation is proportioned on statehood and because states may specify which citizens can
vote and may establish voting districts and regulations, subject to federal legislative supervision.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, art. I, § 3 (as amended by amend. XVII); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.
1.
46. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. & Ducktown Sulpher, Copper & Iron Co., 206
U.S. 230, 231-37 (1907) (the Supreme Court possesses original jurisdiction to determine
equitable rules for transboundary pollution; states have a constitutional entitlement to an
injunction to protect their territorial environments based on their "quasi-sovereign" interests and
as the quid pro quo for abandoning warfare when entering the Union); cf. id. at 239 (Harlan,
J,, concurring) ("Georgia is entitled to the relief sought, not because it is a state, but because
it is a party which has established its right to such relief by proof.").
47. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317-32 (1981) (the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 125-1387 (1994) [hereinafter FWPCA] preempts the constitutional
common laxv of interstate water pollution).
48. See International Paper Co. v. Oulette, 479 U.S. 481,490-96 (1987) (FWPCA preempts
state common law nuisance suits to impose liability on sources in upstream states for
transboundary water pollution).
49. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 104 (1992) (holding that Congress authorized
EPA to impose downstream state water quality requirements in federal water pollution control
permits issued in upstream states, without resolving whether Congress had required EPA to do
so); 40 C.F.R. §122.4(d) (1997) (EPA regulations prohibit issuance of permits by EPA when
"impos[ed] conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements
of all affected States.").
50. It is common in academia to identify values with particular groups that believe or
espouse them and which compete for legislative recognition of their interests. See generally Cass
R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985) (describing
the competition through interest groups-or factions--to establish in law and to impose
particular values on society); Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335
(1990) (same).
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federal legislators are concerned with determining "good" policy, even
though public-choice analyses may refute this assumption.1
B. Competing Conceptions Of Value And Of Social Welfare Are
Resolved Through National Political-Processes
1. Economic Versus Political Conceptions Of Value. Competing
conceptions of value lie at the heart of federalism disputes. Good
policy is often defined by reference to cost-benefit analysis, or
neoclassical economics, which in turn is based on liberal political
theory. Pursuant to the "Kaldor-Hicks" efficiency criterion, a policy
increases social welfare if the benefits are sufficient in theory to
compensate for the costs.5 2 Such economic analysis assumes that we
cannot directly compare the "utility functions" of different individuals,
i.e., the degree of benefit individuals derive by satisfying their
preferences. Value is therefore revealed, for neoclassical economics,
by the willingness of individuals to pay for goods and services in
economic markets. 3
Because economic markets do not normally exist to reveal the
strength of citizen preferences for regulatory policies, social welfare
cannot be assessed by measuring individuals' willingness to pay for
policy.54 Instead, social welfare is assessed by predicting the results
of regulatory policies and by extrapolating the costs and benefits from
market values for the goods and services achieved by the policies.
51. See William S. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 283-95 (1988) (describing as a
"Madisonian Nightmare" the politics and results of interest group competition for legislation);
cf Frank Rich, It Takes Courage to Go After "Big Tobacco," ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Dec. 12,1995,
at A13 (discussing the likely future failure of federal legislators to address serious health risks
from tobacco use, because influenced by large and pervasive campaign contributions of the
tobacco industry).
52. See Baker, supra note 36, at 1971 & n.281.
53. See supra note 16; MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 44-45; but see Tsosie, supra
note 44, at 58 ("Although the Western positivist tradition considers science to be 'objective' and
free from bias, and economists assert that free markets enhance the common good without state
coercion, both intellectual trends in fact inculcate values of human supremacy over the natural
world, profit maximization, and measure efficiency using short-term, individualist norms."). See
generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1971); JEREMY BENTHEM, PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1988).
54. Political markets exist to measure preferences for regulation. But bribery of
government officials is illegal. It should also be obvious: (1) that the ability to spend wealth to
influence policy does not provide an objective measure of value; and (2) that policies adopted
in response to campaign contributions do not necessarily increase social welfare.
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But even assuming accurate predictions of physical and human
responses to policy, economic markets may not exist for the relevant
goods and services55 and market prices may not properly reflect
individuals' valuations due to market failures. 6 Substantial disputes
thus exist over how to value non-market preferences for regulation. 7
Even if cost-benefit analysis based on willingness-to-pay is
accepted as a good means to assess the welfare effects of policy, cost-
benefit analysis is rarely the basis on which preemptive federal
legislation is enacted.5" Instead, federal legislators may informally
55. For example, markets do not normally exist in which people routinely buy or sell
environmental quality or bodily integrity. Although prices may be set for the enjoyment of
public amenities, such "public goods" are often unique and the prices set may therefore
undervalue or overvalue the preferences of various citizens for these amenities. See MENELL
& STEWART, supra note 27, at 67, 68 & n.28, 69-70 (discussing different options for government
regulation of "collective goods"); id. at 84-85 (discussing direct policy and project costs,
commercial impacts, health effects, recreational, ecosystem, and aesthetic impacts, and option
and existence values that must be specified in order to determine the costs and benefits of
policies); cf KEN KOLLMAN, ET AL, A COMPARISON OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN A
TIEBOUT MODEL 4-5 (1995)("The system of policy choices by government and jurisdictional
choices by citizens [regarding public goods] can be viewed as a complex adaptive system in
which movements and policies are determined by the preference of citizens and the political
institution. Some institutions may create complex systems which settle into equilibria while others
may create systems which never equilibrate.")(emphasis added).
56. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982)(discussing
monopoly power, externalities, and other market imperfections that affect prices); KOLLMAN,
ET AL., supra note 55, at 3 ("[T]he Tiebout hypothesis does not hold .... More troubling is
[the] result thar[it] can be expected to hold only when the number of jurisdictions is at least as
large as the number of citizens-a rather unlikely situation.").
57. See Regulatory Decision-Making, supra note 21, at 56 ("quantitative estimates of value
... can be highly variable and often controversial. Cost estimates are also highly variable and
imprecise, and they can vary according to the bias of the organizations affected."); id. at 55
("Like health risk assessment, economic analysis involves multiple assumptions and produces
uncertain results."); Esty, supra note 20, at 631 ("environmental regulation operates in a realm
where quantitative welfare comparisons are difficult."); N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop To
Drink Public Regulation of Water Quality, 52 IOWA L. REV. 186. 196-201 (1966) (noting
difficulties of valuing health and environmental risks); Thomas 0. McGarity, Media Quality,
Technology and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46(3)
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 173-179 (1983) (same). See generally Richard B. Stewart,
Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537 (1983).
Cost-effectiveness analysis does not avoid these problems, but reduces the number of
assumptions by eliminating estimates of benefits.
58. See BREYER, supra note 56, at 34 ("paternalism, based on mistrust of consumer
rationality ... plays an important role in many governmental decisions."); cf. KOLLMAN, ET
AL, supra note 55, at 19 ("Democratic referenda, which performed best in the one jurisdiction
model ... yields the lowest aggregate utility [as the numbers of jurisdictions increase] and
proportional representation ... performs second best."). Nor is it always the basis upon which
Congress directs federal agencies to regulate, even if the President may require cost-benefit
analysis to assure that the most Kaldor-Hicks efficient option is adopted among statutorily
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"aggregate" the competing political interests of their constituents and
weigh those interests With numerous other considerations, including
their own reelection prospects.59 The informal aggregation of interests
is invariably required because of uncertainties in the measures used
to predict consequences or to assess market prices.' The evaluative
norms suggested by such aggregation will often determine the
resultant characterization of the welfare effects of regulatory policies."
permitted policies. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) ("agencies
should select those approaches that maximize net benefits... unless a statute requires another
regulatory approach"); cf. supra note 6.
59. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REv. 265,
274-90 (1990) (describing how federal legislators enact legislation based on personal incentives
- particularly for reelection - rather than on the expressed politica preferences of their
constituents); Swire, supra note 16, at 96 ("[Mjfagically, the [economic] model assumes that
regulators know the preferences of the citizens in the state.").
60. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT
7 (1994) (risk assessment requires the specification of "default options," i.e., assumptions for
bridging the inevitable gaps in information); Kevin L. Fast, Treating Uncertainty as Risk: The
Next Step in the Evolution of Environmental Regulation, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10627, 10643 (Dec. 1996) ("uncertainty displaces evidence as the driving force for regulatory
action. The ultimate consequence is a shift in the burden of proof").
61. For example, the EPA estimated that the benefits of implementing the Clean Air Act
from 1970 to 1990 exceeded the costs by a factor of seventy, resulting in net benefits ranging
from $10.5-40.6 trillion, with a "central estimate" of $22.5 trillion. The benefits measured were
limited to the value of avoiding premature death ($4.8 million per life saved) and specific
diseases, as well as to the avoided costs of hospital admissions. See Air Pollution: Revised
Report Says Air Act's Benefits May Be 70 Times Higher Than Its Costs, DAILY ENVIR. REPT.
(BNA), Nov. 13,1996, at 3. In the case of premature death, the value of life was derived from
studies demonstrating how people trade workplace risks for higher wages, without regard to the
statistical likelihood that they would have soon died anyway or already suffered from chronic
conditions and without discounting for the fact that the deaths would occur after 1990. Even
assuming the dubious premise that wages reflect accurate perceptions and valuations of personal
health risks, these considerations alone would reduce the estimates by at least a factor ranging
from 4.4 to 9.6. See Coalition for Clean Air Implementation, Comments on EPA's Draft Clean
Air Act Section 812 Retrospective Study entitled "The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act,
1970 to 1990" 2, Attachment 2-7 (1996) (unpublished letter, on file with the author). EPA's
analysis excluded numerous but unmeasured or unmeasurable costs, such as paperwork burdens,
transaction costs of complying with regulations, transition costs of moving or altering production
based on competitiveness effects, and research and development opportunity costs. See id. at 7.
Conversely, EPA's calculations may not properly allocate costs of technological controls to
efficient production rather than to environmental protection. See Robert W. Crandall, et al.,
Clearing the Air: EPA's Self-Assessment of Clean Air Policy, 19 REG. 35, 36 (1996). EPA's
calculation of benefits may have overpredicted: (1) the "baseline" of emissions that would have
occurred absent federal regulatory controls;- (2) the extent to which emissions affected air
quality; and (3) the degree to which reduced emissions improved health. See id. at 37-44.
Conversely, EPA's calculations excluded benefits to individuals other than the persons whose
lives were saved, because such individuals do not normally participate in the decisions to trade
higher wages for increased risk of disease. Markets do not normally exist to price these values,
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2. State-Level Values Versus National Values. In order to
informally aggregate citizens' values, federal legislators should ask
whose preferences for regulation count and how to weigh those
preferences in order to determine the evaluative norms for social
welfare analyses. I shall refer to informal aggregations based on the
preferences of a particular state's citizens as "state-level values." In
contrast, I shall refer to aggregations based on the preferences of all
federal citizens as "national values," even if many of those citizens'
preferences in practice are given little or no weight.'
State-level values are often employed to assess the social welfare
effects of policy. The consequences of a policy for individuals located
outside a jurisdiction are ignored, unless the policy clearly and
substantially imposes external physical harms.63 This limitation cannot
be justified by liberal political theory.' Nor can the limitation be
which in the aggregate could provide a small or a substantial contribution to net benefits. More
realistic upper-bound and lower-bound estimates representing a high level of confidence thus
would likely have ranged from huge net benefits to huge net costs. Such analyses are not
helpful for policymakers or political debate, particularly because they do not discuss the
marginal benefits and costs of existing policies. See id. at 37, 46.
62. Many federal "citizens" do not vote for federal legislators, either because they are
thought unable to form intelligent preferences that are entitled to recognition or because they
do not reside in states and thus are structurally excluded from representation. See, e.g.,
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (felons may be denied the right to vote); Heald v.
District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114* (1922) (federal citizens may be taxed by the federal
government without representation in Congress). Amendments to the Constitution and the
Equal Protection Clause protect individuals from being deprived of the right to vote based solely
on hostility, thereby assuring political aggregation of their preferences. See U.S. CONST. amends.
XV, XIX, XIV, XXVI; Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620,1625-28 (1996). Federal legislators are
not forced to aggregate the interests of children, who do not vote but are affected by an
extremely broad range of policies. Federal legislators routinely take children's interests into
account, even if some do so only because their constituents care. Similarly, they may take the
interests of citizens who do not reside in states into account because their constituents care
about relatives, friends, acquaintances, or strangers.
63. See Esty, supra note 20, at 594,595 & n. 73-74,596 (economic analyses of extrajurisdic-
tional effects may improperly be limited to physical harm to identified property rights; such
analyses fail to consider national welfare effects and exclude consideration of individuals'
preferences based on fear of over-reporting or "moral hazard"). Although the fear of over-
reporting is justified, the wholesale exclusion of external preferences is not. Cf Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprinted in JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 375 (13th ed. 1955) ("I know no safe depository ... but the people
themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a
wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion.").
64. See Romer, 116 S.Ct. at 1628 ("Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our
own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of
its parts remains open on impartial terms to all those who seek its assistance."); David Golove,
Democracy Among States 26-27, 67 n.74 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author) (discussing the commitment of liberal political theory to value pluralism, which requires
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justified on any purely factual basis.65 When- states refuse to provide
political recognition to the interests of out-of-state citizens, moreover,
they-may reduce social welfare by preventing reciprocal bargaining to
establish "efficient" prices for legal entitlements.66
Some legal analysts further argue that federal regulation will
increase social welfare only if states would hypothetically contract -
based on state-level values - for the federal legislation. In many
cases, federal legislation will coerce states to impose policies for which
they would not accept the transfer payments offered by other
states.67 But this contractarian approach assumes ihe appropriateness
equal consideration of individuals' preferences by government; noting that the imposition of the
status quo legal order is not value-neutral because it is biased against change and thus does not
treat individuals' preferences equally); cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964); Baker &
Dinkin, supra note 15 (noting that the Equal Protection Clause prevents states from adopting
forms of government similar to the Senate); Mark Tushnet, What Then Is The American?, 38
ARIz. L. REv. 873, 878 (1996) (liberal political theory is not committed to a universal ordering
of values that would preclude value pluralism); supra note 58; but see Stewart, supra note 7, at
1216 n.77 ("a congressional power to regulate a person's activity because it is distasteful to
others (an 'external preference') might be opposed as constituting a potential threat to individual
self-development and diversity, and inconsistent with the premises of a liberal society, in which
government limits its concerns to the allocation of material goods and advantages.")
65. Absent sufficient countervailing benefits, social welfare is clearly reduced by psychologi-
cal (moral) harm. See Esty, supra note 20, at 595 (psychological externalities are real; the
relevant question is "whether those suffering the harm have a legitimate interest in the policy
decision made elsewhere... [i.e.], have a right to have their feelings factored into the policy
calculus."). Even purely psychological harms may have physical manifestations. But cf.
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766,775 (1983) (rejecting
a challenge to the restart of the Three Mile Island nuclear power reactor; holding that the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission was not required to consider the damage to health caused by
fear of the risk of physical harm). Whether conduct is harmful or merely distasteful is thus a
political dispute over value, as are most federalism disputes. The cause or magnitude of the
harm is less often in dispute than the legitimacy of the claims to protection. But cf. Esty, supra
note 20, at 575 n.14, 586 & n.49, 587 & n.50 (serious regulatory failures and nonoptimal policies
are explained more by the failure to comprehend causal connections and other factual errors
than by political disputes over value).
66. See Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 706-08, 709 & nn.18-20, 710 & n.22 (1996) (property
rules may inefficiently prevent "successive and reciprocal taking options" that would provide "a
more or less orderly indication of the parties' comparative valuations of the entitlement"). Out-
of-state citizens will not vote (directly or indirectly) for the state judges, legislators, or
administrators who establish state law property rights and thus are unlikely to receive
entitlements with which they can bargain. Similarly, out-of-state citizens will not be able to exert
political pressure to establish their option priorities. Thus, political exclusion will not generate
an "orderly indication" of comparative value.
67. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 15 (preemptive federal legislation is "intuitively" likely
to decrease welfare because it will impose conditions that in most cases would not result from
voluntary transfers among states); Wallace E. Oates, Federalism and Government Finance, in
MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE 144 (John M. Quigley & Eugene Smolensky, eds. 1994) (The benefits
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of excluding external preferences from the measure of in-state social
welfare. When national values are applied, federal legislation may
convey net benefits even in states that view such -legislation as
imposing net burdens." The contractarian approach also improperly
suggests that the federal redistribution of wealth is a harm from which
state citizens should possess the right to be protected.69
The state-level values approach, moreover, is intelligible only if
political decision-making should be based on "efficiency" and then
only in regard to federal Senators. Senators are elected by all of a
state's citizens and thus may be obligated to consider the preferences
of all of their constituents.7 ° At least such analysis is consistent with
liberal political theory.7  In contrast, members of the House of
and costs of many pollutants "are regional or local in character"; a "first-best outcome" thus
involves "jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction" standard setting).
68. But cf. Baker, supra note 36, at 1935-47 (describing the redistribution of wealth that
results from federal taxation that depletes potential sources of state revenue).
69. See Esty, supra note 20, at 611-12 (such arguments narrowly define political
communities and improperly reject legitimate claims of right). Because Congress may legally
adopt policies that discriminate territorially, redistribution poses principally moral rather than
legal concerns. See Gerald N. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-
Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261,267-331 (1987); Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View
of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 220 & n.59
("Uniformity [of federal law] need not be viewed as constitutional requirement, but can instead
be seen as a constitutional option committed to the discretion of Congress."); cf. Golove, supra
note 64, at 58 (describing the self-interest of nonliberal states - such as theocracies - as
requiring protection of their values from central dictation, rendering such governments unwilling
to cede sovereignty); PRINCE BISMARCK, REMINISCENCES OF THE KING OF ROUMANIA 170
(Sidney Whitman ed. 1899) ("The peculiarities of each separate country forming the empire will
always be respected and interference with their internal affairs must be avoided .... ").
Redistribution poses serious moral concern and may create legal claims when it is based on
unequal political representation. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 15 (existing representation
in the Senate provides citizens with unequal power to influence the redistribution of wealth and
dilutes the voting power of distinctive minority groups). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1718 (1984) (discussing problems of
substantive due process review of legislation in regard to political power and wealth transfers).
70. It is arguable, however, that Senators should identify more with the level of government
in which they participate than with the constituents electing them. But cf. Nagel, supra note 32,
at 851 (criticizing the Supreme Court for claiming that elected federal legislators owe their
allegiance to the nation and not to the states). Further, Senators may support federal regulation
because they believe: (1) that they are better able to assess state-level values than state
legislators representing particular localities; or (2) that the federal government will better
effectuate their constituents' interests by imposing state-level values on other states or will better
protect those interests by preventing other states from directly imposing values on their
constituents.
71. If states were to possess interests identifiably distinct from the preferences of their
citizens, Senators might need to determine whether their loyalty is owed to the state or to their
constituents. Cf. Golove, supra note 64, at 26-30, 31 & n.44 (discussing the inability to identify
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Representatives should not employ state-level values to assess the
social welfare effects of federal legislation, but should apply "district-
level values." By effectuating the preferences of all of the citizens of
a state, Representatives may prejudice the interests of their constitu-
ents.
72
But even Senators who are concerned about efficiency should not
always apply state-level values. Senators will not increase social
welfare by effectuating the irrational or immoral preferences of their
constituents.73 Whatever the theoretical merit of refusing to com-
pare utility functions, all societies routinely reject individual prefer-
ences as the ultimate measure of value. 4  The Constitution itself
established republicanism rather than direct democracy and provided
for judicial review of legislation in order to assure paternalistic
restraints on an arbitrary, capricious, and abusive popular will.7'
The state-level values approach to social welfare is thus theoreti-
cally incoherent. To preserve willingness-to-pay as the basis for
assessing value, interpersonal utility comparisons cannot be made.
Because jurisdictional lines are historically arbitrary, the preferences
distinct interests of "juridical" international states by deriving a list of the basic goods that all
states would desire). See generally JOHN, RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
72. Representatives may often believe that the interests of their constituents will be
advanced by promoting state regulatory prerogatives. But they may just as often believe
otherwise. Substantial normative diversity exists within many states. See Rubin & Feeley, supra
note 3, at 916, 919-20 (given substantial local variation, the political interests and values of
particular localities may often receive greater support or protection from the federal government
than from states); Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 158 (heterogenous states "face relentless issues
of intrastate governmental variety and conflict"; conflicts internal to states may impede effective
state competition and prevent useful state collaboration).
73. See Revesz, supra note 14, at 1235 n.81, 1243 & n.114, 1244 & nn.115-16 (states may
irrationally "overvalue" environmental protection benefits in a land use 'context and
"undervalue" such benefits in a regulatory context); cf. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 921-23
(state officials may not act rationally even if they properly aggregate the values of their citizens).
See generally DANIEL KAHNEMANN, ET AL, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES passim (1982) (discussing psychological reasons why people may misperceive reality
or their self-interest). Because they reject interpersonal comparisons of utility, however,
economic analysts may believe that individuals irrationally value benefits and costs only if
willingness-to-pay behavior is inconsistent.
74. See CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 18 ("[E]xternal social costs and benefits.., are not
self-defining and are in fact as narrow or as broad as any society cares to make them."); cf. Esty,
supra note 20, at 576 (property rights are defined by reference to "normative assumptions about
what constitutes an environmental harm or an externality"); id. at 583 (the historic touchstone
of property rights is an undefined conception of "reasonableness").
75. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 603 (1984); Carlos E. Gonzales, Reinterpreting
Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REv. 585, 647-52 (1996).
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of individuals residing outside the jurisdiction should be considered in
the calculus of value.76 Conversely, to preserve jurisdictional
boundary lines as the basis for assessing value, political norms must
be imposed that are not based upon willingness-to-pay." The
dilemma is invariably resolved by federal legislators through political
compromises that reflect neither willingness-to-pay nor jurisdictional
boundaries."
Finally, whatever the merit of adopting a state-level values
approach for individual legislators, legislators from different states will
adopt different sets of state-level values. National political processes
thus internalize the preferences of out-of-state citizens that state-level
values exclude.79 A different measure of value and of social welfare
results depending upon which level of government regulates conduct
within a state. Within the scope of federal legislative power, Congress
ultimately chooses the level of government that may regulate. The
applicable measures of value and of social welfare thus are the but-for
results of national political processes.8"
76. Cf. Joel Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government Institutional
Designs for Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300,1321-22 (1983) ("[I]f no special
assumptions are made about the distribution of decision outcomes or social preferences, there
is no logically consistent decision rule that gives uncertainties zero weight.").
77. Cf. Esty, supra note 20, at 597 ("In attempting to maximize environmental social
welfare, we should be careful not to conclude too hastily that we know the precise boundaries
of the appropriate community and thus whose costs and benefits should 'count."').
78. Political influence and political recognition do not recognize jurisdictionarlines. Cf. Guy
Gugliotta & Ira Chinoy, Money Machine The Fund-Raising Frenzy of Campaign '96: Outsiders
Made Erie Ballot A National Ballot, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1997, at Al (discussing how
campaigns for federal legislative office have been transformed into referenda on national
political issues by competing interest groups, which provide the majority of funding for the
campaigns from sources outside the jurisdiction); Esty, supra note 20 at 639, 641 ("[E]nviron-
mental interests and values are not coterminous with existing jurisdictional lines. ... The inter-
connectedness of modem life is much more extensive and complex than is suggested by a
simplistic focus on pollution impacts within immediately shared physical space or narrowly
defined political borders.").
79. See Swire, supra note 16, at 100.
80. If Congress finds that out-of-state citizens' interests warrant protection and thus adopts
regulatory controls, Congress should not be able to delegate unconstrained federal regulatory
powers to states. See Joshua D. Samoff, Cooperative Federalism, The Delegation of Federal
Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 205, 243-55, 270-80 (1997). In contrast, the
Constitution clearly authorizes Congress to refuse to enact legislation and thus to leave the
specification of policy to states. At least when it refuses to act, Congress implies the political
value judgment, made in national political processes, that out-of-state citizens' interests do not
warrant protection. Except in the limited circumstances of diversity jurisdiction, pendent
jurisdiction, and certain other jurisdictional grants under U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, Congress will
not place federal power behind state policies.
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3. Paternalism and Supermajoritarian Decisionmaking. Many
legal analysts often oppose "paternalistic" federal regulation on the
belief that state normative diversity enhances social welfare." But the
predominant values of a particular state are not self-evidently better
than the predominant values of the nation, even for citizens who
"volunteer" to live within that state.' Similarly, protecting norma-
tive diversity does not self-evidently enhance social welfare.8 3
81. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1231 ("Centralized dictation may represent at best
paternalism, at worst a usurpation of local self-determination in order to advance the interests
or tastes of a social elite."); Lynn A. Baker, "They the People". A Comment On U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 38 Amz. L. REV. 859, 865 (1996) (the structure of representation in
Congress allows federal legislation to be enacted with the support of as little as thirty-one
percent of the national electorate; "In short, in the realm of federal lawmaking, We the People
of this nation do not exist in any meaningful way.... For strong nationalists, the states are so
frightening... because the states give us, the People, too much of a voice."). These concerns
are particularly severe when the government intentionally shapes the preferences of individuals,
because the values indoctrinated will reflect back on future policymaking through politics. Cf.
United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995) ("[I]f Congress can, pursuant to its
Commerce Clause power, regulate activities that adversely affect the learning environment, then,
a fortiori, it also can regulate the educational process directly.").
82. Cf Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1783), in THE WRITINaS
OF JAMES MADISON at 27 (G. Hunt ed. 1901) ("[T]he evils issuing from [state governmental]
sources contributed more to ... the [Constitutional] Convention ... than... the inadequacy
of the Confederation."). A better argument against federal paternalism is that we are risk-
averse. Because federal law will shape more preferences than a particular state's laws, the costs
of federal value errors are substantial. Cf. Yellin, supra note 76, at 1310-11 ("How should one
specify the sizes of the environmental mistakes that society is willing to tolerate?"); but cf. Rubin
& Feeley, supra note 3, at 919 n.67 (criticizing arguments that federalism limits value mistakes;
the purported mistakes occurred in local jurisdictions and thus protection against the mistakes
had nothing to do. with states' rights). But the benefits of federal correction to state value errors
are also substantial. See Rubin & .Feeley, supra note 3, at 934 n.107 (excluding the federal
government from moral supervision "may well permit divergent actions that 'we,' as a polity,
would regard as seriously mistaken."). Whether risk aversion is "rational" thus may ultimately
depend on the merits of the normative disputes.
83. For only one example, most people would now agree that the Supreme Court's decision
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prevents racial discrimination in
public schools enhanced social welfare or was otherwise morally justified, even though the
decision reduced normative diversity. See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 347
U.S. 483 (1954). Further, the Supremacy Clause preempts state normative diversity once federal
rights are found to exist within the Constitution or in federal legislation even if the existence of
such rights is not self-evident. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958) (the Supreme
Court's decisions are the supreme law of the land binding on the states); Evan H. Caminker,
State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement
Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1028 & n.102,1029 & n.108, 1030 (1995) (the Suprema-
cy Clause makes federal law "supreme in-state law" that state officials must recognize and
effectuate; federal law does not merely supersede state law or impose federal requirements).
The point made here is not that federal values invariably warrant preempting normative
diversity but rather that the merits of normative diversity cannotrbe assessed without resolving
the underlying disputes over value. But see Baker & Dinkin, supra note 15 (federal laws that
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Nevertheless, the U.S. Constitution provides substantial protec-
tion for state-level normative diversity. The structure and voting rules
of the Senate assure that federal legislation normally is enacted only
by the representatives of a "supermajority" of the population.'
Supermajority enactment requirements assure that a higher level of
consensus over values will exist before normative diversity will be
preempted. But supermajority enactment requirements do not assure
that the normative diversity thereby obtained will increase social
welfare.85
Further, supermajoritarian enactment requirements are inconsis-
tent with the premises of liberal theory upon which neoclassical
economics and the state-level values approach are based. 6 Again, the
fear of federal paternalism generates support for supermajoritarian
enactment requirements.87 Supermajoritarian enactment require-
ments also may provide stability against legal change, but the benefits
of stability and the values of the past do not self-evidently outweigh
the benefits of change and the values of the present or future."8
do not protect constitutional rights are "the most likely candidates" to reduce social welfare by
preempting normative diversity; "These areas of substantial moral disagreement within our
society are precisely the ones in which inter-state diversity is most valuable and federal
homogenizing legislation will therefore most probably and most greatly reduce aggregate social
welfare.").
84. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 15 (also noting how such supermajoritarian enactment
requirements reduce the power of large population states to block legislation).
85. Supermajoritarian enactment requirements impose costs of foregone, beneficial
preemptive legislation due to increased demands on time for coalition building. See Baker &
Dinkin, supra note 15. But the question posed is not whether the costs of fewer federal welfare-
enhancing enactments due to coalition building are outweighed by the benefits of fewer welfare-
reducing enactments due to supermajoritarian enactment requirements. See id. The question
is whether the supermajoritarian enactment requirement or the coalition building time constraint
prevents enactment of more legislation that would be welfare-enhancing than would be welfare-
reducing.
86. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 15, at 40 n.124 (citing numerous historic and
contemporary sources for the commitment to majority rule). That comfaitment is based on the
entitlement of citizens to equal recognition of their interests by the government. See supra note
64.
87. Cf. Baker & Dinkin, supra note 16 (supermajority enactment requirements are
equivalent to minority rule only if inaction is considered the equivalent of action; "the power
to impose costs on others is importantly different from the power to prevent costs from being
imposed on one's self."); id. (the Constitution imposes supermajoritarian enactment
requirements in a wide range of contexts). But the power to impose costs on others is different
from the power to prevent costs only in regard to who determines what ccinstitutes a cost and
not a benefit. Further, the inability to impose "costs" on others may protect the others' abilities
to impose "costs" on one's self. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
88. See Swire, supra note 16, at-99-100 (discussing "inter-temporal externalities"); Jill E.
Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARv. L REV.
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In sum, national values may not be self-evidently 'correct, but
national political processes impose the applicable evaluative norms for
regulatory policy through supermajoritarian enactment requirements.
Opponents of existing federal environmental laws thus face a substan-
tial normative burden to demonstrate that federal law is no longer
warranted."9  They must convince the representatives of a
supermajority of the public that federal legislation imposes values that
are not now shared by most of their constituents or that are objective-
ly bad.9" If normative consensus can be obtained, however, oppo-
nents need only convince such representatives that federal regulatory
controls and federal bureaucratic implementation are less efficient
than the~state alternatives.91
(forthcoming 1997) (there is no obvious way to balance efficiency and fairness concerns that
attend legal change; a fundamental premise of economic analysis of law is that legal change
generates improved laws; if legal rules achieve a stable equilibrium, subsequent changes pose
greater fairness concerns and higher transition costs); cf. id. (distinguishing legal changes that
prevent harm or redistribute wealth from those that impose social or moral stigma); Carol M.
Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1146-47 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A.
FIscHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)) ("[T]he larger the
relevant 'community,' the more a purportedly norm-driven takings test clashes with Tiebout's
thesis about citizens sorting themselves into their own chosen localities.. . . [A]nother question
... is the most basic of all: whether takings jurisprudence really is just about fairness, or
whether this branch of jurisprudence is also aimed at accommodating regulatory change,").
Further, once federal legislation is enacted, supermajoritarian enactment requirements
discourage the repeal or amendment of preemptive federal requirements in order to restore
,normative diversity or to achieve greater efficiency. But whether the values of the past should
govern the present also must inevitably be resolved by national political and legal processes.
See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is Nafta Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REV. 799, 910-11
(1995) (the point of interpretative arguments to change seminal constitutional doctrines was to
"convince legalists that the constitutional tradition[s] applauded the collective effort to correct
the anachronistic formalisms of the past when modern Americans were demanding fundamental
change."); Thomas B. McAffee, A Critical Guide To. The Ninth Amendment, 69 TEMP. L. REV.
61, 91-92 (1996) (Ninth Amendment debates not only address the possibility of justifying rights-
limitations on the government but how to define the foundations of our constitutional order,
citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798)); cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Jan. 30, 1787), in JOHN BARTLr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 388 (13th ed. 1955) ("a little
rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the
physical.").
89. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994) (proponent of a change to a rule bears the burden of
proof); but cf. supra note 14.
90. Even if federal legislation never imposed supermajoritarian values but was enacted due
to historic defects in national political processes, a supermajority of citizens may not support
repeal. Similarly, a supermajority of states is required to amend the Constitution.
91. See Rubin & Feeley, supia note 3, at 913-14 ("The notion that an admittedly valid
national policy is best implemented by decentralizing its administration cannot support either
the rhetoric of federalism or the remedy of judicial intervention.").
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II. FEDERALISM CONCERNS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Federal regulation may be justified on numerous theoretical
grounds. The application of these rationales, however, depends upon
contested measures of value in the absence of adequate empirical
information. Although federal regulation may seem excessive or
inefficient to some citizens of some states, it may seem necessary or
justified when assessed by the values of some citizens of those or
other states. These federalism disputes over value are resolved in
national political processes that implicitly weigh the benefits of
normative diversity against its perceived costs. Further, analyses of
comparative institutional competence are also plagued by lack of data,
the inability to conduct control experiments, and disputes over value.
The presumptive implementation strategies adopted to achieve
preemptive federal goals are often based on citizen hostility to federal
bureaucracies rather than the "efficient" implementation of policy.
A. Regulatory "Efficiency" Rationales
1. Economies of Scale. Federal environmental regulation may
be justified on instrumental grounds as achieving specified environ-
mental goals more efficiently than could be achieved by states.
Federal regulation may provide economies of scale relative to state-
by-state regulation. Economies of scale are resource savings resulting
from lower "per unit" costs of implementing a specified regulatory
measure or goal.
Economies of scale may (but will not always) be obtained by
centralizing research, standard setting, control-measure selection,
implementation, or enforcement. The federal government can absorb
these costs so that states do not have to repetitively perform these
functions.9" Federal regulation also may provide economies of scale
if the federal government is better than states at recognizing and
duplicating successful regulatory strategies.93  Further, federal
regulation may assure that efficient policies will be imposed, because
92. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1212; Esty, supra note 20, at 614-15.
93. See Esty, supra note 20, at 614 (centralized regulatory bodies may more or less readily
identify particular problems); cf. id. at 616 & n.169 (environmental groups and regulated entities
may transfer information more readily than governmental entities).
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state and local governments may lack the resources or political will to
undertake such regulatory activities.9"
Additional economies of scale may be obtained if the federal
government adopts uniform standards, thereby avoiding the costs of
tailoring requirements to local conditions or activities." Federal
uniform requirements that preempt the field and thus exclude state
and local regulation may protect interstate commerce from burden-'
some and diverse controls, may avoid the costs of regulatory
confusion, and may achieve additional benefits. 6 Regulated entities,
particularly those producing goods for national markets, may support
enactment.of field preemptive uniform federal standards to avoid the
costs of "balkanized" state and local regulatory controls.97 Converse-
94. See Esty, supra note 20, at 615 & n.165 (noting fiscal limitations on states and the
consequent lack of technical competence). It is important to distinguish between efficiency and
effectiveness and thus between two meanings of efficiency. First, there is the instrumental
question of the most efficient means to achieve a specified policy. Second, there is the
normative question of whether achieving the policy through any means is efficient. See supra
note 18. I presented a preliminary analysis of how to make cooperative federalism statutes more
instrumentally efficient and effective at a conference on "Major Issues in Federalism," held at
the University of Arizona College of Law, Mar. 20-21, 1996.
95. See Esty, supra note 20, at 618 n.174 ("[T]he tailoring of regulations to smaller and
smaller subgroups achieves welfare gains by matching policies with local values, but this comes
at the cost of increased administrative burdens. The economies of scale in analytic methods
argue for having the metaquestion of optimal scale answered nationally.") (emphasis added);
James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System-And
Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1230-41 (1995) (discussing how political arguments based
on economies of scale and on the equal treatment of states encourage Congress to adopt
preemptive uniform standards); cf. Hill, supra note 28, at 10255 (describing the complexity and
confusion costs that result from tailoring requirements in the context of hazardous waste
regulation). See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65 (1983). Even analysts who are careful to distinguish the forms of tailoring,
however, assume without adequate justification that tailoring to local values (without considering
tailoring costs) enhances social welfare.
96. See Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1195-96 n.61 (listing Congressional statements regarding
the inefficiency of multiple standards for industrial products); Esty, supra note 19, at 618-19
(noting that multiple standard setting also may be inefficient for production processes; "following
common approaches to a common problem may be particularly welfare enhancing if 'network'
effects are significant."); Fred. C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335,352-
55, 370, 371-71 (1994) (proposing uniform federal rules for attorney conduct; noting existing
conflicts of laws that result in confusion between jurisdictions and burdens on legal practice; and
arguing that local rules fail to protect federal interests); cf. id. at 371 & n.165 (describing
economies of scale in standard setting and enforcement that would be achieved by such
uniformity).
97. See Percival, supra note 1, at 1172 & n.149; Stewart, supra note 7, at 1215 ("Industry
may seek preemptive uniform national standards or controls to escape more restrictive state
controls."). Curiously, regulated entities have not historically argued for federal preemption of
state regulation of production processes. In theory, regulated entities should support complete
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ly, the failure to provide field preemptive uniform standards and
markets may discourage capital investment in environmental
technologies and services that can reduce costs over time."
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of centralization, it is
commonly argued that federal regulation - particularly uniform
requirements - leads to diseconomies of scale.99 Federal adminis-
trative agencies initially may lack financial resources and expertise
relative to their state counterparts who historically have addressed
particular problems or industries.1" State agencies may be more
efficient at establishing controls because they are more familiar with
regulated activities or entities. They may also better coordinate the
target policies with other regulatory activities, such as zoning and
planning.1 't
Although these claims are sometimes valid, relying upon state
bureaucracies, expertise, and resources may often be less efficient
initially and in the long run. Traditional federal regulatory approach-
es may be more responsible for the activities requiring regulation.
federal preemption over the status quo, in which only less stringent state standards or controls
are preempted. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6929,7616 (1994); Jerome M. Organ,
Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards More Stringent Than
Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373,1392-
93 (1995). Regulated entities thus may believe that repeal of burdensome federal requirements
is more likely to be achieved if state regulation is preserved as a "backstop." Cf. Swire, supra
note 16, at 86 n.77 (discussing how coalitions might not exist to achieve more strict state
regulatory standards if federal minimum standards already exist; characterizing such scenarios
as "unlikely to occur"; and noting that the uniform federal standard may still be justified if the
absence of federal standards allows some states to impose no regulations). Alternately,
regulated entities may believe that the benefits of influencing state implementation of federal
policies on average exceed the additional costs of dual regulation. If the federal policy is
imposed over state-level values, state implementation provides greater opportunities to avoid
compliance. Out-of-state citizens, upon whose values the federal policies are based, cannot hold
state officials to account for their failures to implement federal policies when translating
discretionary standards into control measures or when deciding to enforce requirements. At
least (relatively mobile) firms should prefer to reduce the political influence of out-of-state
citizens more than of citizens of their own state.
98. See Esty, supra note 20, at 619-20.
99. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1219-20 (noting "unnecessary or excessive" costs imposed
by uniform federal standards that are not tailored to local conditions); James E. Krier, The
Irrational National Ambient Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L.
REV. 323, 324-35 (1974) (describing how uniform standards may be inefficient, by imposing
excessive costs in some areas and depleting resources needed to impose controls in other areas).
100. Cf. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1201; Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1192-93; Engel, supra note
37, at 1523-24 & nn.174-177; Caminker, supra note 83, at 1006, 1014-15 (federal directives
requiring states to regulate and to implement federal policies may be more effective and efficient
than federal regulation and implementation).
101. See Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1198-1208.
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Consequently, federal bureaucracies may be more able than states or
localities to transfer relevant experience or may be more able to
provide resources for efficient regulatory strategies."° Federal
bureaucracies also may be more able than states to develop or to
retain expertise over time." Federal bureaucracies also are less likely
to oppose the goals specified by federal legislation and thus may
achieve those goals at lower costs.' °4
Further, uniform federal regulations may be efficient if the costs
of tailoring requirements to local factual conditions outweigh the
benefits."05 Evaluating the costs and benefits of tailoring, however,
102. For example, federal subsidies and tax policies may be much more responsible than
state or local regulation for housing and transportation patterns that cause air pollution. See
Alan T. Durning, Department of Sprawl, SEATTLE WEEKLY, June 5, 1996, at 7-9. Altering
federal taxing and spending policies may achieve reductions in air pollution more efficiently than
traditionally local regulatory strategies such as transportation controls. See generally Louise
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 818-19 (1989) ("Arguably, most of
our 'primary' arrangements are 'interstitial' to our federal tax planning... [such as] elementary
purity [laws] ... basic civil and political rights ... [social] services, welfare payments, and
education ... Much of this pervasive federal governance is in the form of case law, notwith-
standing the typical kernel of statutory or constitutional text that may lie at the core of the
jurisprudence. If state governance remains 'primary' in some sense, that is a circumstance of
diminishing real impact on our lives.").
103. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1214 & nn.73, 74 (scale economies of national
decisionmaking and fiscal commons problems for states result in larger, better funded, and better
staffed agencies at the federal level); id. at 1217 n.83, 1219-22 (the broader sharing of burdens
and the greater fiscal and administrative resources of the federal government provide insulation
from backsliding when social costs are imposed and political opposition results). Similarly,
federal agencies may be headquartered in desirable locations and federal jobs may be viewed
as conveying higher social status, improving relative abilities to recruit and retain expertise. Cf.
Esty, supra note 20, at 616 n.168 ("as a general rule, federal officials are better trained, work
longer and harder, and have higher productivity than their state counterparts.").
104. States that oppose the federal goals are likely to increase the costs of compliance
through bureaucratic resistance and increased federal oversight costs. Conversely, federal
bureaucrats are more accountable to out-of-state citizens' interests and thus are more likely to
identify with the federal goals. As a result, federal bureaucrats are likely to exhibit higher
morale when implementing the goals, further increasing their productivity and reducing
implementation costs. See Ellen Nakashima, Virginia Reverses Position on Federal Tobacco
Rules; State Will Enforce ID Checks, Allen Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1997, at Al ("'They're
federal laws .... States don't enforce federal laws,"' quoting comments of a spokesman for the
Attorney General that were immediately repudiated by the Governor); David Schoenbrod, Why
States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards, REG. 18,20-21 (1996) ("The belief that it took
the federal government to make the states act comes from federal officials who claim credit for
what state officials had already been accomplishing .... Given the palpable unfairness of this
condescending partnership, elected state officials often resist federal environmental mandates
.... States and localities, if left to their own devices, would not adopt such a compulsive style
for making environmental policy.").
105. Such tailoring may entail either adjustment to technological and physical conditions or
allocation of control measures among regulated entities. Allocation among regulated entities
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may depend less upon empirical analysis than upon resolving disputes
over the evaluative norms. 6 Further, even if the benefits of tailoring
normally involves disputes over value and political conflicts rather than solely factual
determinations. Federal statutes often fail to allocate the costs of achieving ambient standards
among regulated entities. See David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of
the Clean Air Act, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 740, 743, 769-76 (1983) ("the [Clean Air] Act fails to
allocate among sources the burden of cleaning the air or even to decide, in meaningful terms,
how clean the air should be."). Executive- Order No. 12,866 requires federal bureaucrats to
adopt regulations that maximize net benefits. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51;735
(1993). Federal agency allocation thus may be more efficient than state allocation to the extent
that the former may be based on marginal control costs and benefits and the latter may be based
on political power. (Of course, federal agencies in practice are highly responsive to political
power, particularly when evaluating costs and benefits). In contrast, it is much harder to
evaluate the degree to which federal or state bureaucracies will trigger costly lobbying disputes
and litigation when allocating controls or when tailoring requirements to factual conditions.
State and federal statutes and judicial doctrines will affect the degree of deference provided to
bureaucrats making such decisions. A comparative analysis of the relative federal or state
institutional competence in such tailoring is far beyond the present scope. Cf Rodriguez, supra
note 24, at 162-75 (initiating comparative analysis of state "legislative" institutions). State
allocation or tailoring, however, is likely to be less efficient if state decisions can be revisited and
litigated in federal oversight decisions. Cf. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 260, 261
n.7, 262 n.9 (1976) (rejecting challenges to EPA approval of state implementation plans that
contained requirements more stringent than necessary to achieve federal goals, thereby avoiding
the need for EPA to determine whether state allocations imposed economically or technically
infeasible controls; holding that Congress did not require states and EPA "to expend
considerable time and energy determining whether a state plan was precisely tailored to meet
the federal standards").
106. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 910 n.40 (citing MANFRED KOCHEN & KARL W.
MORIS, DECENTRALIZATION IN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 2 (1968) for a description of
"conditions under which decentralization is more cost-effective than centralization" which self-
consciously assumes externally-imposed norms). For example, uniform technology standards
may impose controls that are not needed to achieve a specified level of ambient quality. Such
standards may prevent regulated entities from exploiting their comparative advantages and thus
from benefiting the public through lower prices. But tailoring technology standards to ambient
conditions also creates "unfair" competition by imposing unequal regulatory burdens on
regulated entities. The value dispute over the entitlement to exploit comparative advantages
renders largely irrelevant any factual comparison of avoided regulatory costs with data-
collection, modeling, and personnel costs. Similarly, tailoring emission controls based on
marginal costs of control technologies may fail to prevent "excessive" pollution by entities that
"can and should" bear the costs of additional controls. Protection of privately owned resources,
however, is less likely to engender these ideologic conflicts than protection of public resources,
because private ownership may be perceived as "committing" the resources to exploitation. Cf.
Telephone interview with J.T. Smith II, Partner, Covington & Burling (Dec. 12, 1995) (noting
that variances are provided from minimum technology standards for hazardous wastes required
to be pretreated before disposal, primarily at privately owned facilities, upon demonstration that
the wastes will not migrate when disposed, see 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(1)(C)(1994); in contrast, few
ambient quality variances exist from minimum technology standards for discharges of effluent
to publicly owned waterways, see 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)&(2)(1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(1994)).
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clearly exceed the costs according to consensus evaluative norms, 7
federal regulatory agencies may be more efficient than state bureau-
cracies at tailoring legal requirements to local conditions." 8
Significantly, empirical data rarely exist to resolve whether
greater economies of scale will be realized by federal regulation or by
state regulation. It may not be possible (or may be prohibitively
expensive) to conduct control experiments in order to determine
relative efficiency initially or over time. Further, the measures of
bureaucratic costs and of regulatory success are subject to substantial
dispute. In the absence of data and agreed-upon norms, Congress
inevitably aggregates unreflective citizen preferences for the level of
government at which to regulate.
Given supermajoritarian enactment requirements for federal
legislation, citizen hostility to national values normally prevents the
creation of or preferential reliance on federal regulatory bureaucra-
cies."° Citizen hostility to federal implementation may also lead to
inaccurate descriptions of modem federal and state legal roles1"' and
107. From my experience representing regulated ehtities, I believe that the costs of
expending additional governmental resources to tailor regulatory standards to factual conditions
will normally be less than the additional costs of complying with uniform standards. But this
does not mean that the net benefits of such tailoring outweigh the systemic costs of increased
regulatory complexity. Empirical studies of system costs are unlikely to be conducted, given the
substantial problems of gathering data from all individuals, firms, and governmental institutions
that interpret regulations and of assessing how they are affected by regulatory complexity. If
tailoring generates net benefits, however, increased regulatory resources will be needed.
Reducing the federal environmental regulatory budget may be counterproductive to efficiency.
108. In order to develop regulatory standards and control measures, federal agencies must
understand the activities of regulated entities and often must make "tailoring" distinctions to
categorize or subcategorize regulated entities. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (1994). As a result,
federal tailoring expertise and efficiency may be relatively high compared to state or local
counterparts. But cf. Esty, supra note 20, at 617 & n.170 (where environmental problems are
geographically heterogeneous, tailoring to local knowledge and normative diversity are of central
importance; "Smaller jurisdictions can tailor their regulatory solutions according to the exact,
location-specific parameters .... Decentralized information gathering, analysis, and decision-
making... almost certainly would improve the technical content of the regulatory process.")
(emphasis added). At a minimum, "tate tailoring will duplicate the expertise developed by
federal agencies when states tailor federal regulatory standards to local conditions.
109. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1240-41 (state citizens may perceive federal regulations to
be more intrusive and less politically acceptable than state regulations); cf. Caminker, supra note
82, at 1044 (requiring state revenue collectors to execute federal taxes "would not only 'avoid
any occasions of disgust to the State governments and to the people' but also would 'save
expense in the collection,"' quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 221-22 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis omitted)).
110. Although federal regulatory controls and federal bureaucratic regulation largely
determine environmental policy, federal laws continue to claim that the primary responsibility
for environmental policy lies with states. Compare Percival, supra note 1, at 1146-71 (discussing
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to atavistic efforts to restore traditional state regulatory preroga-
tives."i Finally, citizen hostility may assure that state implementation
is the quid pro quo for federal legislators to enact preemptive
environmental legislation." 2
2. Political Accountability. Arguments that federal regulation or
implementation is less efficient are supported with political claims
regarding accountability. Federal regulation is claimed to be less
accountable to state and local citizens because it provides fewer
opportunities for public participation."' Dual ,federal and state
regulation is claimed to hide the level of government responsible for
the history of increasingly pervasive federal regulatory controls) and Stewart, supra note 7, at
1196-97 (same) with An Act to Provide Research and Technical Assistance Relating to Air
Pollution Control, Pub. L. -No. 84-159, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (adopting a federal policy "to
preserve and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States and local governments
in controlling air pollution."), as amended by An Act to Improve, Strengthen, and Accelerate
Programs for the Prevention and Abatement of Air Pollution, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 1, 77 Stat.
392 (adding "that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary
responsibility of States and local governments,"), as amended and renumbered Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, title I, § 101(3), 79 Stat. 992, as amended by Clean
Air Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, Title I, § 108(k), 104 Stat. 2468, Nov. 15, 1990,
currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3)(1994) and 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(1994) (similar
language regarding water quality); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(7)(1994) (objectives for hazardous
waste regulation include "establishing a ,iable Federal-State partnership to carry out the
purposes of this chapter and... giv[ing] a high priority to assisting and cooperating with States
in obtaining full authorization of State programs .... ").
111. Cf. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 950 ("[F]ederalism is a neurosis, a dysfunctional
belief to which we cling despite its irrelevance to present circumstances.").
112. By adopting the rhetoric of federalism and by providing for state implementation,
federal legislators may improve their reelection prospects with constituents who are hostile to
federal regulation and may increase their ability to build coalitions with legislators whose
constituents are more strongly opposed to federal regulation. The emotional and political needs
of hostile citizens and legislators will be better satisfied. But the rhetoric may come at a
substantial cost. See Edward L. Rubin, The Structure of Modem Government 11 (1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) ("Unless we explore the metaphorical
structure of our thought processes, we are likely to fall back into familiar patterns, ignore or
misinterpret phenomena that lie outside those patterns, and devise solutions that replicate the
problems that they were designed to solve.").
113. See Schoenbrod, supra note 104, at 21 (federal regulation is less accountable because:
(1) Congress delegates policymaking to unelected EPA officials; (2) voters cannot effectively
hold national officials to account for their resolution of local disputes; and (3) federal officials
may take credit for the benefits of federal regulation but may shift the blame for costs to state
and local officials). All of these rationales assume the debatable premise that officials should
effectuate the preferences of their constituents and thus that lack of accountability is a vice
rather than a virtue.
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policy."4 To avoid political accountability for raising taxes, more-
over, Congress may inefficiently transfer to states and localities
through conditional spending the costs of implementing federalpolicies.115
But a state's political and judicial processes may be more hostile
and less responsive to the state's citizens than federal political and
judicial processes.16  Stte officials may be no more accountable to
citizens than are federal officials." 7 Although dual regulation may
114. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1241; Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1185 & n.10; Bermann,
supra note 12, at 340-43; cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) ("[WV]here the
Federal Government compels states to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal
officials is diminished.").
115. See Baker, supra note 36, at 1935-39 (describing how federal taxation depletes state and
local sources of revenue and how conditional federal spending returns the same revenues to
states "with strings attached"); cf. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1261, 1262 & n.225 (discussing fiscal
commons problems and noting that the price of foregoing conditional federal funds is "far more
potent than would be the case if the only price for nonparticipation in the federal program were
withdrawal of funds for that program alone"). ,
116. See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62,74-78 (1990)
(states may lack institutional mechanisms to assure accountability, such as bicameralism and
presentment; states may lack effective monitoring and regulatory controls similar to those over
federal officers, making state policy decisions less transparent); Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d
869,876-80 (4th Cir. 1996) (EPA had refused to approve of Virginia's operating permit program
for major sources of air pollutants because, inter alia, Virginia did not provide judicial standing
to review issued permits to persons who would have standing to challenge federally issued
permits in federal courts pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution; upholding EPA's
interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6) (1994) and EPA's finding that the state's standing
provisiQns were insufficient); cf. EPA, Memorandum, Statement of Principles, Effect of State-
Audit Immunity/Privilege Laws on Enforcement Authority for Federal Programs, INSIDE EPA's
AIR PERMIT REPORT, Feb. 28, 1997, at 2 ("Some state audit immunity/privilege laws place
restrictions on the ability-of states to obtain penalties and injunctive relief for violations of
federal program requirements, or to obtain information that may be needed to determine
compliance status."). Federal regulation also may increase the accountability of state political
processes, by providing political "cover" to state officials who would otherwise decline to adopt
policies desired by a majority of their constituents.
117. States may be more hostile than the federal government to assuring participation in
local politics, where citizens have the greatest ability to hold officials accountable for policy
choices. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 915. Further, some citizens may vote on the basis
of single issues of importance to them. This will reduce the importance of any difference in
accountability based on the smaller number of issues that state officials may address. Cf. id. at
916 (the argument that states will more likely foster local participation because they are "'closer
to the people' than the federal government" lacks empirical support). Nevertheless, state
officials may be more accountable than federal officials who deal with a greater number of
issues. The question remains, to whom should officials be accountable? Cf. id. at 946 n.158
(rejecting the argument that the federal government will not be accountable for redistributing
costs to states that own public resources because citizens will not be directly affected and thus
will not provide protection for state interests; this concern is only valid to the extent that states
are political communities entitled to be free from federal redistribution; in any event, there are
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reduce public accountability of both levels of government, it is most
likely to do so when states voluntarily participate in federal regulatory
programs. In contrast, threats to accountability decrease as federal
regulation more fully preempts or coerces states to regulate."8
Congress also is less likely to shift costs to states as it becomes clear
that federal implementation is more efficient." 9
3. Experimentation. Arguments that federal regulation is less
efficient typically are supported by claims that states serve as experi-
mental "laboratories" for the development of regulatory policies.
Consequently, states may develop more efficient and effective
regulatory strategies than would a single, centralized regulatory
agency.t2°
But states may be unable or unwilling to expend the resources
needed to conduct meaningful experiments.12 1 States may be risk-
averse and may not experiment unless the benefits clearly outweigh
the costs.12' Many states thus incorporate federal requirements by
reference or adopt federal requirements without alteration." If
many reasons why federal regulation is less accountable than it should be, but we routinely
tolerate those failures); supra note 58.
118. See Caminker, supra note 83, at 1060-67 (rejecting claims that directives to states reduce
the accountability of federal or state officials beyond the Constitution's limits and arguing that
concerns about "blame misallocation," "liability shifting," and "cost shifting" are overstated);
Sarnoff, supra note 80, at 208-10 (delegation of federal power to states intentionally lifts
structural constraints designed to protect accountability and raises more serious concerns
regarding blame misallocation and decreased transparency of decisionmaking).
119. Nevertheless, federal legislators may inefficiently shift costs to states, particularly by
failing to preempt state regulation when it is efficient to do so. The appropriate remedy,
however, may lie less with limiting federal power than with improving federal legislative
policymaking by amending the Constitution to reduce state power and to assure greater account-
ability to citizens in national political processes.
120. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1185 & n.10; Percival, supra note 1, at 1175; Bermann, supra note 12,
at 341-42; Esty, supra note 20, at 615-16.
121. See Esty, supra note 20, at 616 & n.167 (tailoring to local preferences is irrelevant to
technical adequacy to experiment). States also may be unwilling to deploy their resources to
address specific problems and may not experiment unless they perceive 'substantial benefits
therefrom and coordinate with other states to achieve shared goals.
122. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 923-26; cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking
and Reelection Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 605-06, 610-11
(1980) (so long as experimentation has competitive risks, states will free-ride on the innovations
of others).
123. This may suggest that states: (1) perceive the benefits of experimentation to be less than
the perceived costs of tailoring regulatory approaches, including the incremental costs of seeking
federal approval for tailored regulations; or (2) are unwilling to risk losing authority to
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states already view federal minimum standards as excessive, they are
even less likely to experiment. Many states have adopted laws
limiting the ability of their regulatory agencies to adopt controls more
stringent than federal requirements. 24
Further, states may not effectively coordinate to reduce the risks
of experimentation without federal compulsion."z  Coordinated
state decisionmaking will normally require binding compacts. Such
compacts must limit members from voluntarily exiting the compact i
they are to constrain any individual states activities. But such
restrictions are difficult to enforce, even when backed by the threat
of federal compulsion.1 26
Even if states possess the technical ability and willingness to
conduct experiments, however, the success of experiments must be
measured by national evaluative norms." The costs of failed
experiments may exceed the benefits obtained. Experimentation itself
may be an inefficient regulatory strategy. We are unlikely to know
in advance of the choice of state or federal regulation whether
experimentation will occur and will provide the net benefits de-
sired.' 2s
implement federal, regulatory programs.
124. See Organ, supra note 97. at 1387-90; cf. SIPs Seen Weakened if OTAG States Pass Bill
Like Colorado Law, INSIDE EPA'S AIR PERMrr REPORT, Feb. 28, 1997, at 13 ("[B]oth the
Colorado law and the model legislation restrict the ability of state regulatory agencies to develop
state implementation plans (SIPs) that are more stringent than the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments.... "he Colorado law, according to one Colorado Senator, is intended to keep
EPA from deciding environmental standards-for the state.").
125. Cf. Esty, supra note 20, at 591 & n.60, 592 (cooperation depends on the existence of
common environmental norms and roughly equivalent flows of environmental harms).
126. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503,518 (1893) (compacts affecting the sovereignty
of federal power must be approved by Congress and the integrity of such compacts ultimately
is backed by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Ronald Smothers, Waste Site
Becomes a Toxic Battlefield, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9,1995, at A-6 (noting the recent failure of North
Carolina to site a replacement facility for low-level radioactive waste and for the Southeast
Compact to expel North Carolina; this led South Carolina to withdraw from the Southeast
Compact and to reopen the Barnwell disposal site to all comers except North Carolina; South
Carolina's action in turn removed pressure on states to site facilities or to join compacts
providing jointly sited facilities, nullifying fifteen years of cooperative effort).
127. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 926.
128. The relative benefits of experimentation may increase or decrease over time. Initial
federal approaches are least likely to be efficient because of the lack of bureaucratic expertise
and of technical information regarding the environmental problem and regulatory options. But
federal technical and value errors may occur in both directions of regulatory stringency. See
William F. Pederson, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1059, 1073
& n.44 (1981) (discussing EPA changes to initial ambient air quality standards). Although
scientific knowledge and implementation experience will likely improve the efficiency of federal
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4. Cooperative Federalism. Finally, federal regulation may
duplicate traditional state regulatory roles and may impose substantial
costs through "dual regulation." These costs include state and federal
administrative expenditures to coordinate "separate" regulatory
activities and private expenditures to understand and to comply with
two levels of regulatory controls. 29 State implementation of federal
policy, or "cooperative federalism," may reduce the costs of dual
regulation when federal regulation is imposed. 3 ' Cooperative
policies over time, we have no way to know if the initial experiments by states are likely to
deviate from federal inefficiencies in appropriate or inappropriate directions more or less than
for subsequent experiments. Further, such judgments can only be made in hindsight, which can
only occur by presuming net benefits and thus allowing for experimentation. Again, the
appropriate question is whether risk-aversion to diversity is justified, based on the applicable,
national values and thus whether experimentation should be avoided. See John H. Cushman,
Jr., EPA Withdraws Plan to Empower States: Concerns that a plan would save money but would
not help the environment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1997, at A22 (EPA withdrew a plan to give states
more flexibility because "states had been asked only to help develop a mechanism for speeding
the correction of minor inefficiencies in regulation... [T]he proposal could have been used to
circumvent any regulation or statute."); infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
129. See Second EPA Guidance for Development of Clean Air Act Part 70 Applications,
Issued March 5, 1996: White Paper Number 2 for Improved Implementation of the Part 70
Operating Permits Program, 26 ENVT. REP. (BNA) 2156,2156 (Mar. 15,1996) [hereinafter EPA
White Paper No.2] (dual regulation "can result in some of the requirements being redundant and
unnecessary as a practical matter, even though the requirements still legally apply to the source.
In cases where compliance with a single set of requirements effectively assures compliance with
all requirements, compliance with all elements of each of the overlapping requirements may be
unnecessary and could needlessly consume resources."); Approval of State Programs and
Delegations of Federal Authorities, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,262, 62,263 (1993) (dual regulation "may
burden regulated sources and permitting and enforcement agencies for several reasons ....
[D]ual regulation makes [permits] necessarily longer and more expensive to develop and
approve due to the need to specify separate sets of operating conditions derived from both
Federal and State regulations .... [C]ompliance and enforcement costs may be greater because
of two sets of conditions that must be enforced . ... [D]ual regulation may not always be
complimentary and may even be fundamentally inconsistent in instances where the Federal and
State programs may require measures that are technically incompatible."); Approval and
Promulgation of State and Federal Implementation Plans; California- Sacramento and Ventura
Ozone; South Coast Ozone and Carbon Monoxide; Sacramento Ozone Area Redesignation;
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 Fed. Reg. 23,264,23,269 (1994) (simultaneously approving
a state implementation plan and issuing a federal implementation plan to attain ambient air
quality in Los Angeles, noting "at the very least, these parallel planning processes are likely to
create confusion for the public and regulated community."); cf. Caminker, supra note 83, at 1043
(Hamilton and Madison "recognized that the new federal system might engender diseconomies
to the extent that federal law enforcement efforts would substantially duplicate or overlap with
existing state operations").
130. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (applying the term
"'cooperative federalism"' to federal statutes that provide for state regulation or implementation,
with federal bureaucratic backup, to achieve federal goals; Esty, supra note 20, at 623
("implementation and enforcement of environmental policy is done best on a relatively
decentralized basis to ensure that the regulating entity is aware of local circumstances and is
Spring 1997]
262 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 7:225
federalism also may reduce the costs of dual regulation by providing
scale economies at different points in the regulatory process."'
By auth6rizing states to implement federal regulatory programs,
Congress may integrate federal and state regulatory approaches. But
by "yok[ing] the two [levels of government] in an uneasy partnership
in pursuit of a common goal," cooperative federalism approaches may
generate greater costs than benefits.132  These costs include: in-
creased governmental and private resource expenditures to supervise
the intergovernmental relations; opportunity costs of delaying
desirable changes to regulatory measures; and even greater confusion
costs for regulated entities and the public.33
These costs are likely to vary in direct proportion to disputes
over value." 4  The degree to which particular states oppose or
exceed the minimum standards imposed by federal policy will largely
determine the need for federal oversight and consequent increased
"friction" costs of litigation and the differences between state and
federal regulatory strategies and consequent increased regulatory
accessible to the regulated community."). To the extent that states adopt more stringent
regulatory controls, states may as a practical matter impose only their own requirements on
regulated entities, limiting dual regulation. Cf. Swire, supra note 16, at 86-87 (treating as
beneficial the preservation of state abilities to impose more stringent requirements, because it
allows for experimentation and jurisdictional competition).
131. See Percival, supra note 1, at 1174; Esty, supra note 20, at 618 ,(federal technical
standard setting may achieve scale economies and state implementation may optimize the scale
of institutions).
132. Pederson, supra note 128, at 1069.
133. See Pederson, supra note 128 at 1079,1083, 1088-1109 (governmental staff and industry
time are expended, regulatory change to scientific information is less predictable, and legal
conflict and resistance lead to "intricate" interjurisdictional relations); EPA White Paper No. 2,
supra note 129, at 2156 ("Historically, long periods of time have been required to review and
approve (or disapprove) [state implementation plan] revisions .... This situation can cause
confusion and uncertainty because some sources are effectively subject to two different versions
of the same rules."); David P. Novello, The New Clean Air Act Operating Permit Program:
EPA's Final Rules, 23 ENVTL L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10080 (1993) (describing increased costs
and complexities caused by adding federal permit programs to the existing complex regulatory
structure); Timothy L. Williamson, Fitting Title V Into the Clean Air Act: Implementing The New
Operating Permit Program, 21 ENVT. L. 2085 (1991) (same).
134. See Daniel P. Selmi, Conformity, Cooperation, and Clean Air: Implementation Theory
and Its Lessons for Air Quality Regulation, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 149, 165, 166 & n.85, 173,
183 (describing costly intergovernmental bargaining that undermines achievement of federal
goals, noting that the nature of statutory commands is the most significant factor for assuring
attainment of those goals, and recommending various measures to improve shared implementa-
tion of federal policy).
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review and regulated entity and citizen confusion costs. 35 The
increased complexity of intergovernmental relations also reduces the
accountability of officials in both levels of government.'36
Although the costs of cooperative federalism statutes are recog-
nized to be significant,' the question is rarely posed Whether the
135. For one example, in order to avoid the unintended costs of delayed federal approval
of state rules, EPA recently authorized:
permitting authorities and their sources to base permit applications on State and local
rules that have been submitted for [plan] approval, rather than on the potentially
obsolete approved [plan] provisions that they wouldreplace. Such reliance on pending
state and local rules is proper when the permitting authority has concluded that the
pending rule will probably be approved, or when the source believes it can show that
the pending rule is more stringent than the rule it would replace .... [T]he permitting
authority may allow that application completeness [be determined based on] locally
adopted rules including those which would relax current (i.e. federally approved) [plan]
requirements, provided that (1) the local rule has been submitted to EPA as a [plan]
revision, and (2) the permitting authority reasonably believes that the local rule (not
the current [plan] rule) will be the basis for the... permit .... Where the local rule
submitted to EPA as a [plan] revision represents a relaxation of the current [plan]
requirement .... a permit based on the local rule could not be issued prior to EPA
approval of the rule.
EPA White Paper No.2, supra note 129, at 2157, 2162-63 (emphasis added). This effort to
reduce the regulatory burdens, opportunity costs, and confusion is limited to the context of
initial completeness determinations when revised state requirements are less stringent. Further,
it may be inapplicable when serious disputes exist regarding the adequacy or relative stringency
of the revised state requirements. The policy transfers these judgments regarding adequacy or
relative stringency from federal bureaucrats to states (when they are the permitting authority)
and regulated entities. But the question remains whether the benefits of avoiding delay and
duplicative permit reviews outweigh the costs of predictive and valuation errors. Cf. Sarnoff,
supra note 80, at 261 & n.273, 269 & n.324, 270 & n.327 (cases decided under the FWPCA and
the Safe Drinking Water Act have held that EPA possesses substantial discretion not to initiate
withdrawal of approval of state authority or primacy and not to veto state permits and that
individual state permit errors may not justify the transition costs of program withdrawal).
136. See Sarnoff, supra note 80, at 255-80.
137. When EPA recently proposed to reduce the ambient air quality standards for ground-
level ozone and particulate matter, it took the unprecedented step of simultaneously issuing a
separate interim implementation policy and advance notice of proposed rulemaking to address
the complex implementation issues and to develop public input on options to reduce the
implementation costs. See Interim Implementation Policy on New or Revised Ozone and
Particulate Matter (PM) National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS); Notice of
Proposed Policy, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,752, 65,754-762 (1996)(describing as an interim policy how
EPA will apply numerous requirements fdr rulemaking to approve revised state implementation
plans and to apply various statutory provisions to such plans, including attainment dates; "rather
than expending significant effort during this interim period to evaluate whether to retain or
eliminate the various existing and required control measures... States and stakeholders should
focus their planning efforts on moving forward to attain the new NAAQS .... "); Interim
Implementation Policy on New or Revised Ozone and Particulate Matter (PM) National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS); Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 61 Fed.
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federal preemption of - or federal withdrawal from - the entire
field of regulation would be more efficient than cooperative federal-
ism. Reliable analyses of the net benefits of cooperative federalism
to fully federal - or fully- state - regulatory strategies. will rarely be
made. Data will be extremely sparse and costly to obtain. Compari-
sons of the data that exist will exacerbate the jurisdictional disputes
over appropriate values.'38 Similarly, reliable analysis of compara-
tive costs are unlikely to occur when federal regulation does not
wholly preempt state regulation and implementation is kept separate
(but unequal).'39
Even if it will normally allow states to implement federal policies,
Congress may sometimes choose federal agencies to initially establish,
allocate, and enforce control measures."4  But even in those cases,
Congress may provide numerous incentives and opportunities for
Reg. 65764, 65,754-77 (1996)(describing in an advance note of proposed rulemaking the related
scientific and policy questions and implementation options without regard to legal concerns).
138. In addition to the lack of empirical data regarding the governmental and private
resource and confusion costs, see supra note 107, such comparative analysis requires resolution
of the normative benefits of foregone state or federal regulation. The citizens of different states,
however, will likely compromise their values in order to protect them; they will prefer splitting
the baby to risking its loss. Cf. Neuman, supra note 69, at 346 (federal legislation may provide
exemptions to its preemptive effects upon the showing of compelling state interests). See
generally Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To
Facilitate Cosean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995). The result is another structural incentive
for Congress to provide for state implementation of federal regulatory programs, without
considering whether centralized implementation or decentralized standard setting would be more
efficient.
139. Implementation is unequal because federal environmental laws typically preempt less
stringent state regulatory requirements and because federal courts must resolve when conflicts
exist between federal laws and more stringent state laws. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7416 (1994); ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743,745 (8th Cir. 1986) (preempting under the
Supremacy Clause a state ban on treatment and disposal of acutely hazardous waste, notwith-
standing express savings provision of the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6929 (1994)). Cf supra note 36.
140. Congress has historically selected three different generic approaches. Congress may
require federal agencies to adopt and to implement controls and allow or require them to
delegate implementation to states upon approval of equivalent state programs. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. §§ 7411(c), 7412(1) (1994). Congress also may require federal agencies to adopt and to
implement standards and controls and require them to suspend federal regulatory programs
upon approval of equivalent state programs. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), (c) (1994); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6926(b), (c) (1994). But, Congress also may erticourage states initially to adopt specific
standards and programs subject to federal agency approval and in some cases may require
federal agencies to adopt the requisite standards and programs absent such approval. See, e.g.,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a)-(d) (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6947(a), 7410(a) (1994). Incentives for states to
adopt, impose, and enforce the desired standards are provided by the carrot of conditional
federal funds and the stick of backup federal regulation. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a)(3)(C),-
(d)(2) (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6947(b), 7410(c) (1994).
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states to take over implementation, avoiding resort to federal
bureaucracies.141 The presumption of initial federal or state imple-
mentation will rarely reflect well-considered comparative analyses of
relative institutional competence or efficiency, particularly because
Congress does not distinguish among states when establishing its
presumptions. 2
Further, Congress normally requires federal agencies to perform
some comparative analysis, but the evaluations may be limited to
statutory criteria designed to assure minimal state competence to
implement federal requirements. 4 3 Thus, Congress may require
federal agencies to approve state programs and to delegate federal
authorities even after federal agencies have developed substantial
bureaucratic expertise and even when Federal agencies believe that
states will less efficiently or less effectively implement the require-
ments.14  This pervasive resort to state implementation when
federal bureaucracies are more efficient inevitably reduces social
welfare. It may also be unconstitutional. 45
141. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 6926(c) (1994) (providing for interim authorization of state permit
programs to implement federal regulation of hazardous wastes); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(1)(3)&(4)
(1994) (providing a free technical clearinghouse and grants to states to assist development of
programs to implement federal regulation of hazardous air pollutants); cf 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b),
(d) (1994) (requiring EPA to issue regulations defining an approvable state program for issuing
operating permits for sources to comply with federal regulation of air pollution; requiring states
to submit programs for approval within three years of EPA's regulations and subjecting states
to discretionary and mandatory sanctions for failure to submit an approvable program; and
requiring EPA to impose a federal operating permit program within another two years following
the state's failure, providing additional time to states to cure their failure).
142. Cf. Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 175 ("[W]hat should we expect from the national
legislature in creating and implementing regulatory policy, in light of the impact of these
national decisions on the processes of decisionmaking in state and local governments?").
143. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)&(c)(3) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b)&(e) (1994); 42
U.S.C. § 7410(a)&(e) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(l)(5)&(6) (1994).
144. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1994) (directing EPA to promulgate a plan to achieve
federal ambient standards for certain air pollutants only if EPA finds that the state's plan does
not meet specified statutory criteria, which do not address the relative efficiency or competence
of federal and state implementation); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(c)(1)(1994) (requiring delegation to states
of federal authority to implement controls on new and modified major stationary sources of air
pollutants if states submit an adequate procedure to implement and enforce the standards).
145. See Sarnoff, supra note 80, at 255-56, 257 & n.255 ("unitary executive" concerns exist
when states implement federal law, because the President cannot achieve formal compliance with
the Opinions-in-Writing Clause, the Appointments Clause, and the Faithful Execution Clause
of Article II, section 2 of the Constitution; functional compliance with these clauses is achieved
when the President possesses unconstrained discretion to subdelegate federal administrative
power to states and to withdraw the subdelegated power).
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In summary, the determination of whether federal or state
regulation is more efficient is normally a political judgment regarding
the appropriate measures of value made in the absence of empirical
data. If state regulation is "inefficient" because it provides inade-
quate protection or because federal standard-setting achieves
economies of scale, federal regulation will normally be justified.46
If federal regulation is justified, state implementation will normally
result. Although it may specify a presumptive choice of federal
implementation, Congress may inefficiently demand that federal
bureaucracies relinquish their regulatory prerogatives. Conversely,
the costs of the cooperative federalism approaches, adopted by
Congress may undermine the relative efficiency of federal regulation
in the first instance.
B. Interjurisdictional Spillover Issues
.1. Interjurisdictional Spillovers Impose Welfare Losses Whdn
National Values Are Applied. Another reason to enact federal
environmental regulation is to minimize transboundary pollution and
to promote in-state pollution control. Transboundary pollution may
impose negative externalities, or spillovers. In-state pollution control
may impose positive externalities or spillovers. 47 The existence of
146. Federal regulation may be unwarranted only when the benefits of federal policy are
alternatively outweighed by the costs of dual regulation, cooperative federalism, and the loss of
state experiments and normative diversity. It is unlikely that all three conditions will be fulfilled.
Conversely, the net benefits of state to federal implementation may often be outweighed by the
oversight and dual regulatory costs. But this does not in any way suggest that existing federal
regulation cannot be made more efficient. See Schoenbrod, supra note 105, at 789-819 (Congress
could improve implementation of the goals of the Clean Air Act by specifying concrete rules
for private conduct that allocate the costs of attaining the goals among regulated entities, largely
eliminating state abilities to tailor controls to local preferences).
147. See S. REP. No. 97-284, at 16 (1981) ("'Externalities' of the free market are the most
common justifications for health, safety, and environmental regulation, [often] called 'social'
regulation"; defining negative externalities as costs not borne directly by producers and positive
externalities as benefits enjoyed by persons other than the direct consumers). Even if defined
by reference to costs and benefits, externalities necessarily encompass preferences or ideology,
not just physical harm. In theory, there may be pollution or regulatory masochists and thus
pollution or taxation would be a benefit not a burden. But it is precisely because they are
unwilling to recognize such preferences as rational that neoclassical economists can limit their
focus to physical harm. See Revesz, supra note 14, at 1223 n.34 (distinguishing technological
externalities from pecuniary externalities and noting that pollution is a technological externality
that imposes social welfare losses; arguing that pollution standard setting that induces industrial
migration is a pecuniary externality and that pecuniary externalities will not decrease social
welfare because competition will reallocate prices to achieve efficient production levels); cf Esty,
supra note 20, at 594 (rejecting Professor Revesz' argument that affecting the financial
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negative spillovers and the failure to promote positive spillovers
results from a philosophy of individualism that is "a completely logical
and powerful tendency in individual human behavior.'148 States,
which are the collectivity of the citizens of the jurisdiction, thus lack
political incentives to avoid polluting beyond their borders or to
preserve their environment for the ideologic and economic benefit of
others.1 49  Conversely, if neighboring states are economically inter-
dependent, economic losses may also result from imposing stringent
environmental standards.150
Significantly, whether interjurisdictional externalities are
beneficial depends upon which side of the border the evaluation is
made. The inability of neighboring states to tax positive spillovers
may cause states to adopt suboptimal environmental quality standards
when viewed according to national values.1 ' Similarly, the failure
of states to control or to promote spillovers may impose social welfare
losses through resource misallocation among jurisdictions.' Such
failure may also violate distributive moral obligations among citizens
of the nation. 3
circumstances of out-of-state citizens leads to resource misallocation; the exclusion of out-of-state
citizens from the state regulatory market precludes determinations that the market prices
established for the goods produced by regulation are efficient; the market thus may enhance in-
state social welfare but may reduce national welfare through inefficient subsidies).
148. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-Revolution- The Kepone Incident and
A Review of First Principles, 29 U. RIcH. L. REv. 657, 660 (1995); cf. supra note 51. 1 dispute
that the philosophy of individualism is "logical." However, the tendency indisputably is
pervasive and powerful.
149. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1215-16 ("Environmental degradation in pristine areas
often imposes substantial welfare losses on individuals in other states who value the option of
visiting such areas or who take ideological satisfaction from their preservation. A state that
encourages economic development at the expense of environmental quality [also] may inflict
economic loss (in the form of industrial migration or decreased economic growth) on other states
that prefer a higher level of environmental quality. Bargaining among states to minimize the
losses occasioned by such spillovers is costly.").
150. See id. at 1216 n. 78.
151. See id. at 1215 n.77. Opportunities to attract and tax ecotourism industries and
customers may partially compensate for the failure to tax external option values, but will not
address existence values.
152. See Esty, supra note 20, at 626 (physical externalities lead to "a tragedy-of-the-commons
dynamic that promises market failure, allocative inefficiency, welfare loss, and infringements on
property rights" in the absence of interjurisdictional cooperation or central regulation); Percival,
supra note 1, at 1178 (discussing states that do not bear the regulatory costs of limiting trans-
boundary pollution). See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScIENcE
1243 (1968); Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1979).
153. Serious disputes exist regarding yhether jurisdictions possessing abundant natural
resources and high levels of environmental quality are subject to moral duties to preserve and
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Federal regulation thus may be justified to limit negative
externalities and to promote positive externalities. If a majority of
citizens within each state were motivated by a non-individualist
philosophy, federal regulation might be unnecessary. Although hope
springs eternal, rampant altruism has yet to materialize.1 4
Significantly, state citizens cannot know (under a veil of
ignorance) whether they will be harmed more than they will be
helped by negative externalities and by the failure to create positive
externalities. For this reason, risk-averse state citizens in theory
should prefer to place regulatory policy in a federal (indeed a
universal) government. This will assure that their interests will be
considered in regulatory policy formation.155  Because federal
regulators can be held accountable by the (indirect) voting behavior
of those harmed by interstate externalities, federal regulators are
more likely than their state counterparts to force regulated entities
to share their "wealth" for the benefit of humanity or the less fortunate in other jurisdictions.
See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1217 ("public concern with environmental quality ... partially
reflects the sacrifice of preference satisfaction in order to fulfill duties to others, or to transform
existing preference structures in the direction of lessened dependence upon consumption of
material goods and greater harmony with the natural environment."); cf. MENELL & STEWART,
supra note 27, at 1048-66 (discussing public trust doctrines that limit development to preserve
environmental quality for the public at large); but see Krier, supra note 95, at 1234 (rejecting
distributive concerns as a prudent basis for establishing environmental policy). These disputes
extend over time as well as through space. See Swire, supra note 16, at 100 & n.120 (considering
the interests of future generations will require national and international responses); cf. MENELL
& STEWART, supra note 27, at 1066-79 (discussing various federal laws controlling the use of
public and private lands to preserve resources and species for existing and future benefit of
different social groups). See generally Symposium, Agora: What Obligation Does Our Generation
Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 190
(1990).
154. "Self-interest" or even "spite" may be more common than "altruism" or recognition of
moral duties, thereby inducing states to promote negative spillovers and to avoid positive
spillovers. See generally WILLIAM BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL
POLLUTION (1974) (rejecting altruism as a basis for environmental policy); Organ, supra note
97, at 1387-90 (state legislatures may restrict state agency abilities to adopt more stringent
requirements for numerous reasons, including a desire to promote spillovers of negative
externalities rather than internalize control costs); but cf. Rose, supra note 88, at 1033-35
(rejecting arguments that exit and voice do not provide better answers to local problems than
the lack of exit and voice at larger jurisdictional levels).
155. See Golove, supra note 64, at 2 ("As the need for global cooperation across a range of
issue areas grows, so too will the normative and pragmatic arguments for a more effective
system of global accountability."); cf. id. at 22 (John Rawls' commitment to value pluralism
required recognition of non-liberal values and thus Rawls altered the locus of the "original
position" in the context of international relatioifs from citizens to governments, citing John
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LEcruREs 48
(Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley eds., 1993)).
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and state citizens to pay costs to avoid harm and to generate benefits
for other states. This better assures that national social welfare will
be maximized.
But state citizens will invariably have actual knowledge of their
jurisdictional location and of the consequent distribution of resources
and amenities. International "state" citizens thus may be unwilling to
forsake their values and to cede sovereignty, thereby providing
citizens of other states with an equal voice in regulatory policy.
15 6
Given the existence of a federal government and of the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, however, substantial tensions exist
between American citizens' universalist aspirations and their situated
interests.57 Federalism thus reflects the ambivalent commitment of
American citizens to the level of government that protects their values
in particular disputes."'
2. The Significance Threshold For Federal Regulation of
Interjurisdictional Spillovers. Few legal analysts challenge the
theoretical legitimacy of physical externality rationales. The morality
of individualism underlying interstate externalities is fully consistent
with neoclassical economics and liberal political theory. Instead, some
legal analysts argue that interstate externalities are insufficient to
justify the degree of federal regulation of in-state conduct. 59 This
argument is reflected in beliefs that federal judicial protection should
be limited to significant transboundary harms."
156. See supra note 69.
157. See Tushnet, supra note 64, at 878-81 (federalism requires citizens: (1) to be "loyal" to
both levels of government; (2) not to place their primary allegiance in only one of the levels; and
(3) to respect both the "universalist" moral principles to which our nation is committed and the
"value-pluralism" necessary to respect the integrity of states as political entities).
158. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 948 ("claims of federalism are often nothing more
than strategies to advance substantive positions or, alternatively, that people declare themselves
federalists when they oppose national policy, and abandon that commitment when they favor
it.").
159. See Revesz, supra note 14, at 1224-25,1226 & n.53 & 54; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism
and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341,2344,2346 (1996) (the "core
provisions [of the Clean Air Act] cannot be justified by the need to control interstate
externalities. Similarly, the relatively minor provisions directed at controlling interstate
externalities have been wholly ineffective, largely as a result of the failure of [EPA] and the
federal courts to define a coherent and logical body of law. ... [T]he downwind states have
always been unsuccessful at constraining upwind pollution .... [Nevertheless], the rationale for
federal regulation premised on the problem of interstate externalities is analytically uriimpeach-
able").
160. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1227 ("a state should not be entitled to invoke the principle
of local self-determination against federal controls where that state generates significant
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Limiting federal intervention to significant harms protects norma-
tive diversity.'6' Similarly, imposing a significance threshold reduces
concerns that citizens will overstate their preferences for in-state
regulation. 62 Further, the significance threshold allows these legal
analysts to admit that normative diversity may sometimes decrease
social welfare, without undermining the claim that normative diversity
generally increases social welfare."c
The limitation of the protection of out-of-state citizens to
significant (and normally physical) harms has tremendous significance
for federalism. It may ground the debate over Constitutional limits
spillovers which impair the corresponding ability of sister states to determine the environmental
quality they shall enjoy."); id. at 1229 (federal regulation to prevent spillovers should require
a threshold of substantial harm higher than that required to justify Commerce Clause regulation
against private individuals, because prevention of spillovers is justified on grounds of protecting
the Union rather than economic efficiency); cf. Revesz, supra note'159, at 2344 n.8 ("existence
... values placed on natural resources by out-of-state citizens . . . . provide a powerful.
justification for federal control over exceptional natural resources such as national parks.")
(emphasis added).
161. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1265 ("Three conditions should be met in order to justify
use of the commerce power to coerce state implementation of national moralgoals. First, the
goals should be among those that could persuasively be regarded as basic in a reflective ideal
of the good society. Second, the goals should be of a sort that are unlikely, because of structural
defects, to be realized under a regime of noncentralized decisionmaking. Third, federal
intervention should promise a substantial contribution to the realization of the goals."); cf. id
at 1230 & n:131 (courts should not attempt to invalidate application of uniform laws based on
spillovers by weighing the competing values to affected states, because it would interfere with
legislative coalition building for such laws).
162. See supra note 63. Conversely, when positive externalities are significant, federal
regulation will normally be recognized as justified. Preservation of the Grand Canyon is
commonly cited as an example of a resource for which positive externalities are significant and
thus where external preferences should be recognized. See Esty, supra note 20, at 595, 639. As
a result, the Grand Canyon has taken on tremendous symbolic importance in federalism debates.
The closing of the Grand Canyon in 1995 when the federal government was shut down as a
result of disputes over the federal budget may be principally responsible for halting the political
momentum of devolution in the 104th Congress.
163. See Revesz, supra note 159, at 2409 (discussing, in the context of significant physical
harms, different tests developed by the Supreme Court to protect out-of-state citizens' interests
under the "Dormant" Interstate Commerce Clause of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; these are:
(1) direct interest-balancing among jurisdictions that maximizes social welfare; (2) presumptive •
protection from interstate harm unless protection imposes costs disproportionate to the benefits;
(3) freedom from discriminatorily imposed harms without regard to cost; and (4) freedom from
any externally imposed harm; citing various cases). Significantly, the Supreme Court has in
some cases been willing to protect out-of-state citizens from redistributive economic harms. See
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (states may not hoard or exclude other
jurisdictions from their natural resources because the natural wealth of states is to be shared by
the nation).
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to federal legislative power.'" Further, when federal legislative
power is found to exist, Congress may wholly eliminate state
normative diversity by enacting preemptive requirements.1" The
significance threshold thus limits the exercise of federal legislative
power.'66
Further, it may not be possible to know whether Congress or the
Supreme Court will adopt a higher or lower significance threshold for
protecting against external harms and thus which institution will be
more solicitous of normative diversity for particular substantive
164. Compare United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624,1626 (1995) ("The Constitution creates
a Federal Government of enumerated powers.") with Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 280 (1981) ("inadequacies in existing state laws and the
need for uniform minimum nationwide standards made federal regulations imperative."). See
also Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 793,
816-22 (1996) (limits on Interstate Commerce Clause power should be found when national
solutions are not needed to address the problem); Weinberg, supra note 102, at 817 (nothing
important to federalism turns on whether statutory law is more "legitimate" than case law;
federalism arguments based on deference to state prerogatives "disregard the inevitability of
judicial federalization when inchoate national policy requires it .... [P]olicy rather than law is
'supreme' under article VI.").
165. See Revesz, supra note 159, at 2394,2396 ("[T]he presence of federal regulation in the
environmental area makes the Dormant Commerce Clause formally inapplicable; there are
simply no constitutional constraints on how the federal government allocates among the states
the burdens of meeting the federal ambient standards."). Of course, Congress need not adopt
uniform standards. Congress may adopt nonuniform standards based on national values or may
restore the operation of state laws that .would otherwise be preempted under the Dormant
Commerce Clause to effectuate state-level values. See supra notes 37, 69; In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545, 550-64 (1892).
166. If legislative power is exercised, Congress will likely preempt the judicial role in
protecting against interstate externalities. Congress will thereby substitute the collective values
of a supermajority of public representatives (or by delegation the values of the President and
subsidiary federal officials) for the values of five Justices of the Supreme Court. Cf. Revesz,
supra note 159, at 2367 (the Carter Administration was more willing than the Reagan
Administration to interpret federal provisions limiting interstate externalities under the Clean
Air Act in order to protect more stringent state regulatory standards from interference). Which
collectivity will make fewer value errors? The academic claim that federal protection should be
limited by a significance threshold is a politically honed moral argument. It is an appeal for
citizens to adopt a liberal philosophy and thereby dismiss the nonliberal moral harms that they
experience. A least in regard to adopting legislation, the Constitution imposes no requirement
of philosophic liberalism. Cf. Toni Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REv. 45,
89, 90 & n.209 (1996) ("Liberalism most distinctively defines itself as a public commitment to
toleration of contested points of view about 'the good life.'... Yet there is a crucial distinction,
at least within a liberal scheme, between government policy that touches on the private
individual sphere - where contested discourse points to judicial activism to prohibit governmen-
tal interference - and government policy that deals primarily with the public sphere - where
contested discourse points toward judicial restraint.").
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concerns. 167  But when the Court protects out-of-state citizens
against interstate externalities, it will not impose uniform standards
throughout the nation. The Court will thus leave states generally free
to establish diverse regulatory policies.1'
167. The Supreme Court may sometimes be more willing than Congress to protect state
regulatory prerogatives. The Court may be less able or less willing to recognize the existence
of new forms of harm and thus will normally adopt a higher significance threshold than Congress
before it will act. Cf. Esty, supra note 20, at 575-81 (discussing the need for regulation that
results from the difficulty of defining property rights that can be protected by courts, particularly
in the face of changing scientific and technical information regarding harms). Similarly, the
Court may be more willing to resolve in favor of in-state regulatory diversity the normative
conflict between the values of localism and of free markets. Most legal analysts agree that some
deference to original intentions, is helpful for interpreting ambiguous provisions of the
Constitution. See Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in the Actual
Performance of Legal Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 495, 495-96 (1996). The perceived
benefits of a common market informed the Framers' desire to adopt a new Constitution. See
CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 567 (1937); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. 1, 153 (1824). But the Framers also believed in relatively rigid distinctions between matters
of interstate and of state concern. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 157 (discussing commerce "among"
states as distinct from commerce among individuals within a state); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Federalism Revisited, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 201,205-09 (1982) (arguing that the Rules of Decision
Act, currently codified at 28 U.S.C. §1652 (1994), was intended to apply state law in federal
courts only for purely local matters). The ambivalence between normative diversity and free
markets results from tensions deep at the heart of liberal theory and thus of economics. Given
the inability to compare interpersonal utilities, economists may be risk averse either to: (1) over-
reporting of external ideological preferences (such as option values), requiring adoption of a
significance threshold before interfering in interjurisdictional disputes; or (2) over-protecting of
internal ideological preferences (including economic discrimination), requiring rejection of
jurisdictional prerogatives to overcome bargaining subject to strategic or holdout behaviors. The
consequence is theoretical ambivalence regarding relative risks of value errors. See Richard B.
Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039,2041
(1993) ("The appropriate response to competitiveness concerns is not autarchy. ... [T]he
solution is a combination of domestic policy changes to eliminate unnecessary regulatory and
liability burdens, and international efforts to move toward partial harmonization of national
environmental measures."). What is missing from the free trade versus environment analysis,
however, is the measure of the ideological benefits of "protectionism," which can only be
assessed by a national or international legislature. See id. at 2041, 2051, 2053, 2056 ("Some
differences in national measures are desirable and will in any event persist..,. The normative
questions include such issues as the extent to which differences in circumstances might
appropriately justify variances in standards, or the criteria for determining whether a government
is responsive to the welfare and values of its citizens."). Significantly, in the international
context, legal analysts do not assume that such tailoring to local preferences is necessarily
beneficial.
168. Although the Supreme Court may, under Dormant Commerce Clause doctrines, protect
state diversity at the cost of social welfare, the value-errors will be limited to the particular
dispute before it. The Court's decision will not directly affect other policies of the same state
or the policies of other states. But the case-by-case approach may also be highly inefficient, by
allowing most states to impose welfare-reducing external harms unless and until individual cases
are brought to the Court's attention.
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Similar concerns over a significance threshold for externalities
exist at the international level. But political and legal institutions do
not exist to establish legislative or judicial protection from interstate
externalities or to resolve the value disputes.169 Lacking a world
government with an international Supremacy Clause, international
environmental disputes regarding interjurisdictional externalities are
resolved through transfer payments, diplomacy and force."'
3. Marketable Permits Versus Uniform Regulatory Standards as
a Remedy for Interjurisdictional Spillovers. Given their commitment
to normative diversity, to a significance threshold for externalities, and
to limits on federal regulation, some legal analysts contend that
uniform federal ambient and technology standards based on interstate
externalities are inefficient. This is because uniform federal standards
are not adequately tailored to the degree of (physical) externalities
transferred among particular states." Although these analysts
169. For example, the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) do not cede
authority for the WTO to impose within national borders the political resolution of free market
and environmental protection norms. At most, the WTO authorizes other members to retaliate
against the norm violator. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, URUGUAY ROUND TRADE
AGREEMENTS: TExT OF AGREEMENTS, IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION, AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1008 (1994)
(discussing the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes:
"It is important to note that the new WTO dispute settlement system does not give panels any
power to order the United States or other countries to change their laws. If a panel finds that
a country has not lived up to its commitments, all a panel may do is recommend that the country
begin observing its obligations. It is then up to the disputing countries to decide how they will
settle their differences.").
170. See supra note 125; Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental
Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 266 (1992) ("even on the most optimistic view, customary
international law can hardly be said to have sufficient scope or content to prevent damage and
provide sufficient sanctions to be directed against the perpetrators of the damage when it
occurs."); Developments in the Law - International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1484, 1505 (1991) ("rules of customary international law rarely specify required behavior ....
Many developing nations, moreover, refuse to consider themselves bound by rules of customary
international law .. "). Existing "soft law" also does not provide enforceable norms. See id.
at 1508 (discussing Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment at 4-7,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 (1972)). Treaties are binding only by consent. See Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in INT. LEG. MATS. 679
(1969). Nations may be able to isolate their economies from the rest of the world or may be
willing to visit privations on their citizens. They may therefore effectively resist trade sanctions.
Conversely, they may believe that externalizing physical harms or imposing sacrifices will benefit
their citizens more than the lower prices their citizens would otherwise pay. Nevertheless,
nations cannot be wholly isolated from physical and ideological externalities.
171. See Revesz, supra note 159, at 2350 (uniform technology standards do not regulate the
cumulative impacts of sources within a jurisdiction and uniform ambient standards "are both
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recognize that such standards could in theory be an efficient "second-
best" regulatory strategy for externalities, they contend that the
failure to address other factors that affect the magnitude of external
harms prevents uniform standards from being efficient in practice."'
Serious complexity attends federal regulation that would attempt
to efficiently allocate controls in regard to externalities that affect
uniform ambient standards. 73 For this reason, these analysts recom-
mend adoption of marketable permit schemes (the best of which
provide tradeable rights to degrade ambient quality within states
rather than to emit pollution). In: this way, the value of the external
harms can be revealed through purchasing behavior, federal ambient
standards will be efficiently achieved, and social welfare will be
maximized. 4
But marketable permit systems do not avoid the need for resort
to political markets to specify the applicable measures of value,
efficiency, and social welfare. At the macro level, marketable permit
systems will maximize social welfare only by assuming the efficiency
overinclusive and underinclusive .... [A]mbient standards are overinclusive because they
require a state to restrict pollution that has only in-state consequences .... Conversely, the
federal ambient air-quality standards -are underinclusive .... because a state could meet the
applicable emission standards but nonetheless export a great deal of pollution to downwind
states.").
172. See Revesz, supra note 159, at 2351 ("The federal ambient and emissions standards
could perhaps be justified as a second-best means by which to reduce the problem of
uncontrolled interstate externalities .... Such a view, however, is incorrect as a matter of both
theory and empirical observation. The amount of aggregate emissions is not the only variable
that affects the level of interstate externalities; ... Second, the level of interstate externalities
is affected by the location of the sources."). See generally R.G. Lipsey & R.K. Lancaster, The
General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956-57).
173. See Revesz, supra note 159, at 2375,2381,2386,2387-94 (explaining different efficiency
calculations for different conditions relative to federal minimum standards). Further, welfare
will be maximized in regard to more stringent state standards by performing similar calculations,
but only if the benefits of effectuating citizen preferences in the downwind jurisdiction for such
standards exceed the costs imposed in upwind states. See Revesz, supra note 159, at 2393. But
unlike national ambient standards, no political "market" will exist to aggregate these
interjurisdictional preferences in order to assess the costs and benefits. Similarly, no economic
market will exist to price the benefits of increased regulatory stringency in the downwind
jurisdiction and the costs imposed in the upwind jurisdiction will vary depending upon the
allocation of legal rights to pollute beyond its borders.
174. See Revesz, supra note 159, at 2410-13 (by adopting marketable permit schemes, states
and firms can purchase margins for growth measured in units of environmental degradation; the
number of such permits will be determined by reference to the ambient standards that need to
be met; trading will assure that the desired ratio of marginal costs and marginal benefits is
realized, or additional trades will occur, nonmarket mechanisms of central planning to allocate
the rights "would be exceedingly cumbersome."); MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 384-85.
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and morality of the allocation of entitlements specified by Con-
gress.17 At the micro level, marketable permit systems collapse the
size of the "regulatory jurisdiction" performing the cost-benefit
calculus (here, the prices that will be paid for the permits and the
degree to which pollution will occur).176  As a result, external
preferences are excluded from consideration in decisions regarding the
efficiency of particular levels of production and pollution. Marketable
permit systems addressed to interstate externalities should properly be
175. See Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199,203 (1988) (markets
may efficiently allocate resources and production given a particular set of governmental
entitlements, but normative conflict may exist over the ex-ante choice of entitlements and over
the ex-post valuation of the conduct resulting from market interactions). Significantly,
marketable permit systems are~only a means of allocating entitlements among claimants and
over time. Even if the permit system will "efficiently" allocate the pollution reduction burdens
among sources over the time frame relative to a regulatory allocation of control measures, the
overall allocation and timing of entitlements to pollute may be inefficient. If the overall costs of
pollution currently exceed the benefits (including the political and social costs of effectuating the
results of such analyses through regulatory strategies), regulatory prohibitions or more rapid
limitation of pollution rights may be more efficient. (Pollution taxes redistributed to those
affected may be even more efficient). For example, Congress in 1990 enacted a marketable
permit scheme for sulfuric oxide pollution resulting principally from coal-fired electric utilities.
Congress resolved the critical normative disputes by specifying the total amount of pollution that
would be allowed initially, the allocation and initial purchase price for the rights to pollute prior
to trading, the general conditions for trading, the amount of reduction that would be achieved,
and the time by which desired reductions would occur. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651a-7651e (1990).
Specifically, Congress imposed a 50 percent reduction relative to specified historic baselines to
be accomplished over ten years and allocated the initial entitlements (wealth) principally to
existing sources of the relevant pollutants. Subsequent cost-benefit analyses of acid rain damage
have debatably suggested that the initial allocations were overly generous (without regard to
timing), because additional reductions are needed to fully protect sensitive waters from acid rain.
See EPA, ACID DEPOSITION STANDARD FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT To CONGRESS: DRAFT
FOR PUBLIC COMMENT, EPA 430-R-95-001, xiv-xvii, 79-99 (1995). (Of course, the initial
allocation could have been found overly stringent, if different values were applied in the cost-
benefit analyses.) Further, the existence of a marketable permit system may impede political
abilities to adjust entitlements to efficient levels, by suggesting that costs are efficiently allocated
through the trading system. Given the uncertainties over the scientific information and political
valuations, we may be risk-averse to imposing substantial costs of reducing pollution. A
marketable permit system that reduces entitlements slowly over time thus may reduce the costs
of scientific and valuation errors. But it will also reduce the benefits of scientifically warranted
and appropriate control measures. Again, risk-aversion may not be rational.
176. See Revesz, supra note 159, at 2411 (noting that rights to degrade air quality would be
purchased by states and by firms). Thus, the state or firm generating pollution will normally
purchase permits when they are less than marginal control costs. The state or firm will also
weigh the cost of permits against the benefits it will achieve from increased or decreased
production. The state or firm will pollute at the level that maximizes net production and
ideological benefits for it.
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understood as a form of iailoring regulatory standards to "local"
preferences that may not necessarily increase social welfare.1"
Further, uniform federal standards may not necessarily be
inefficient if the costs of administering a regime to allocate external-
ities are substantial. 78  Federal legislation addressing interstate air
pollution externalities (adopted in addition to uniform standards) was
supposedly justified as a more effective means than litigation to
177. The net benefits of increased or decreased production will include the ideological
preferences of the individuals within the state or the firm. See Herbert E. Striner, Zones of
Danger- Values, Decision-Making & Change Ph. 4, at 2 (1997)(unpublished manuscript, on file
with the author) ("The first fundamental fallacy at the heart of classical and neo-classical
economic theory is that all economic decisions are based on a single economic value. And that
value is profit maximization.... The second fundamental fallacy . .. is that the forces that
drive people in the decision-making process are mechanical and, regardless of how selfishly
motivated, must lead eventually to the general good."); id. ch. 6, at 9 (describing how Donald
E. Peterson transformed the decisionmaking processes at the Ford Motor Company based on
personal beliefs and suggestiotis of W. Edwards Deming; "Just think! Here was a company
policy putting profits behind people and products."); Interview by Herbert E. Striner with Lewis
E. Platt, then Senior Vice-President of Hewlett Packard (July 15, 1986) (Striner: "Is profit
maximization ever the sole factor in your overall business strategy?" Platt: "No. Never."
Striner: "What other factors are seen as significant?" Platt: "Growth, market share, protection
of our work force.... Image. Profit maximization is never the sole reason."); Interview by
Herbert E. Striner with E.B. Mosier, then Vice-President for Glass Production of PPG Industries
(July 24, 1986) (Striner. "How significant do you believe the following values are in their effects
on business decisions? On a basis of 1-5 (highest importance). Corporate image?" Mosier: "We
have some very strong values such as a very high ethical and moral standards [sic] in that
context would clearly be a five .... [E]mbarassment is a test that stands well and goes beyond
the legal requirements."); but see Revesz, supra note 159, at 2352 ("[A] firm will take [the
external hbalth] effects [of emissions] into account only if required to do so by a regulator.");
Swire, supra note 16, at 101 (equating firm rationality with profitability). The fact that permits
cost less than marginal controls and that profit can be made at a given level of production does
not necessarily mean that the level of pollution generated is efficient on this micro scale,
precisely because the permit prices may reflect market failures due to externalized harm. See
supra note 106. The marketable permit system, moreover, displaces the political decisionmaking
of federal officials regarding the socially optimal level of production for the particular states or
firms. Whose values are better: the aggregated citizens of the nation, of the state, or of the
firm?
178. Cf. Oren, supra note 27, at 90 (arguing that the increased stringency of uniform ambient
.controls may ease problems of allocating interstate externalities). As noted by Professor Revesz,
ambient standards are incomplete and standards are also needed to address location and the
ability to transmit pollution due to stack height. See Revesz, supra note 159, at 2376-91. But
adding these regulatory measures will be efficient only if benefits of better regulatory controls
outweigh the regulatory costs. It seems intuitively likely that the costs of regulating technology
such as stack height would be outweighed by the benefits. Regulating location is more
problematic, particularly because of the fairness, transition cost, and allocational dispute and
litigation concerns that might attend the imposition of truly efficient location patterns. See supra
note 105. Although marketable permit systems may reduce some tailoring costs of allocation
once the market is established, moreover, a substantial bureaucratic infrastructure is required
which is normally layered on top of existing regulatory controls.
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resolve highly contested externality disputes.179  But even when
Congress had resolved normative disputes over the ambient endpoint
to be achieved (by adopting uniform standards), EPA failed to
allocate externalities by weighing values.' Similarly, voluntary
state efforts to address these externalities to date have not resolved
the externality disputes, even when they were limited to achieving
uniform federal minimum standards.'81 The continuing failure to
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (1994) (requiring state air plans for "criteria" pollutants
to contain provisions to limit contributions of pollutafits that would interfere with other
jurisdictions' abilities to attain federal ambient air quality standards or federal requirements to
maintain existing quality that is better than such standards); Oren, supra note 27, at 84, 85 &
nn.389-90, 86-88 (discussing the failure of federal judicial efforts to resolve externality disputes
prior to enactment of the Clean Air Act in 1970; noting that the externality provisions have not
been implemented because of the intensity of the political conflict).
180. See Revesz, supra note 159, at 2372 & n.111, 2373-74 (describing how the federal
requirements in theory could provide for federal allocation of margins for growth by equalizing
marginal control costs and criticizing the decisions of EPA to adopt inefficient allocation rules
or for failing to apply its own criteria); Oren, supra note 27, at 89-91 (noting that the Clean Air
Act's system of ambient and technology standards is not well suited to resolving conflicting state
interests in allocating contrdls in the presence of transboundary pollution). EPA did allocate
externalities, but it did not weigh the competing values. Because allocation is a "zero-sum
game," moreover, Congress may often be unable to enact legislation that allocates entitlements
among states possessing disproportionate blocking power. Given Congressional inability to
resolve the normative disputes on a wholesale basis, it is unremarkable that EPA is unwilling
to resolve them on a retail basis. For this reason, the marketable permit scheme to allocate
externalities proposed by Professor Revesz has some merit; it will at least provide opportunities
to bargain in order to reveal the strength of competing preferences among sources in different
states.
181. For example, EPA recently indicated that it would require states to amend their
implementatidn plans to impose additional measures to prevent interference with other states'
abilities to achieve uniform ambient air quality standards for ground-level ozone. After substan-
tial delays, EPA decided not to wait for the recommendations of a regional organization created
to negotiate ozone transport issues. See Letter from Mary Nichols, Assistant Administrator for
Air and Radiation, U.S. EPA, to Mary Gade, Chair of the Ozone Transportation Assessment
Group ("OTAG") (Nov. 8, 1996) (on file with author); Calls for State Implementation Plan
Revisions for Certain States to Reduce Regional Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 1420, 1421
(1997) ("Notwithstanding significant efforts, the States generally were not able to meet the
November. 15, 1994 deadline for the attainment demonstration [for ozone nonattainment areas]
and other SIP submissions.. . ."). Substantial public concern regarding fairness to states and
regulated entities attended EPA's decision to force allocations before OTAG could prepare
scientific and economic analyses of ozone transportation. See Air Pollution: OTAG Seeks
Assurance that EPA Proposal Will Reflect Group's Ozone Transport Work, BNA NAT'L ENV'T
DAILY, Dec. 12, 1996, at 2; Capitol Hill Questions OTAG Process: Bilirakis Questions EPA's
Upcoming Mandatory OTAG SIP Call, INSIDE EPA's CLEAN AIR REPORT, Dec. 12, 1996, at
2. Although EPA subsequently agreed to consider the results of OTAG's forthcoming technical
assessments when it issues its rule requiring revision of state plans, it has engaged in a high-
stakes game to force states (under the threat of increased regulatory burdens, for sources and
withdrawal of federal highway funds) to the table in order to allocate the costs of achieving the
required emission reductions. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 1423.
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develop consensus norms to resolve interstate pollution externality
disputes suggests that uniform federal minimum standards may well
be the second-best solution.182
C. Race-to-the-Bottom and Race-to-the-Top Rationales
The third reason for federal environmental regulation is to
prevent states and localities from engaging in a welfare reducing
"race-to-the-bottom." Such a race may exist whenever jurisdictions
compete to attract or to retain industry by lowering their environmen-
tal standards."s The race will decrease national social welfare if
states raise or lower environmental standards below levels that
maximize social welfare. In this context, social welfare is normally
evaluated by comparing the benefits to states of increased wages and
taxes with the costs of increased pollution that result from industrial
relocation. 184
Of course, it is possible that states will compete to attract
industry and development by raising environmental standards, thereby
182. Because Congress adopted provisions for EPA to allocate externalities, it expressed the
national value judgment that benefits of retail tailoring of externalities should exceed their costs.
But Congress largely delegated such decisionmaking to EPA without any guidance on how to
resolve the value disputes. Congress thereby avoided being held to account for the results of
EPA's political decisions to promote the values of citizens of particular states in particular
disputes. See supra note 118. Like Congress, EPA has been unwilling to resolve the value
disputes on an individual basis. This may suggest either: (1) that Congress improperly evaluated
the costs and benefits of tailoring and that uniform standards without tailoring externalities are
the second-best solution; or (2) that existing governmental representation is inadequate and
citizens will have to force government officials at all levels to achieve more efficient solutions.
Cf Sarnoff, supra note 80, at 280-81 (political action is required to elect officials who will be
more responsive to citizen preferences and will appoint federal judges who will better protect.
participation rights).
183. The "race-to-the-bottom" is a manifestation of the "tragedy of the commons." Stewart,
supra note 7, at 1211 & rn.65; see supra note 152. For excellent descriptions of the theory behind
corporate charter and environmental races-to-the-bottom and races-to-the-top, see Revesz, supra
note 14, at 1213-1221, and Swire, supra note 16, at 75, 80-87.
184. See Revesz, supra note 14, at 1215 & n.9, 1239-53 (discussing neoclassical economic
models of such competition); cf. Esty, supra note 20, at 628 (noting additional measures of
welfare that cross state jurisdictional lines, such as lost sales for state industries, reduced future
investment within the state, and job displacement); Swire, supra note 16, at 72-80 (noting the
confusion over terminology because a descriptive race-to-the-bottom results in less stringent
standards, whereas a prescriptive race-to-the-bottom results in socially undesirable outcomes).
See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL ECON. 416
(1956); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions:
Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988).
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creating a "race-to-the-top."' Such competition may decrease
social welfare if environmental compliance costs are raised so that
wage and tax losses outweigh the public health and environmental
gains.
1. The Validity Of Race-To-The-Bottom and Race-To-The-Top
Rationales Based On Regulatory "Efficiency." The welfare effects of
interstate regulatory competition are normally assessed through a form
of cost-benefit analysis, in which the responses of producing "firms"
to regulatory policies are predicted and the consequences from the
prices of goods and services in economic markets are evaluated. Very
different assumptions may be adopted, however, in regard to the
existence of failures in the regulatory and economic markets. 6' As
a result, the degree of sensitivity of firm location behaviors to
environmental standard-setting is hotly disputed, as is the degree to
which such standard-setting reflects market prices for the tax, wage,
and pollution control benefits. This is because market failures render
unreliable firm location decisions and state regulatory decisions based
on willingness-to-pay and revealed preferences.Y Normative beliefs
in the absence of empirical data regarding the relative degree of
185. See Swire, supra note 16, at 70 & n.8, 80-87 (state competition to raise environmental
standards may be limited to regulation of mobile products rather than regulation to protect
stationary resources and may occur only if consumers cannot purchase products from out-of-state
producers or cannot use the goods outside the state). The benefits of ecotourism may trigger
races-to-the-top in regard to production standards.
186. Compare Revesz, supra note 14, at 1233-35 (social welfare will not be reduced if the
market for location rights is competitive and if state-level regulation properly reflects
preferences revealed by market 'prices; analogizing efficient regulation to production) with
Kirsten Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is it a "Race" and Is It "to the Bottom?",
48 HASTINGS LJ. (forthcoming 1997) (distinguishing between models based on neoclassical
economic assumptions of perfectly competitive markets and models based on game-theoretic
approaches that assume strategic behavior and market failures) and Esty, supra note 20, at 629-
33 (regulation differs from production because states act strategically and thus regulation does
not occur in a competitive market) and Swire, supra note 16, at 100-04 (regulatory evaluations
of the consequences of environmental policies are routinely skewed to exaggerate compliance
costs and to minimize pollution control benefits; regulation itself is the product of imperfect
negotiations between states and firms that routinely favor the interests of firms, due to decreased
uncertainty regarding valuation mistakes).
187. See Engel, supra note 186 (game theory models assume the market for firm location is
imperfect and crippled by strategic interactions, causing states to establish suboptimal standards);
Swire supra note 16, at 76 (assessing competition "involves not only market failures and the lack
of the 'measuring rod of money,' but also a view on difficult moral issues."); Esty, supra note
20, at 632 (the assumption that governmental regulators "carefully calibrat[e] the price of their
location rights (that is, the stringency of their environmental controls) to get the optimal level
and kind of industry seems farfetched.").
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perfection of economic markets and the correspondence of regulation
to economic market valuatiQns thus largely dictate the policy
conclusions.' 88
Nevertheless, most legal analysts normally agree upon liberal
political conceptions of value. 89  As a result, they may fail to
recognize the critical distinction between state-level values and
national values when used to measure social welfare. 9' The degree
to which state regulators will maximize social welfare in response to
interjurisdictional competition may be determined less by whether
regulators properly match state citizen preferences to firm behaviors
than by whether they should do so.'
In any event, the degree to which regulators will properly match
citizen preferences to firm location behaviors may depend less on
what firms actually do than on what regulators believe that firms
do."9 The one study conducted to date of state regulators' beliefs
aked state regulators, legislators, economic development agency
188. Significantly, many empirical studies exist regarding how firms relocate in regard to
regulatory controls. But these studies cannot demonstrate location errors without regard to the
normative evaluations of the costs and benefits to firms of relocation. See supra note 177. Until
recently, no studies existed which directly evaluated regulators perceptions of firm location
behaviors and how they match actual behaviors. See Engel, supra note 186 (summarizing data
regarding the numbers of firm and state players competing in the interjurisdictional location
market and statistipal analyses designed to model firm location sensitivity to regulatory stan-
dards).
189. See Engel, supra note 186 (game theory is a branch of economics based on liberal
political theory and assumes the instrumental rationality of individuals in satisfying their
preferences, which are ordered and consistent over the range of desires).
190. Neoclassical models assume that jurisdictions should act in the interest of their
constituents, evaluated by reference to the preferences of the median (not mean) citizen. See
Engel, supra note 186 (discussing neoclassical assumptions of the median voter and indistinguish-
able preferences); cf. Rose, supra note 88, at 1032 (Professor Fischel "argues that [local] govern-
ments' very efficiency - their satisfaction of their own 'median voters' - is linked to a
predilection for unfairness to those who fall outside the category.").
191. In contrast, at least some legal analysts may recognize that firm values will not always
be dictated by profit maximization and thus that economic models of firm sensitivity to lowered
regulatory costs may often fail to predict firm behavior. See Engel, supra note 186 (discussing
a study which concluded that variations in regulatory stringency had little bearing upon state
economic prosperity as measured by correlation to constructidn employment; arguing that the
positive correlation of high environmental standards with firm location behavior is plausibly
xplained by the highly skilled and well educated workers for new industries being attracted to
regions offering a better quality of life).
192. See Swire, supra note 16, at 104-05 ("[T]he perception of a prisoners dilemma may well
be more important than whether one actually exists .... [A] prisoners' dilemma may exist, or
the perception of one may exist, but neither is necessary to the possibility that a variety of
measurement and public choice effects are pushing states toward a lower level of environmental
protection than their citizens would prefer.")(emphasis in original).
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officials, chamber of commerce officials, and environmental groups to
rate whether and to what extent concern over industrial relocation
had played a role in state regulatory, permitting, and enforcement
decisions. The study concludes that state regulators' perceptions do
not correspond to: economic models of how firms should respond to
regulatory standards; the degree to which surveyed groups other than
regulators believe that firms are influenced by regulatory standards;
and the degree to which the other surveyed groups believed that
states adjust their standards to induce firms to locate.'93 The study
clearly shows that states raced to laxity. Taken together with
empirical data showing that firms are largely insensitive to regulatory
standards in location decisions, the study thus suggests that states
raced to the bottom. State regulators obtained fewer wages and taxes
than they should have expected to receive in trade for increased
environmental harms.
9 4
But this analysis fails to resolve the underlying question of
whether the state responses, as evaluated by appropriate measures and
correct perceptions of firm relocation behaviors, in fact reduced social
welfare. The study, for good reason, did not attempt to resolve the
value disputes at issue. Thus, we do not know whether state
regulators believed that: (1) citizen preferences are the proper
measure of the value of expected trade-offs between wages, taxes, and
environmental protection benefits; (2) state-level values or national
values provide a more appropriate measure of the consequences of
193. See Engel, supra note 186. Although most respondents to the survey stated that they
did not believe that states raced to the bottom, more than one-quarter to one-third of
respondents (other than environmental groups) claimed that their state had reduced standards
after learning that other jurisdictions provided less stringent requirements. A majority of state
environmental agency respondents indicated their belief that regulatory stringency was very or
fairly important to industrial location. A range of from 12% to 46% of such respondents
believed that their agencies had altered various types of regulatory policies, such as altering
regulatory standards or dropping enforcement, based on location concerns. Other respondents
(particularly environmental groups) indicated differing perceptions, which generally reflected
substantially higher sensitivity of state agencies to relocation concerns. See id.
194. The state did not survey the beliefs of firms. Curiously, however, the study also
suggests that all other respondents (except environmental groups) believed that firms were more
sensitive to regulatory standards than did state regulators. See id. Environmental groups may
be better situated to recognize the importance of non-profit maximizing values within firms that
minimize the influence of regulatory costs on firm location decisions. Cf. supra note 177. If the
descriptions of firm and regulatory agency beliefs are accurate, states either (1) raced to laxity
but failed to lower standards enough to capture the location benefits that were available; or (2)
unintentionally coordinated with other states (through their erroneous perceptions) to limit
competition, leaving the welfare effects ambiguous because of interjurisdictional relocation
market failures.
DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM
their policies; (3) competition for industry is a zero-sum game (rather
than a positive or negative sum game due to international mobility of
capital) and other states would also lower their standards in response
to competition, so that states would not obtain corresponding firm
relocation benefits from relaxing environmental standards; (4)
decisions to lower regulatory standards increased or decreased social
welfare if value is defined by measures other than citizen preferences;
(5) intentional decisions to reduce social welfare by lowering
environmental standards (if they admit to having done so) were
rational, appropriate, or moral; (6) standards were lowered below
preemptive federal minimum standards, suggesting that preemptive
federal minimum standards are insufficient to prevent a race to the
bottom; (7) or field preemptive federal regulation w6uld have resulted
in greater net increases or decreases in in-state social welfare.195
These evaluative uncertainties can only be resolved through national
political processes.
2. The Validity Of Race-To-The-Bottom And Race-To-The-Top
Rationales Based on Risk Aversion To Value Errors. The .traditional
accounts of the race to the bottom assume that welfare will be
reduced if state regulators do not accurately perceive the degree to
which firm location decisions are influenced by regulatory standards
and do not set those standards at the level that generates the greatest
net benefits for state citizens, as best revealed in perfectly or
imperfectly competitive economic markets and as best achieved in the
face of perfectly or imperfectly competitive firm and state interac-
tions.196  The differences between the traditional accounts results
from the technical magnitude of the economic and regulatory market
failures. If they are too great, we cannot know that states will
maximize social welfare when they tailor their regulatory standards to
satisfy their citizens' preferences: 97
195. Cf. Stewart, supra note 167, at 2059 (describing in the international context whether
nations find themselves "at ground zero" because "internal and external constraints" prevent
them from racing). The study does suggest that there is a wide difference of opinion regarding
perceptions and norms. This in turn suggests that state (and likely federal) regulators may make
substantial errors in "informally aggregating preferences and that empirical analyses of firm
location decisions and regulator responses are unlikely to resolve disputes over race-to-the-
bottom rationales.
196. See Swire supra note 16, at 100-04.
197. Even when applying state-leyel values, significant interstate strategic interactions will
therefore warrant uniform preemptive federal regulation. If a particular states' regulators make
evaluative errors of firm location or evaluative errors of citizen preferences due to public choice
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A totally different account of the race-to-the-bottom results,
however, if the relevant measures of value are specified by national
political processes. The application of national evaluative norms will
prevent any claim that states will necessarily maximize social welfare
by tailoring their regulatory standards and levels of industry through
strategic bargaining based on (and which better reveals) state citizens'
preferences.9 ' The application of national evaluative norms will
also prevent resort to the misleading metaphor of "island" and
"competitive" jurisdictions, which suggests the appropriateness of
state-level valuations and the existence of states' rights to be free
from external preferences.'99
The "efficient" response in moving from an island to a competi-
tive jurisdiction based on state-level values may lead to suboptimally
high (or suboptimally low) levels of pollution (relative to wages and
taxes) when evaluated according to national evaluative norms.'
But there will be no way to know in advance whether interjurisdic-
tional competition will generate greater welfare gains or welfare
or other problems that do not apply to federal regulators or other states, nonuniform preemptive
federal regulation should be warranted. This will restore appropriate in-state decisionmaking
in the context of interstate bargaining. But the fact that economic markets imperfectly reveal
state citizens' preferences will not (in this context) warrant preemptive federal substantive
regulation. There is no federal political market that will better evaluate state-level values.
198. See Revesz, supra note 14, at 1229-32, 1236.40, 1241 & n.110, 1243-44 (in the absence
of federal minimum standards, states will achieve some equilibrium level that will prevent a race
to the very bottom; in the presence of federal minimum standards, states will sometimes achieve
more stringent equilibrium levels; if environmental benefits are undervalued or if capital is taxed
suboptimally, these irrationalities should have the same effects in island and compdtitive
jurisdictions). But the irrationalities may affect competition because of public choice problems
within or external to the jurisdiction that affect bargaining behavior. Cf. MICHAEL SUK-YOUNG
CHWE, STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY IN COLLECTIVE ACTION: COMMUNICATION AND
COORDINATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS 1 (1996) (describing through mathematic modeling how
social structures - Le., communications networks - interact with individual incentives, in order
to predict how and among whom collective actions emerge and grow); Revesz, supra note 14,
at 1233 & n.73 or 1234 & n.79 (rejecting as lacking any normative demonstration the argument
that preferences for environmental quality may not be comparable to preferences for the
benefits of firm relocation and thus that states should take into account firm relocation
preferences only if ethically justifiable).
199. See Revesz, supra note 14, at 1216-21 (reciting the traditional account of the race-to-the-
bottom employing the island metaphor to set up neoclassical economic challenges to that
account).
200. The valuation errors become more extreme if the transition to a competitive jurisdiction
causes states to alter their values rather than their regulatory strategies. Resort to the island and
competitive jurisdiction metaphor may alter state citizens preferences for free market values
versus rights to territorial integrity. See supra notes 81, 154, 167.
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losses. 1  Critically, if the nation is not ambivalent between the
forms of welfare losses, i.e., is selectively risk-averse to state-level
value errors, then it will have reason to impose preemptive minimum
or maximum standards that limit normative diversity, or both °. 2
The theoretical dispute over the existence of a race-to-the-bottom
thus resembles the significance threshold for recognition of external
harm. Both vary with the substantive commitments of citizens to
particular values and both weigh those commitments against a
generalized .liberal political commitment to normative diversity.
23
201. By hypothesis, the national legislature aggregates the preferences of the citizens of all
states. Some states should thus establish initial pollution control levels suboptimally high when
viewed from a national perspective. Other states should establish control levels suboptimally
low. In practice, however, supermajoritariin enactment requirements, public choice concerns
and strategic interactions may result in (1) legislation that unstably exceeds aggregated
preferences within any state and (2) all states establishing suboptimally high or low standards.
See infra note 210 and accompanying text. Assuming competition induces laxity of standards,
there is no way to know whether the welfare gains from less suboptimally high regulatory levels
in some states will outweigh the welfare losses from more suboptimally low regulatory levels in
others. If the race is to stringency, the same normative uncertainty remains. Cf. Esty,
supra note 20, at 634 ("Once any party moves off its 'true' optimal level of environmental
regulation - to a standard that is either too high or too low - others cannot be assured, under
the Theory of the Second Best, that staying with their own 'island jurisdiction' optimization
strategy will continue to maximize welfare.").
202. See supra notes 82, 175. For example, if the nation is averse to substantially lower
environmental quality levels and presumably higher employment, it should establish preemptive
minimum environmental standards. Conversely, if the nation is averse to presumably higher
environmental quality standards and presumably lower employment, it should establish
preemptive maximum standards. And if the nation is ambivalent between the direction of value
errors but is risk averse to their absolute magnitude, it should wholly preempt state regulation
to limit variation in both directions. Cf. Esty, supra note 20, at 634 ("[T]he scope for failure in
the market for environmental-policy-determined location rights is significant enough to make
untenable a presumption that regulatory competition in this domain will be welfare enhancing.").
Significantly, in regard to environmental protection, Congress has expressed a primary prefer-
ence for floor rather than for ceiling preemption. See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1994) (preserving state
diversity except in regard to emission standards and limitations on stationary sources that are
less stringent than federal standards and limitations). The nation's citizens are more risk-avorse
to losing their lives from pollution than from starving. The direction of American risk-aversion
may be highly rational, given the tremendous wealth of our country and (at least until recently)
the relentless expansion of the welfare state. If we deplete our resources, our values and thus
our laws may change. Cf. Rose, supra note 88, at 1049 ("[N]orms about resource use may
respond to altered conditions of scarcity .... ")
203. See supra note 158; Esty, supra note 20, at 641 ("The extent of our interest in a distant
environmental harm is also likely to be determined by the scope and severity of the harm itself
and by our confidence, or lack thereof, that those on the scene are handling the problem
appropriately."). Significantly, where we most fear value errors from paternalism, it is at the
"jurisdictional" level of the individual citizen and by distinguishing between public and private
behaviors. The Constitution (or the Supreme Court interpreting it) thus preempts both federal
and state laws that would limit such normative diversity. The First Amendment protects
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If most of the citizens of the states disvalue the conduct occurring in
some states more than they value the freedom of others to differ,
Congress will normally impose floor, ceiling, or field preemption.
The preemptive federal standards adopted to limit value errors,
moreover, will normally be uniform. Comparative analyses of state
and federal values and of the risks of value errors cannot be
performed empirically but are generated through legislative processes
in which states possess (in the Senate) equal voting rights.' The
existence of nonuniformly preemptive federal legislation will thus
reflect either disproportionate political power of the nonpreempted
states (notwithstanding Senate representation), strong and demonstra-
ble factual differences, or more limited, nonuniform value-error
risks.2 °5
D. The Normative Interest-Representation Rationale
Another rationale for federal regulation is to remedy the public
choice problem of underrepresentation of environmental iiterests in
state legislative, executive, and judicial fora.21 As a descriptive
matter, "diffuse" environmental interests may be more successful than
political and other public expression and religious and other private freedoms closest to the
moral concerns about shaping and expressing of preferences. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Similarly, rights to privacy generally or in the home apply to individuals or, at most, to families.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V. Once we recognize that significant psychic or physical harms
may result from such protection, however, we are willing to preempt such normative diversity.
See infra note 214. So that people do not mistake my point, I am not advocating the forced
imposition of a uniform morality. Rather, I make the descriptive claim that the degree to which
we recognize harm will determine the degree to which we will tolerate normative diversity. Cf.
Massaro, supra note 166, at 97 ("[A] commitment to liberalism suggests that, if the issue is
difficult, contested, and suspect, then government should not decide the issue for us, especially
if it involves questions of 'morality.'... My point in invoking this liberal structure therefore,
is not that I think it solves the riddle (or even that I wish to celebrate liberalism).") The risks
of world war, genocide, torture, mass starvation, etc., from imposing a bad morality and from
failing to impose a good one are both too great. Which is more likely or worse?
204. Any empirical studies of self-reported values of state citizens will be subject to serious
challenge both in regard to over-reporting and in regard to how to aggregate the preferences.
Any empirical studies of their values as revealed by existing state regulations will be subject to
serious challenge both in regard to the existence of external harms and to public choice
concerns.
205. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)&(b) (1994) (preempting state regulation of motor vehicle
emissions but preserving California's ability to impose more stringent motor vehicle emissions
upon receiving federal waivers).
206. See Caminker, supra note 83, at 1013 n.44 (state decisionmaking may not maximize
social welfare because of disparities of political power and because local decisionmakers will not
allocate resources according to majority preferences).
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"concentrated" compliance interests' in affecting legislative and
bureaucratic policy at the federal level than at the state level. The
relative degree of political success results from economies of scale and
reduced transaction costs for organizing and lobbying."3 Further,
federal governmental entities may have greater resources or desire
than: states to address environmental concerns. On specific issues,
however, environmental interests may achieve greater representation
at state or local levels than at the federal level. 10
Because Congress has enacted federal minimum standards that
impose requirements more stringent than some states would voluntari-
ly adopt, environmental interests necessarily attain greater representa-
tion at the federal level than in those states. Because national
political processes define the applicable evaluative norms, the
descriptive claim that some states "under-represent" environmental
interests is presumptively a legitimate normative claim. The only way
to challenge the validity of the normative claim is to demonstrate that
the federal laws do not reflect the preferences of a supermajority of
the nation's citizens -- in which case the normative dispute is likely to
be resolved by itself through repeal of the federal law, or that the
federal evaluative norms are objectively bad or wrong -- in which case
the normative dispute becomes a battle to shape citizen preferenc-
207. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1212-13 (noting the differences between diffuse interests
for environmental protection and concentrated interests to avoid control costs); Swire, supra
note 16, at 101-02 (the costs of compliance are highlighted by front-loading in time and being
incurred in tangible ways, whereas the benefits of environmental regulation occur over longer
time frames and are incurred in less tangible ways; the problems are exacerbated by public
choice considerations, because political decision-makers will be affected by the greater ability
of pro-development groups to mobilize to influence decisionmakers, who either may be
motivated to promote public values or may be "captured" or bribed).
208. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1213-15 (noting scale economies and fiscal commons
effects); Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law
in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA
L. REV. 713, 747 (1977) (same); cf Swire, supra note 16, at 101 ("IT]he outlook for passing
environmental laws is much bleaker than the Olson problems, acute as they are, would suggest.
Under the Olson analysis, industry is assumed to know the costs it would suffer and breathers
are assumed to know their potential benefits."); cf. supra note 198. See generally MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECrIVE ACION (1965).
209. See supra note 103; Stewart, supra note 7, at 1214-15 (noting that federal agencies are
less sensitive to imposing costs and are subject to greater "cultural and media encouragement
to take a 'long-run'or 'national' perspective favoring environmental concerns."). The greater
degree of identification with environmental interests also results be'cause the interests are
identified with preemptive federal minimum standards rather than with environmental harm per
se. See supra note 104.
210. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1215; Organ, supra note 97, at 1392-93.
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es." Again, the citizens of states (perhaps unlike Indian Tribes)
lack the option to exit from this political and normative battle.2 12
Further, Congress may not fully preempt state diversity or may
not clearly specify the preemptive effects of its legislation. This will
leave to "unrepresentative" federal and state trial and appellate
judges, subject to varying levels of review by the U.S. Supreme Court,
the normative decisions regarding whether to impose policy on the
states. 21  In such cases, it may be much harder to claim that pre-
emptive federal legislation justifies its existence.2 4
The adoption of uniform preemptive federal standards based on
political underrepresentation rationales, however, may pose even
more serious risk-aversion concerns.2 t5 If federal standards directly
address state political representation processes, the value corrections
will affect a larger range of policies and will thus more substantially
shape citizen preferences.1 6 Likely for this reason, the Supreme
Court has ambivalently interpreted the Constitution to provide
protection of state governmental integrity from federal reorganization
and to limit federal governmental power to specify policy regulating
intrastate conduct.21 7
211. See supra notes 30-31, 73-88 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
214. The Supreme Court's decisions will manipulate interpretation of federal legislative or
constitutional provisions, based upon the Court's identification or lack of identification with the
underlying harms in the cases before it and of the consequent benefits of normative diversity
when it develops interpretations that will apply to subsequent decisions. See Weinberg, supra
note 102, at 839-40 (stating that courts adjudicating legal controversies necessarily strike a policy
balance; preempting federal but not state common law is disfunctional, because we know the
matter is a national policy concern; additional disfunction results from choosing state law to
supply the contents of national policy); Striner, supra note 177, at Ch.9 (discussing how
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes reversed his earlier interpretation - that the
First Amendment provided little protection for political opposition to war efforts - when he
changed his view of the costs and benefits of political dissent). We should be more worried
about the Court's than Congress' value errors, because they are harder to correct. See
supra note 42. But again, the benefits of benevolent dictatorship are correspondingly great. See
supra notes 82, 202-03 and accompanying text.
215. As for competition in race-to-the-bottom arguments, interest representation rationales
are not susceptible to ex-ante determination of the scope of the valuation errors. See supra
notes 201, 204 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 81, 116-19 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 8-11, 36, 39.40, 48.49, 83, 159-68 and accompanying text.
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E. Moral Rationales
Moral rationales for federal regulation self-consciously reject
state-level values, political liberalism, and the benefits of normative
diversity. It is often (albeit inconclusively) argued that preemptive
federal regulation establishes and fulfills moral obligations for the
protection and preservation of environmental quality.
218
Imposing moral obligations at the national level shares more
widely the sacrifices born by consumers and industry and thus helps
to achieve agreement concerning the goals to be attained.2 9
Centralizing moral decisionmaking also makes the sacrifices less
visible and thereby counters "backsliding" when the costs become
visible 2 ° Federal regulation may be inherently more "public-regard-
ing" than state regulation because smaller geographical units will not
formulate sound policy due to factional pressures.2 1 Similarly, the
ability to externalize harms beyond state boundaries suggests that
national (or international) decisionmaking may result in better
decisionmaking.t z Centralized decisionmaking thus may be both a
sufficient (efficient) and a necessary condition to fulfilling moral
obligations, because of the need to preempt normative diversity.
Centralizing moral decisionmaking, however, does not resolve the
ex-ante question of whose morality to impose, including political
liberals' morality of protecting normative diversity.2' The question
thus remains whether national morals legislation imposes beneficial
policies or "unjustified [sacrifices] by those that bear them (in
218. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1217-19.
219. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1217 n.83.
220. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1218-19 (the greater resource base of the federal fisc makes
the connection between taxing and spending less transparent, and makes federal allocation
decisions less susceptible to competing claims); Dwyer, supra note 27, at 236-45 (describing
legislative reelection incentives to enact and retain morally symbolic legislation).
221. See Krent, supra note 86, at 104 & n.148; THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
222. See supra notes 151-58, 167-70 and accompanying text.
223. Professor Richard Stewart thus refers to the work of Peter Berger, "decr[ying] the
insensitive willingness of governmental elites [in less-developed countries] to impose severe
sacrifices on the populace, repressing opposition to such sacrifices on the grounds that they are
necessary to 'development' but will not be undertaken voluntarily, and that once development
has occurred the society will look back upon the sacrifices as justified." Stewart, supra note 7,
at 1221-22. See also PETER BERGER, PYRAMIDS OF SACRIFICE 10-11, 90-91,128-29 (1976). The
rhetoric invokes the metaphor of Egyptian and Meso-American "god-kings" who caused millions
to die to erect monuments to their glory. Cf supra note 71.
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particular poor communities), for the sake of a national elite's vision
of a better society. '
Significantly, Congress may enact "symbolic" legislation, i.e.,
legislation that leads rather than follows citizen preferences. Symbolic
legislation may be overtly paternalistic and based on moral rationales.
But symbolic legislation also may contain provisions that legislators
do not intend to be interpreted literally or goals that legislators do not
intend or desire to be accomplished. This form of symbolic legislation
is strategic, because it may allow for coalition building by legislators
who can later deny responsibility for imposing costs, thereby
providing reelection benefits.' Legislation also may be symbolic
when it fails to provide authority sufficient to achieve its goals.226
Even when legislators do not intend literal interpretation, however,
symbolic legislation may beneficially reallocate resources, demonstrate
public commitment to and thereby inculcate values, and force the
investment of labor and capital to create new and efficient technolo-
gies.227
But the claim that legislation is symbolic is itself a political claim.
Data will normally be insufficient to demonstrate that citizens
honestly or intelligently supported the commitments at the time
legislation was enacted, whether or not their preferences later
224. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1222; see Krier, supra note 95, at 1240-41 (federal sacrifices
have been based on a "foolish" consistency).
225. See Dwyer, supra note 27, at 234, 248 n.63, 249 n.64, 250 n.68 ("The enactment of
symbolic legislation reflects a breakdown of the legislative policymaking machinery," a system
that all too frequently addresses real social problems in an unrealistic fashion); cf Rose, supra
note 88, at 1026-29 (discussing cyclical "legislative due process" resulting from coalition building;
local political processes are too small in scale for such behavior and regulation tends to protect
local homeowner majorities' interests in repose more than new developers' claims to equal
treatment). It is important to distinguish in this context between the public choice concern that
citizens values are properly assessed and the liberal theoretic solicitude for supermajoritarian
enactment requirements. See supra notes 31, 81-88 and accompanying text.
226. The most obvious environmental example is "the national goal that the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985," which remains codified law more
than a decade after the goal was not accomplished. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1994). Congress
did provide authority to prohibit discharges of pollutants without a permit, although it limited
the definition of discharges to releases into navigable waters from "point sources." See 33
U.S.C. § 1362(12)&(14) (1994). But Congress limited regulatory authority regarding conditions
that could be imposed in permits and thus apparently did not intend to prohibit all industrial (or
personal) activity resulting in such discharges.
227. See Dwyer, supra not6 27, at 244-48. Symbolic legislation also may not be undemocrat-
ic. Such symbolism may lead to the creation of coalitions to provide benefits that otherwise
might not occur due to supermajoritarian enactment requirements.
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changed.' Similarly, legislators are unlikely to admit that they
intentionally voted for laws that they did not intend to be complied
with or did not believe were supported by their citizens.229 Further,
federal legislators may be unable to know the costs and benefits of
legislation prior to subsequent interpretation by agencies, states, and
courts. It may not be possible to determine before subsequent
interpretation that the controls are insufficient to accomplish the
stated goals.' ° Nevertheless, it may be wise to distinguish between
the forms of symbolic moral commitments of the public and of
legislators, in order to avoid depleting limited national moral and
legislative resources." I '
The wise judgment regarding whether federal morals legislation
is symbolic and beneficial or strategic and sacrificial must be made by
federal judges interpreting legislation, written in absolute terms, that
was approved by federal legislators who have every reason not to
reveal what they really think. The interpretations imposed on the
nation thus will. impose the inadequately constrained value choices of
federal judges and will rarely be overturned due to a limited
legislative agenda and supermajoritarian enactment requirements.~2
But resistance to the interpretations of federal judges will be
228. See supra note 31.
229. Public choice concerns thus suggest serious underreporting of legislator "preferences,"
in contrast to the fear of over-reporting of the preferences of citizens for legislation. See supra
note 63.
230. Compare Schoenbrod, supra note 105, at 791, 822 ("[T]he clean air legislation is stated
in such abstract terms that if environmentalists do not take principled and therefore seemingly
stiff-necked positions, it is hard to see what protection they are leftwith under the legislation.")
with Dwyer, supra note 27, at 234 (environmental interest groups wrongly treat such uniform
legislation as establishing rights).
231. See Rich, supra note 51, at A13 (noting the irony of spending resources to attack a
company that manufactures tobacco products, "for sponsoring afternoon TV talk shows with
commercials in its food division ... when it is peddling the product that most threatens our
children's health."); Krier, supra note 95, at 1231-33 (discussing opportunity costs in relation to
justice).
232. See supra notes-29, 84-85, 214 and accompanying text; Martin H. Redish, Federal
Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process:An "Institutionalist" Perspective,
83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761, 762 & n.8, 763-68, 788-89, 790 & n.115, 793-97 (1989) (distinguishing
interpretive gap-filling and delegation from federal common lawmaking; claiming that federal
common lawmaking effectively usurps federal legislative power that has not been delegated);
Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723,757-
62 (1988) (judicially fashioned rules or interpretations are not the equivalent of legislative acts,
because stare decisis creates only a binding obligation not to change the law without good
reason). See generally Gonzales, supra note 75.
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substantial and will impose friction costs on the nation.23 The only
way to avoid those costs is to more effectively compel implementation
or to repeal the commitment. The supermajoritarian consensus
regarding value needed to enact such legislation must come from the
nation's citizenry.
Finally, even if moral rationales justify preemptive federal
standards, federal standards need not be uniform and may be
unidirectional. Different types of moralities will suggest different
types of federal preemption. Federal legislation based on deontolog-
ical rights 4 should normally impose uniform minimum or maximum
preemptive standards. In contrast, utilitarian morality based ont
political liberalism will suggest no federal preemptive standards, when
normative diversity generates net benefits, or uniform field preemptive
standards, when net benefits are achieved through economies of scale.
Finally, moralities based on duties or obligations attach to individuals
in particular factual circumstancesP5 and thus suggest nonuniform
minimum or maximum preemptive standards. For precisely this
reason, such moralities may present a better hope of merging our
disputed claims regarding efficiency with our disputed claims of right.
Because Western Europe recognizes positive rights, i.e., duties of
government, they may be ahead of us in regard to environmental
regulation.
III. THE EXPANDED PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
A. The Structure Of The Act And Congressional Motivations-For
That Structure
Initial federal environmental measures were based on perceived
economies of scale in research, funding, and scientific expertise. In
1955, Congress took a "model" approach, providing technical
233. See supra notes 29, 104, 135 and accompanying text; cf. Dwyer, supra note 27, at 288
("[L]egislators and agency officials often have a continuing dialog on matters surrounding
statutory interpretation and regulatory priorities.").
234. Deontological rights approaches typically treat individuals as equally deserving and as
entitled to protection without regard to instrumental costs. Further, rights approaches normally
provide baselines for protection. See supra note 22; WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHics 94-95
(1963). But rights may be in conflict, requiring establishment of "higher-order" rights. Cf supra
note 202. It thus may not be clear in which direction particular measures'of protection may run.
235. See FRANKENA, supra note 234, at 55-62.
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information to states and bolstering state capacities with federal
grants, while declaring that air pollution control was the primary
responsibility of states 36 By 1963, Congress had taken limited steps
to address interstate air pollution spillovers.37 In 1965, Congress
enacted uniform, preemptive standards and controls over motor
vehicle emissions, in part to protect industry from the emerging
burdens of multiple state standards.3 In 1967, Congress issued
directives to statesto legislate ambient standards and to adopt control
measures and programs to attain the standards, subject to federal
approval.239 Congress thereby implied a belief either that relying
upon existing state bureaucratic expertise to address national pollution
problems would be more efficient or that continued reliance on state
bureaucracies was the quid pro quo for legislation.2"
In 1970, Congress revised the motor vehicle requirements. It
adopted "shock treatment" for the automobile industry, requiring
reductions of emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide by 90
percent in 1975, and of nitrogen oxides by 90 percent in 1976.241
The revised, field preemptive motor vehicle requirements were self-
consciously adopted to force the development of technologies that did
not exist in 1970.242 Authority was provided to EPA to extend the
236. See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 242; Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1191 n.27;
supra note 110.
237. See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 241-44; Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1191 n.31.
238. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965).
Following judicial interpretation that the federal standards impliedly preempted state controls
to assure nationwide uniformity, Congress amended the provision in 1967 to make this explicit,
but preserved California's ability to impose more stringent standards, thereby creating a "two-
car" economy. See Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1195 & n.61; 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (1994). Such full
and explicit preemption, however, is rare. See supra note 97.
239. See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 243-44; Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1191 n.31.
240. See supra notes 29, 100, 109, 129; cf. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation
Plans, California (South Coast Air Basin); Plans for Ozone and Carbon Monoxide, 55 Fed. Reg.
36,458, 36,451 (Sept. 5, 1990) ("[M]assive federal intrusion is inherently ill-suited to strike
necessary balances, and.., a state plan has far more certain prospects of success than a federal
alternative.").
241. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see 42
U.S.C. § 1857f-1 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1994)).
242. The statute provided for civil penalties of $10,000 per violation for the sale, introduction
into commerce, or import of each new car that failed to comply with the standards. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857f-4 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7524 (1994)). It is highly debatable whether the
1970 Congress desired the judiciary to interpret the statute literally and impose such draconian
penalties, partictvlarly since it was aware of the possibility that the technology would not be
developed. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 27, at 832-44; MENELL & STEVART, supra note
27, at 296-310. It is thus debatable whether the legislation was strategically symbolic, and if so,
whether it was dysfunctional. See supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
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deadlines for one year if the technology could not be developed in
time.243
Congress also mandated that EPA adopt nationally uniform,
preemptive minimum ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") for
certain ubiquitous ("criteria") pollutants.244 States were to imple-
ment the NAAQS by adopting and enforcing control measures
contained in state implementation plans ("SIPs").245 If SIPs were
not submitted or approved, the EPA was required to adopt federal
implementation plans ("FIPs"). 246 Congress also provided grants to
assure that limited state resources would not preclude effective state
implementation.247
Federal regulation to achieve the NAAQS was based on
numerous rationales. Some have attributed congressional motivation
to race-to-the-bottom theories.248 But it is also clear that Congress
regulated to achieve perceived economies of scale, to remedy
underrepresentation of environmental interests in states that had
failed to achieve desired levels of quality, and to legislate perceived
deontological rights to ambient air quality.249 The federal standards
were to protect health, without regard to cost, except when consider-
ing an "adequate margin of safety."" 0
243. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b)(5) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (1994)).
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (1994)).
Congress also expressly preserved state authority to impose standards more stringent than the
NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1994)).
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1994)). Again,
Congress continued to rely on state implementation. See Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1184 & n.7,
1192 & nn. 33-34, 1198 (also noting that the EPA was organized in 1970, shortly before the Act
was passed).
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (1994)). In
1990, Congress substantially changed the procedures and dates for submitting SIPs and issuing
FIPs, as well as the contents thereof. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c),(k) (1994); Dwyer, supra note 26,
at 1193-94.
247. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c, 1857c-1, 1857f-615(1970) (current versions at42 U.S.C. §§ 7405,
7406, 7544 (1994) (respectively)) (federal grants for planning and implementing state air
pollution control programs); Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1198 & n.79.
248. See Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1195 & n.60.
249. See supra note 26; H.R. RaP. No. 91-1146, at 5 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N
5356, 5360 ("A review of achievements to date, however, make abundantly clear that the
strategies which we have pursued in the war against air pollution have been inadequate in
several important respects, and the methods employed in implementing those strategies often
have been slow and less effective than they might have been .... Furthermore, unless a State
desires to set stricter standards, the time that would be consumed by such States in adopting the
ambient air quality standards will be saved.").
250. See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 257-84; Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Additional, "secondary" NAAQS were also required, based on
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Congress also adopted in 1970 requirements for EPA to
promulgate federal technology standards to regulate emissions from
new or modified large sources of air pollutants ("NSPS"). 1 The
NSPS were more exclusively based on race-to-the-bottom ratio-
nales.1 2 If states developed adequate programs to implement and
enforce the standards, EPA was required to delegate its NSPS
authority to them. 3
Congress also enacted requirements for EPA to promulgate
federal ambient national emission standards for hazardous air
pollutants ("NESHAPs") emitted from new and existing sources. 21'
The NESHAPs, which were to protect health without regard to cost,
were based on similar rationales to those supporting the NAAQS2 5
As with the NSPS, however, Congress adopted presumptive federal
protecting public welfare, Le., preserving public benefits such as visibility and avoiding damage
to ecosystems. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1994)).
251. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-6(a)(1)&(2) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1)-
&(2) (1994); MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 284-296. The NSPS impose uniform
controls within, and nonuniform controls among, categories of regulated sources.
252. See supra note 26; H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, at 5-6 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5356, 5360-61.
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(c) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(c) (1994)); supra
note 145. The Congressional presumption of centralized implementation may be explained as
achieving initial economies of scale, given that the resources required to apply the uniform
national technology standards to the new sources that would occur in the future were
significantly less than the resources required to adopt plans to attain ambient quality levels. See
Letter from David Novello, partner, Friedman, Levy, Kroll & Simonds (Feb. 13, 1996) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter Novello letter]. EPA developed in 1983 a "Good Practices
Manual" describing the criteria and procedures to obtain regulatory approval for the delegated
authority under § 7411 and similar delegated authority under § 7412. The delegation procedures
have become substantially more complex since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, due to
the requirement for states to adopt operating permit programs. See John S. Seitz, Director;
Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Straight Delegations Issues Concerning
Sections 111 and 112 Requirements and Title V, Dec. 10, 1993. Under current policies, states
must assure resource adequacy and authority to implement and enforce standards exactly as
promulgated (although some interim flexibility may be provided if enforcement authority
, "substantially meets" the criteria). See id. at 6-7.
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(b) (1970) (former requirement preserved in current version at
42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (1994)); MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 327-35.
255. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(a)(1) (1970) (former requirement preserved in current version
at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (1994)) (EPA must establish emission level protecting public health,
considering costs only when providing an "adequate margin of safety"); H.R. CONF. REP. No.
91-1783, at 5 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5374,5378 ("The Senate amendment also
provided in a separate section for the publication of a list of air pollutants ... which are
hazardous to the health of persons.... Emission levels must provide an ample margin of safety
to assure public health protection."); Dwyer, supra note 27, at 242-50.
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implementation, allowing states to develop programs and authorizing
EPA to delegate its authority.2
6
Finally, Congress in 1970 impliedly prohibited EPA from
approving SIPs, unless the SIPs also assured the prevention of
significant deterioration ("PSD") of air quality in areas attaining the
NAAQS.17  In 1977, Congress made PSD requirements explicit
elements of SIPs. EPA was to specify permissible "increments" of
insignificant deterioration and to require states to conduct new source
reviews ("NSR") and issue pre-construction permits for new and
modified large facilities emitting criteria pollutants' 8
The original rationale for the PSD requirements attributed to
Congress focused on protection of public health and welfare, similar
to moral rationales for the NAAQS and the NESHAPs.19 Addition-
al rationales attributed to Congress when it codified the requirements
256. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(1) (1994)); Approval
of State Programs and Delegation to Federal Authorities, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,262 (1993). The
presumption of federal implementation may have been based on the erroneous belief that
developing such standards would be relatively uncomplicated and that the standards would apply
to few sources, thereby requiring few federal resources. Cf. Dwyer, supra note 27, at 251-76
(describing the complex history of EPA'regulatory efforts). See generally Howard Latin, Good
Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. REG. 89 (1988) (discussing
problems in evaluating health risks from toxic substances).
257. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1994)
(congressional purpose to protect and enhance air quality to promote public health and welfare
and the productive capacity of citizens); Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.
1972) (interpreting §7401(b)(1)), affd by an equally divided court, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 7470-91 (1982) (current version at42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-92 (1994)) ("Part
C"). The statutorily specified increments for certain criteria pollutants are imposed uniformly
in PSD jurisdictions, but have nonuniform effects given nonuniform levels of ambient air quality.
The permits, in contrast, imposed nonuniform, case-by-case technology-based controls subject
to changing EPA regulatory policies. These technology controls also limited emissions of
noncriteria pollutants. See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 343-45. See generally Oren,
supra note 27.
259. The federal appellate court focused on the congressional statement of policy at 42
U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1994)), the Senate Report
accompanying the bill that became the 1970 Act, and statements of administrative officials
interpreting the predecessor policy under the Air Quality Act of 1967 and testifying on the 1970
Act. See Sierra Club, 344 F. Supp. at 255. Additional legislative history supports the court's
analysis. Se4 eg., H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, at 6 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5361
("Effective pollution control requires both reduction of present pollution and prevention of new
significant pollution problems."). Although the statuiory policy includes enhancing existing air
quality, neither the Congress nor EPA have adopted control requirements to improve air quality
in regions exceeding the NAAQS. It is debatable that the Congressional codification in 1977
precluded EPA from issuing such regulations. Cf. Tennessee Valley Ass'n. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978) (repeals by implication disfavored); 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1997) (EPA's anti-degradation
policy for existing water quality, implemented through permit control requirements and based
on the legislative goals).
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in 1977 include: (1) protecting unique areas from pollution; (2)
minimizing the potential for backsliding on the ambient NAAQS
levels that deteriorating air quality might occasion; (3) minimizing
interjurisdictional spillovers; (4) promoting state regulatory analyses;
(5) maximizing economic growth; and (6) restricting various states'
comparative advantages in competing for industry, similar to the race-
to-the-bottom rationale.26
In summary, Congress adopted the various, provisions of the
Clean Air Act based on numerous rationales. Congress relied upon
economy of scale and uniformity rationales for federal research and
funding, for decentralized implementation of the NAAQS and PSD
provisions (and possibly for centralized implementation of the NSPS
and NESHAP requirements), and for the field preemptive motor
vehicle emission standards. Congress justified tailored limitations tied
to the PSD and NAAQS provisions with the externality rationale and
may have adopted the NAAQS as a second-best approach to the
externality problems. Congress primarily counted upon the race-to-
the-bottom rationale for the uniform preemptive minimum technology
NSPS requirements. Congress used regulatory competition and
various additional rationales to justify the uniform preemptive
minimum ambient PSD increments and nonuniform technology permit
requirements. Finally, Congress relied upon economy of scale,
negative spillover, race-to-the-bottom, normative interest representa-
'tion, and moral rationales for the uniform preemptive minimum
ambient NAAQS and ambient and techiology-based NESHAP
standards.
B. Relevant Implementation History Of The Act
1. The Uniform Field Preemptive Motor Vehicle Requirements.
EPA initially rejected applications of American motor vehicle
manufacturers requesting an extension of the deadlines for the
required reduction of automobile emissions, but EPA's decision was
invalidated on procedural and substantive grounds. 261 Although the
manufacturers developed and installed the technology of catalytic
260. See Oren, supra note 27, at 52; MENELL & STEWART, supra note 26, at 341-42; Peter
Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected, 23 ECON.
INQUIRY 551 (1985). Section 165(a)(3), currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3) (1994), was
premised upon spillovers and prohibited issuing permits that would contribute to another area
exceeding the NAAQS.
261. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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converters in new cars, in 1975, the converters did not result in the
required reductions. EPA subsequently granted one-year extensions,
extending the dates for compliance to 1976 and 1977.262
In 1977, Congress amended the motor vehicle provisions,
requiring achievement of the original 90% reductions for hydrocar-
bons by 1980 and for carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide by
1981.2" Congress also allowed other states to "piggyback" on the
California emission control standards, so long as they adopted
identical emission controls. 64 The standards were achieved by 1981,
but the estimates of the costs and benefits of achieving the standards
predictably vary dramatically.265
In 1990, Congress again amended the motor vehicle provisions.
It reduced further the emissions levels for all automobiles and added
various new requirements that were not nationally uniform, i.e., were
applicable only in areas violating the NAAQS.266 Congress restricted
the ability of other states to piggyback on California car standards,
prohibiting them from taking actions that would have the effect of
creating a "third" car.267
2. The Decentralized NAAQS And PSD Requirements. Attain-
ment of the NAAQS was not achieved by numerous states in the time
required.2" This failure resulted largely from states being* unwilling
262. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 27, at 835.
263. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3) (1994); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 27, at 835.
264. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. New York Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 79 F.3d
1298,1302 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding some challenges to the preemptive effects of this provision not
to be ripe but upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment that state regulation of
fuel quality was not preempted); see 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (1994).
265. See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 307 (citing differing estimates of EPA and
of R. CRANDALL ET AL, REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE (1986)).
266. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A) & (B) (1994) (lower hydrocarbon, carbon monoxide,
and nitrogen oxide emission levels); 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) & (in) (1994) (reformulated and
oxygenated fuels for use in nonattainment areas); 42 U.S.C. § 7586, 7588-90 (1994) (requiring
clean fuel vehicles for serious nonattainment areas and federal agency fleets, and also providing
a test program in California and allowing states to opt-in to clean fuel vehicle programs).
267. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. New York Dept. of Envtl Conservation, 17
F.3d 521,532-38 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting allegations that these provisions were violated by New
York's simultaneous failure to adopt California clean fuel regulations and its imposition of
quotas on the ratio of low-emission vehicle and zero-emission vehicles; finding that New York's
adoption of standards before California was issued a waiver did not provide the required two-
year lead time before other states could implement piggyback requirements).
268. The following discussion focuses on ground level ozone and carbon monoxide, which
result largely from motor vehicle emissions. Greater success was obtained for other criteria
pollutants, in large part due to the field preemptive, motor vehicle requirements. See PERCIVAL
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to provide, and EPA to compel states to adopt, critical control
measures.269 This in turn was due to initial lack of EPA expertise
and administrative resources; resistance of states to paying the
political and administrative costs of imposing requirements and to
losing traditional prerogatives to specify standards; the perceived
constitutional infirmity of subjecting states and their officials to civil
penalties for failing to implement the federal policies; and backsliding
support of the public and in Congress for pursuing the most contro-
versial implementation strategies that imposed costs more directly on
citizens.'
In 1974, Congress prohibited EPA from requiring states to adopt
motor vehicle and land use c6ntrols.2  In 1977, Congress also
extended the deadlines for attaining the ambient air quality levels
until 1982.272 Nevertheless, Congress retained the NAAQS goals
and SIP/FIP implementing structure. Further, Congress imposed
signifidant additional measures to force attainment by the new
dates.273 Congress also enacted more constitutionally sound sanc-
tions to induce states to implement the federal, policies274 and
ET AL, supra note 27, at 792-95, 810 (noting reductions in ambient lead levels from removal of
lead in gasoline, but listing failures to attain b 1989 for other criteria pollutants).
269. See Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1199-1208 (discussing state failures to the original SIP
provisions, under which EPA required land use and motor vehicle transportation controls if
necessary to achieve attainment).
270. See Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1199-1208; Brown v. EPA, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (dismissing
as moot constitutional challenges to EPA authority to sanction state officials for failing to
implement transportation control measures, when EPA rescinded its interpretation that the
Clean Air Act authorized such sanctions); cf. supra note 8 and accompanying text.
271. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(5)(A), 7410(c)(2)(B) (1982); Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1206-07
& nn. 111, 112.
272. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (1982) (current version at §§ 7502(a)(2), 7511a (1994)). If all
possible extensions were applied for and granted, states had until 1987 to attain the NAAQS
for ozone and carbon monoxide. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(e) (1982) (repealed 1990).
273. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-06 (1982) (current version at §§ 7501-15 (1994) ("Part D")).
These controls include requirements for nonuniform, case-by-case NSR preconstruction permits
(which impose control technologies more stringent than those required in PSD regions),
measures to document and assure progress toward ittainment, a prohibition on federal funding
for transportation projects that do not conform to specified requirements, and a construction ban
in nonattainment areas failing to submit approvable SIPs.
274. See 42 U.S.C. § 7506(b) (1982) (repealed 1990) (authority to prevent transportation
project grants upon finding thata state is not implementing a SIP or submitting required SIP
revisions); Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1196-97.
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provided EPA with authority to "call" for revision of inadequate
SIPs.
27 5
As discussed, above, Congress also adopted requirements to
protect states from emission externalities that would contribute to
violations of the federal ambient standards. States had to adopt
provisions in SIPs controlling stationary sources from emitting
amounts that would "prevent attainment or maintenance" of the
NAAQS or "interfere" with PSD measures in other states. States
also could petition EPA to determine that major sources would cause
such effects.276
These measures again were insufficient to achieve the NAAQS.
This subsequent failure resulted from state resistance to "'forced
federal requirements,"' based on sovereignty concerns and a lesser
commitment than the nation as a whole to the federal norms.2'
EPA proved reluctant to impose sanctions on states for failing to
submit revised SIPs by the dates required.27 EPA also attempted to
conciliate disputes and imposed sanctions only when it became clear
that states were not acting in good faith to implement the require-
ments.279
EPA adopted additional strategies to avoid assuming the adminis-
trative burdens and political costs of disapproving SIP revisions and
of issuing FIPs. EPA "conditionally approved" SIPs that did not
275. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(H) (1982) (current version at42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) (1994)).
276. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (1982) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)
(1994)). EPA originally interpreted the petition provision to protect against interference with
state standards, which was upheld in dicta as a permissible interpretation by one federal court
of appeals. EPA later abandoned this interpretation. See supra note 166; Connecticut v. EPA,
656 F.2d 902,910 (2d Cir. 1981). These provisions may be explained as: (1) shoring-up second-
best regulatory strategies to interstate externalities; (2) requiring meaningful allocation of
interjurisdictional externalities above a significance threshold established by federal legislation;
or (3) strategic and symbolic legislation through which Congress could avoid accountability for
failing to allocate externalities. See supra notes 159-81 and accompanying text.
277. See Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1209 & n.128 (quoting a report of the General Accounting
Office attributing state recalcitrance to resentment over federal intrusion, disagreement over the
effectiveness and efficiency of the measures, and the expectation of further congressional
backsliding).
278. See id. at 1209-10 (describing EPA reluctance to impose sanctions). Further, EPA
under Administrator Ruckelshaus withdrew efforts under Administrator Gorsuch to sanctioni
states for failure to attain the NAAQS, which had been favored because they might provoke a
public backlash leading to repeal of the legislation. See Schoenbrod, supra note 105, at 769 &
n.166; cf. id. at 775 (discussing EPA's limited use of sanctions authority following the 1977
Amendments due to fear of legislative repeal).
279. See Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1211 & n.140. The EPA policy to defer sanctions arguably
exceeded its statutory authority. See id. at 1209-10.
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contain the required controls, but promised to adopt them within a
short time.m EPA then refused to make findings that the SIPs
were not being carried out 8' EPA also failed to disapprove SIPs
and approved SIPs that failed to contain adequate controls. EPA
reversed its earlier policies in this regard, to avoid having to write
FIPs.' Even when it disapproved SIPs, EPA delayed promulgating
FIPs until subject to court order and then sought and took additional
time.?
Similarly, EPA adopted numerous policies to avoid making
politically unpopular decisions to restrict externalities. EPA effective-
ly nullified the provisions by rejecting long-range pollutant transport
models as inaccurate, by refusing to address transformation of
pollutants in the environment, by failing to issue standards that would
have restricted transboundary flows of specific pollutants, and by
eliminating from consideration the cumulative impacts of multiple
sources in the upwind state upon the ambient quality in the downwind
state.2m
Further, EPA interpreted the externality standards: not to apply
unless there was a violation of the NAAQS or PSD increments; to
require a "significant" contribution to exceeding the NAAQS in
280. See, eg., Arizona v. Thomas, 824 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding EPA's decision
to disapprove Arizona's revised SIP submitted in 1987, following earlier EPA conditional
approval of Arizona SIP revisions and subsequent failure to meet the conditions or attain by
1982 for carbon monoxide). In 1990, Congress ratified EPA's authority to conditionally approve
SIPs. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(4) (1994).
281. See, e.g., American Lung Ass'n v. New Jersey, 871 F.2d 319, 321 (3rd Cir. 1989) (after
state and EPA were sued to force the state to adopt controls required by conditions of the
approved SIP, EPA joined with plaintiffs to condemn the state failure).
282. See, eg., Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1990) (invalidating EPA's
approval of Arizona's SIP revisions submitted following Arizona v. Thomas, 829 F.2d 834 (9th
Cir. 1987) because Arizona had not met EPA's requirement to demonstrate imposition of all.
reasonably available control measures and "possible measures" to assure "the most expeditious
[attainment] date beyond 1987."); Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1987) (ordering
EPA to reject the submitted control measures of the Los Angeles area SIP, which would not
attain the carbon monoxide and ozone NAAQS by 1987, when EPA refused to take action; the
disapproval triggered EPA's requirement to develop a FIP).
283. See, e.g., Coalition for Clean Air v. Southern California Edison Co., 971 F.2d 219 (9th
Cir. 1992) (following Abramowitz, plaintiffs sued to force EPA to issue a FIP; the parties settled
in 1989; EPA sought an extension which the district court allowed; the Ninth Circuit reversed,
finding that the 1990 Amendments did not relieve EPA of the preexisting obligation). EPA
finally issued the required FIP in 1994, which goes out of its way to provide for replacement by
state controls that may be adopted in the future. See Approval and Promulgation of State and
Federal Implementation Plans, 59 Fed. Reg. 23,264 (1994). The FIP and SIP controls will not
attain the NAAQS for many years, if at all.
284. See Revesz, supra note 159, at 2373-74 (citing numerous cases).
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downwind jurisdictions; and to shift to upwind states the full burden
of removing any "but-for' contribution to a violation and some
additional amount needed to preserve margins of growth in the
downwind state. EPA failed to identify how it would balance the
numerous comparison criteria that it found to guide determinations
of significance, and refused to find a significant contribution whenever
EPA considered the question. EPA also rejected the use of models
that purported to demonstrate causation."s
In 1990, Congress again extended the deadlines. This time,
Congress distinguished between nonattaining areas based on the
severity with which they exceeded the various NAAQS.2 6  For
example, for each of the classes of ozone nonattainment areas,
Congress provided a graduated series of additional control measures
to be included in SIP revisions and specified timetables for submitting
such revisions.'
The 1990 Amendments also created additional measures to make
more efficient the long-delayed transition to the NAAQS and
provided additional measures to protect the SIP controls from
interjurisdictional pollution transport problems.28 Congress clarified
the procedures for EPA review of SIPs, and provided additional time
for states to attain if they failed toadopt approvable SIPs or failed to
285. See id. at 2372-74.
286. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7515 (1994); MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 345-51.
287. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511, 7511a (1994); MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 345-51.
288. For example, Congress enacted the tradeable permit system for various criteria
pollutants that cause acid rain. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994); supra note 175. The
marketable permit scheme may reduce the cost of transitions to achieving the NAAQS and thus
may more quickly achieve desired ambient quality levels, but does not alter the dates (well past
due for many jurisdictions) for such attainment. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f)(1994). Similarly,
Congress established interstate commissions to assist achievement of ambient quality by
improving cooperation to limit spillovers, but such authority does not impair the existing
obligations of areas to attain the NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7506a (1994); supra note 181.
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attain the NAAQS. 9 Congress also adopted new strategies to deal
with spillovers that contributed to NAAQS violations.290
Congress provided EPA with additional discretionary and
mandatory sanctions authority.29 It also required EPA to impose at
least one of the possible sanctions within 18 months of the relevant
finding, and both sanctions if the state did not act in good faith to
adopt or implement the requirements.2 2
Although the additional controls have induced many states to
improve their air quality, many other states still will not attain the
NAAQS by the dates required. 93 States are refusing to implement
the federal directives,294 and EPA again is refusing to sanction
289. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a), (c), (k) (1994). For example, upon a determination by EPA
that a state has not attained the NAAQS for ground-level ozone in the required time, the state
automatically is reclassified into the next level of nonattainment. This requires the state to
submit a revised SIP containing additional controls. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b) (1994). EPA's
determination of nonattainment is to be made within six months of the applicable attainment
date. See id. If the state continues to fail to attain the NAAQS, it must submit increasingly
stringent revised SIPs, thereby gaining additional time. If after twenty years it still has not
attained the NAAQS, the state returns to the beginning and repeats the cycle (perhaps
indefinitely). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(a), 7509(d)(1)&(3), 7410(k) (1994). Added deadline
complexities occur if EPA does not make the required determinations of nonattainment within
the six months, if states do not submit the required revisions within one year, and if EPA does
not make the required completeness and approval determinations on the revisions within six
months and one year, respectively. Further, EPA may conditionally approve plan revisions, in
whole or in part. See § 7410(k)(3)&(4) (1994).
290. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
291. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(m), 7509(a)(1)-(4) (1994). Sanctions may not be imposed
statewide for at least 24 months, when multiple political jurisdictions within the state contribute
to the failures. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m) (1994).
292. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a) (1994). The 18 months provides a safe harbor for states if they cure
their failures. See id.
293. See Lee, supra note 5, at A4 ("fifty-five of the 98 areas that fell below federal standards
for ozone in 1990 now meet them."); Several States Make Little or No Progress In Meeting Air
Act Requirements, Report Says, 26 Envt. Rep. (BNA) 1286 (Dec. 1, 1995) ("At least five states
are making little or no progress [in reducing air pollutants] and will not meet the deadlines set
by the Clean Air Act... . Only three states.., were described as steadily making progress and
'on track to meet the public health standards by the deadlines in the Clean Air Act.').
294. See Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1211-14. States were required to submit to EPA by*
November 1994 "attainment plans" for ozone nonattainment areas that would include modeling
demonstrations that emissions reductions would result in attainment by the relevant dates and
rules that would assure the reductions were achieved. In September 1994, EPA abandoned strict
compliance with the requirements. See John Seitz, Director Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards, U.S. EPA, November 1994 Submittal Policy, Sept. 1, 1994. More recently, EPA has
adopted "an alternative approach to provide States flexibility in their planning efforts for ozone
nonattainment areas classified as serious and above." Mary Nichols, Assistant Administrator
for Air, U.S. EPA, Ozone Attainment Demonstrations 1, March 2, 1995, at 1 (also noting
"unavoidable delays in rule development by the States.") (emphasis added).
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states, to disapprove SIPs and to provide FIPs in order to achieve the
required controls.295 EPA also has retracted many policies in order
to accommodate states that believe that they can avoid sanctions.296
However, EPA has recently indicated that it may issue a SIP-call to
require states to address ozone transport in order to reduce NAAQS
violations. 29 7
Finally, EPA has recently proposed to make more stringent the
NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter.298 Although EPA has
proposed to retain the requirements to achieve the existing NAAQS
levels for at least five years, EPA is considering allowing states to "be
freed from the most looming deadlines and ... instead be asked to
turn their attention toward meeting the revised standard."'29 9 EPA
has indicated that it will not penalize states during the five year
implementation period for failing to achieve the NAAQS for ozone
by the deadlines required by the statute, which have expired by or
will expire during that period.3"
295. See Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1211-16. EPA has also adopted a policy that allows states
to avoid "mandatory" sanctions for inadequate SIP revisions. EPA originally proposed
relatively stringent policies interpreting the sanctions provisions. See Criteria for Exercising
Discretionary Sanctions Under Title I of the Clean Air Act, 57 Fed. Reg. 44,534 (1992) (discre-
tionary sanctions under 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m)(1994)); Application Sequence for Clean Air Section
179 Sanctions, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,270 (1993) (mandatory sanctions under 42 U.S.C. § 7509-
(a)(1994)). EPA's final rule for mandatory sanctions, however, allowed states to "reset the
clock" for another 18 months after EPA first identifies the SIP revision as deficient, if they
provide a new "complete" SIP revision, even if EPA subsequently disapproves the revision as
inadequate. See Selection of Sequence of Mandatory Sanctions for Findings Made Pursuant to
Section 179 of the Clean Air Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 39832, 39837-52 (1994). Thus, a state may
always avoid the mandatory sanctions simply by submitting a new but inadequate revised SIP.
EPA's policy was upheld as required by the statute. See Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122,1123-25 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting the complexities of timing in the
SIP revision and approval processes).
296. See supra note 5; Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1213-14, 1216 (discussing EPA's
"compromise" with California on automobile inspection and maintenance provisions, EPA's
agreement to provide greater flexibility following the 1994 elections, and the response of other
states to delay submissions or to submit plans that EPA previously claimed it would not approve
prior to EPA's changes in policy).
297. See supra note 181.
298. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone: Proposed Decision, 61 Fed.
Reg. 65,716 (1996); National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter- Proposed
Decision, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,638 (1996).
299. In New Interim Implementation Policy EPA Moves to Accommodate State Concerns
Over Tight NAAQS Deadlines, 17 INSIDE E.P.A. WEEKLY REPORT, Nov. 29, 1996, at 12.
300. See id.
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Decentralized implementation has to date been somewhat more
successful in regard to PSD requirements."' The relative success
may have resulted because the requirements are simpler and impose
fewer costs than for nonattainment ° or because states achieving the
NAAQS may be more likely to share a commitment to the federal
norms.03 Nevertheless, some elements of the PSD program were
long delayed by EPA."
3. The Centralized NSPS And NESHAP Requirements. Following
the 1970 enactment, EPA issued only a few NSPS. As a result,
Congress in 1977 required EPA to issue numerous additional NSPS
by 1982 for categories of major sources that were significant contribu-
tors of air pollution. 5 EPA again failed to issue the additional
NSPS in the time required, although it eventually issued the majority
of the NSPS on its "Priority list," and Congress in 1990 required EPA
to propose to issue many more NSPS by specific dates? 6 EPA has
not yet proposed to issue many of the additional NSPS as required by
the 1990 Amendments.3 7 Nevertheless, EPA has been relatively
productive in issuing NSPS, at least compared to its pre-1990 record
in promulgating NESHAPs.
EPA strongly resisted the congressional mandate to establish
ambient standards for hazardous air pollutants, preferring to adopt
technology-based standards.08 This was true even though EPA was
301. See Oren, supra note 27, at 10-12, 47-114 (finding little evidence of new significant
deterioration beyond existing PSD increments, but raising concern over potential for future
deterioration of quality).
302. See Novello Letter, supra note 253, at 4; but see Oren, supra note 27, at 113-14 (noting
complexities of current provisions to prevent deterioration and the refusal of Congress and of
EPA to adopt a simpler and more effective control regime).
303. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
304. EPA was required to determine by 1979 increments for pollutants that were not
specified, by the statute, but substantially delayed issuing the additional limitations. See Sierra
Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
305. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(f) (1994); Revisions to the Priority List of Categories of Stationary
Sources, 47 Fed. Reg. 950, 951 (1982).
306. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(f) (1994); 40 C.F.R. 60.16 (1996).
307. See Regulatory Agenda, 60 Fed. Reg. 23,928, 24,012 (1995) (by 1992, EPA had not
proposed any of the remaining 19 categories of NSPS; EPA entered into a partial consent decree
in 1993).
308. See Dwyer, supra note 27, at 269-76 (describing EPA efforts to employ technology
standards for specific pollutants applicable to categories of significant sources of such pollutants,
in order to avoid the political and economic costs of the moral commitment established by the
NESHAP provision); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en banc) (invalidating EPA standards based on technology and cost considerations,
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placed under numerous court ordered deadlines to issue such
standards. 9 In fairness to EPA, Congress imposed unreasonably
short deadlines for such a technically difficult and politically sensitive
task.310
EPA's reluctance to impose ambient health standards in 1990 led
Congress to change its presumptive approach for NESHAPs to
technology based controls, requiring health based regulation eight
years after imposing the technology controls if they do not prove
adequate urider the 1970 health-based standards and Congress does
not further amend the Act.31' If EPA failed to issue technology
standards in the required time, however, states would be obligated to
impose case-by-case technology controls on certain sources once they
received approval for operating permit programs. 312
requiring EPA to specify threshold levels of pollution that protect public health).
309. See Dwyer, supra note 27, at 250-76. Numerous court challenges to EPA's failure to
issue NESHAPs were successful and in one case resulted in a contempt citation against EPA.
See id. at 261 & n. 120, 271 & n.171.
310. See id. at 277 & n.190, 278-80. By removing consideration of costs, Congress required
EPA to evaluate only the benefits of health reductions (benefit-effectiveness analysis), increasing
the significance of the disputed measures of health protection values. Cf supra note 57.
Further, Congress prevented regulation based on utilitarian considerations and required EPA
to establish deontological rights. EPA simply was not well suited for resolving non-technical
moral disputes.
311. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d), (f) (1994) (uniform, technology based controls imposed by
category of source and potential additional ambient controls).
312. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2) (1994). If a state failed to submit an operating permit
program within three years, or EPA had not approved such a program within an additional two
years, EPA was required to promulgate a federal operating permit program for such state, and
thus to impose the case-by-case technology controls. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d) (1994). EPA
recently issued final rules for the federal operating permit program. See Federal Operating
Permits Program, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,202 (1996). EPA has provided interim authorization to many
state operating programs pursuant to the final state permit program rules that EPA previously
issued. See Operating Permits Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250 (1992). EPA also has proposed
to amend the state permit program rules to simplify procedures for revising permits. See
Operating Permits Program Rule Revisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 44,460 (1994); Operating Permits
Program and Federal Operating Permits Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 45,530 (1995). In general, these
provisions would help to reduce the complexities and costs of dual permitting. See supra notes
1321-354 and accompanying text. Finally, EPA has adopted a sanctions policy for failing to
submit approvable operating permit programs similar to the approach it adopted for sanctions
for failure to submit approvable SIPs to attain the NAAQS by the dates required, requiring 18
months to expire from the time a complete submission was due or from the date that EPA
disapproves a state's submission, and allowing states to avoid sanctions by (re)submission during
that period. See supra note 295; John S. Seitz, Director Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards, U.S. EPA, Sanctions Policy For State Title V Operating Permits Programs, Mar. 15,
1995; John S. Seitz, Director Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Update
to Sanctions Policy For State Title V Operating Permits Programs (1995). In the later guidance,
EPA clarified that it did not intend to create a higher threshold for avoiding sanctions when
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EPA has not issued the required technology standards on time
and has revised some proposed standards to be more flexible.313
EPA also made more flexible its regulations to delegate air toxic
programs in response to political resistance from states concerned
about interference With their existing programs. 3 14  Following
substantial pressure from regulated entities315 and from states,
316
EPA also reinterpreted (arguably rewrote) the statutory provision for
states to issue case-by-case technology standards before EPA issues
EPA disapproves submission of a partial program than when it disapproves submission of a
complete program.
313. See Sierra Club v. Browner, No. 95-627 (D.D.C. 1995) (consent decree to issue § 112(d)
standards); National Emissions Standaids for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories;
Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Industry
and Other Processes Subject to Negotiated Regulation for Equipment Leaks, 59 Fed. Reg.
19,402 (1994). Litigation over the rule has led to amendments, including provisions for further
extensions before the compliance date of April 1997. See, eg., National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the
Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Industry and Other Processes Subject to the
Negotiated Regulation for Equipment Leaks; Rule Clarifications, 62 Fed. Reg. 2722 (1997).
314. See Approval of State Programs and Delegation of Federal Authority, 58 Fed. Reg.
29,296 (1993); Approval of State Programs and Delegation to Federal Authorities, 58 Fed. Reg.
62,262 (1993); supra note 221 and accompanying text. State air toxics programs have tended to
be based on ambient levels, set by reference to industrial exposure limit or other risk data. See
DAviD P. NOVELLO, THE NEW TITLE III Am TOXICS PROGRAM 45 (1994). The pollutants and
sources regulated vary widely from state to state. States continue to support additional ambient
controls, notwithstanding the new federal technology controls and ultimate residual risk
determinations. See id. at 47. EPA's delegation rule issued under § 112(1), allowed states to
"adjust" or "substitute" for technology-based NESHAPs, but only if the state controls are
demonstrated to be at least as stringent and if state programs are expressed in measures
demonstrating equivalence. See id. at 47-48. EPA's delegation rule was subsequently challenged
by environmental groups who claimed that the rule authorized delegation when state rules would
be less stringent tha A federal rules and before state rules might take effect. In contrast,
regulated entities argued that the rule allowed EPA to delegate authority to impose more
stringent conditions, which was beyond EPA's statutory authority and was unconstitutional on
legislative delegation and unitary executive grounds. Cf. supra note 145. The suit was dismissed
for lack of standing and of prudential ripeness. Louisiana Environmental Action Network v.
Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1381-84 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
315. EPA's approval of Washington's operating permit program was challenged by an
industry petition, claiming that such approval would *trigger case-by-case technology
requirements without adequate guidance regarding how the standards were to apply, thereby
denying due process of law. See EPA to Delay Implementation of Air Toxics Rule for Plant
Modifications, INSIDE EPA'S CLEAN AIR Acr REPORT, Jan. 12, 1995, at 3.
316. See EPA Releases Interpretive Guidance on 112(g) Requirements, INSIDE EPA'S CLEAN
AIR Acr REPORT, Feb. 23, 1995, at 16. An association of state and territorial governments sent
a letter to EPA indicating how its proposed rule would interfere with existing state air toxic
control programs, and would impose huge implementation costs that state agencies lacked the
resources to bear. See States, Industry Disagree over Use of Offsets, INSIDE. EPA'S CLEAN AIR
Acr REPORT, Aug. 24, 1995, at 5.
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or if EPA fails to timely issue - national standards, further
delaying implementation.1 7
C. Conclusions To Be Drawn From The Implementation History
1. Regulatory Failures and Congressional Responses. The history
of implementing these provisions indicates substantial friction and
resistance by states, EPA, and the regulated community to implement-
ing the immensely costly requirements of the Clean Air Act, thereby
requiring substantial expenditure of regulatory oversight resources and
imposing costly litigation. In part, the resistance to implementation
has resulted from the willingness of Congress to delegate implementa-
317. Originally, EPA indicated that states were required to issue case-by-case determinations
of maximum available control technology (MACT) when issuing permits to "modified,"
"constructed," or "reconstructed" major sources of hazardous air pollutants following approval
of state or federal operating permit programs. See John Seitz, Director Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Guidance for Initial Implementation of Section 112(g), June
28, 1994. EPA later indicated that 42 U.S.C. § 112(g) (1994) would not apply until EPA issued
a rule clarifying the nature of the "major sources" and "modifications" to which the MACT
determinations would apply and that EPA would restrict the scope of modifications in its final
rule, thereby further delaying imposition of technology standards. See Hazardous Air Pollutants:
Provisions Governing Constructed, Reconstructed, or Modified Major Sources: Interpretive
Notice, 60 Fed. Reg. 8,333 (1995); EPA to Repropose Draft 112(g) Air Toxics Rule by September
15, INSIDE EPA'S CLEAN Am Acr REPORT, Aug. 10, 1995, at 3 (discussing testimony of EPA
Assistant Administrator Mary Nichols regarding regulatory directions). EPA subsequently
reproposed and finalized a rule to implement section 112(g), which limited the requirement for
case-by-case MACT determinations to newly constructed or reconstructed sources, extended the
compliance dates for states to impose the requirements, and eliminated requirements for
modified sources in order to provide greater certainty to regulated entities. Proposed
Requirements for Control Technology Determinations for Major Sources in Accordance with
Clean Air Act Section 112(g), 61 Fed. Reg. 13,125 (1996); Hazardous Air Pollutants:
Regulations Governing Constructed or Reconstructed Major Sources, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,385,
63,386-87 (1996). Significantly, EPA's position was based on the problem that EPA's
determination of a "major source" was simultaneously being subjected to legal challenge.
Absent further deferral, EPA would have required states to issue case-by-case MACI'
determinations for sources that might not later considered "major." In fact, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded EPA's determinations regarding
federally enforceable conditions that might limit the "potential to emit," which thereby defines
which facilities are major sources. See National Mining Ass'n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir.
1995); John Seitz, Director Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Release
of Interim Policy on Federal Enforceability of Limitations on Potential to Emit, Jan. 22, 1996;
John Seitz, Director Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Release of
Interim Policy on Federal Enforceability of Limitations on Potential to Emit, June 28, 1996.
EPA similarly extended the section 1120) deadline for the requirement for major sources to
seek case-by-case MAC' determinations 18 months after EPA failed'to promulgate a timely
MACI standard. See Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendment to Regulations Governing
Equivalent Emission Limitations by Permit, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,370, 21,371 (1996).
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tion to EPA and from the supermajoritarian blocking ability and
other influence exercised by states in the Congress? 8
The fewest implementation problems may have resulted from the
uniformly preemptive technology forcing motor vehicle requirements.
But those requirements addressed only a single industry and dealt
with product regulation that allowed the economic market rather than
regulators to allocate the costs among jurisdictions (car producers who
may pass on those costs to owners located in different states). The
requirements more closely matched the regulatory "jurisdiction" to
the regulated institutions (and indirectly to the sources of political
value) that create pollution." 9 The requirements were achieved
within a few years of the dates initially specified by Congress, even
though the original goals might be viewed as strategically symbolic
and even though Congress subsequently delayed the compliance dates.
In contrast, the greatest implementation problems may have
resulted from interstate externality provisions. Those provisions
required regulators to allocate control costs and benefits among
jurisdictions (firms located in different states). EPA consistently
refused to implement a tailored allocation regime and rendered the
provisions largely ineffectual.
Issuance of the NSPS as directed by Congress also was delayed.
Given the paucity of standards issued compared to the original
legislative goals, it is at least debatable whether presumptively
decentralized technology-based standard setting would have achieved
more effective and efficient results. Economies of scale may exist at
either the federal or state level for such technology standards. The
existence of net scale economies depends on whether the federal
regulations tailored to categories of industry sources will reduce
otherwise repetitive state efforts more than they fail to utilize existing
state, expertise. Similar uncertainties exist regarding standard setting
under the ambient and technology based NESHAP provisions, which
318. Cf. Scho6nbrod, supra note 38, at 1226 ("Practice shows, however, that delegates are
often less capable than Congress of resolving the political conflicts in an issue. Delegation can
set in motion a protracted game that frustrates statutory goals. For example, my own analysis
of the Clean Air Act [supra note 105] suggests that government is sometimes less able to cope
with delegation than without it.") (emphasis in original).
319. See supra note 56. Again, this excludes the concerns of citizens who either do not own
cars or who would prefer to restrict car use by others. The result is the specification of an
efficient transition regime regarding-costs but the absence of any transition regime regarding
benefits. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. Was it efficient or good policy?
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(in the case of ambient standards) were more substantially delayed
when compared to the legislative goals.
For both the NSPS and the NESHAPs, there is litle or no data
from which to determine whether EPA improperly delegated
implementing authority or whether fully centralizing implementation
would be more efficient. Similarly, although EPA has attempted to
avoid imposing technology standards that interfere with state
programs, there is little data from which to evaluate whether
preempting state requirements would be preferable to the existing
implementation structure.
Centralized standard setting under the PSD requirements also has
been delayed in regard to certain pollutants, but presumptively
decentralized implementation has generally been successful. In
contrast, extreme resistance to accomplishing the NAAQS resulted
from decentralized establishment of control measures. Whatever the
benefits of such federal standards may have been,3" and without
regard to whether EPA would have done better, the presumptively
decentralized implementation of the NAAQS has been an abysmal
failure when measured by the original and subsequent legislative
goals.
Unfortunately, the history of implementing the Clean Air Act
does not provide sufficient data adequately to compare the relative
efficiency or effectiveness of field preemptive standards and preemp-
tive minimum standards implemented presumptively by states or by
EPA. 21 But the history does demonstrate that Congress has
presumptively chosen centralized or decentralized implementa-
tion principally based on recognition of cold political realities and by
making highly debatable assumptions regarding relative efficiency
without performing any comparisons of initial or potential institutional
320. The federal regulatory efforts are generally recognized as having resulted in
substantially improved ambient air quality or at least as having prevented substantial
deterioration of quality that would otherwise have resulted in an expanding economy. See
generally Robert Melnick, Pollution Deadlines and the Coalition for Failure, 75 PUB. INTEREST
123 (1984). This should be unremarkable, since the federal government provided substantial
financial inducements and imposed or threatened to impose sanctions if states did not improve
their environmental quality. But it does not demonstrate whether: (1) wholly federal strategies
would have achieved substantial greater reductions at lower costs; (2) more effective coercion
of states would have done so; or (3) state strategies in the absence of federal regulation would
have done so.
321. This brief history also did not address the extent to which federal funding and research
may have resulted in economies of -scale. But such measures do not impose compliance
obligations or allocate costs and thus are less likely to result in significant normative disputes.
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competence. In part, Congress based its apporaches on scientific
assumptions that have often proven invalid and on perceived
institutional regulatory advantages that are likely unprovable. The
rationales for federal regulation thus are valid, but the presumptive
choices of federal or state implementation do not always match the
rationales and reflect highly debatable value choices in the absence of
empirical information.
In two cases, however, Congress significantly altered its imple-
mentation strategy. In regard to implementing the NAAQS, Congress
in 1974 rescinded EPA's authority to impose land use and transport
controls to attain the NAAQS. If the NAAQS were not already
strategically symbolic by reflecting goals that the 1970 Congress.did
not believe, this action may have rendered the NAAQS strategically
symbolic by removing authority needed to attain the goals on time
and by dramatically increasing the costs of attainment.3" Alternate-
ly, given the normative commitments of the public to the automobile
and to housing patterns and given citizen sensitivity (as voters) to the
serious transition costs, the prohibition may be considered an efficient
response to the applicable measure of value and a practical instrumen-
tal strategy - when combined with the additional control measures
imposed by Congress - to better achieving the elusive ambient air
quality goals.3" The normative debate has no principled resolution
without consensus over the measures of value.32a
Second, in regard to the NESHAPs, Congress shifted its
presumptive approach from ambient to technology standards in 1990.
But Congress preserved authority for EPA to impose ambient
controls in the future, when the incremental costs of any such
regulation will be substantially reduced.32 Again, two normative
accounts are possible. In response to widespread resistance, Congress
withdrew protection and inefficiently allowed "excessive" levels of
pollution "inefficiently" to continue into the indefinite future.
322. See Dwyer, supra note 26, at 1206.
323. See supra note 76; cf. Craig N. Oren, Clearing the-Air: The Mccubbins.Noll-Weingast
Hypothesis and the Clean Air Act, 9 VA. INT'L. L. J. 45, 53 & n.44 (1989) (arguing that public
support for environmental measures decreased after the oil shocks of the middle 1970s); RALPH
NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965) (challenging the American love affair with a particularly
risky automobile as irrational given the number of people killed).
324. Significantly, substantial debate exists regarding the costs and benefits of the current
proposal to make the NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter more stringent. See supra note
298 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, Congress prudently adopted an "efficient" strategy to
reduce the costs of excessive health-based pollution reduction, which
was not "justified" by the ambient levels.
We will have only a few years to wait before we will see to which
account EPA adheres. We can be certain that a vigorous debate over
the cost-benefit analyses will ensue. But Congress did not change its
presumptive reliance upon EPA to implement the requirements.
2. Retention of the Goals of the Clean Air Act. Notwithstanding
the incredible resistance to implementation, and except in regard to
the NAAQS provisions described above, Congress has not yet
repealed in any significant measure the goals or controls of the Clean
Air Act. 6 When amending the Act, Congress did not retrospec-
tively repeal judicial injunctions compelling EPA to effectuate
centralized requirements that EPA had refused to implement.
Congress also did not repeal injunctions compelling EPA to undertake
the backup regulation required by cooperative federalism approach-
es.
327
In general, congressional response to implementation failure has
been to preserve the goals, to provide additional time for compliance,
and to impose additional control measures and sanctions - burdened
by unimaginably complex procedures and tremendous administrative
discretion - in order to force recalcitrant states and EPA to
implement the requirements. Many states have failed to respond to
congressional prodding and have overtly refused to impose controls
adequate to achieve federal goals by the dates required. Such refusal
is unsurprising, given EPA's reluctance to impose sanctions for
nonattainment, which in large part was due to defunding threats and
other powers exerted by states in Congress. EPA has also failed to
implement Congress's directives in a timely fashion and has gone out
of its way to avoid withdrawing state authority or to delegate federal
authority in order to avoid the burdens of regulation. 28
The consequences of state and EPA failures are dramatic. High
costs are imposed on society from regulatory confusion and litigation
to force long-delayed bureaucratic action, as well as from lost health
and environmental protection benefits caused by delay. In contrast,
when evaluated by state-level values or other norms, the costs of
326. Compare supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text with supra note 162.
327. See supra notes 261-317 and accompanying text.
328. See id.
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imposing the symbolic federal goals are excessive and delay or
nonacquiescence is thus efficient and welfare-enhancing. Ultimately,
the implementation history suggests that the success or failure of the
Clean Air Act is a normative and not an empirical claim.3 29
Unless Congress imposes sanctions to induce states to regulate
that EPA cannot effectively rescind, states will continue to provide
levels of environmental quality lower than the stated federal goals.
Similarly, unless Congress further restricts discretion from EPA and
provides additional funding to accomplish its mandates, EPA will
continue to avoid or will remain unable to accomplish the federal
goals. If Congress does not intend to impose the measures needed to
attain the goals in the face of certain future resistance, Congress
should likely repeal the goals. Congress may then avoid enacting
strategically symbolic legislation purportedly justified as efficient,
social-welfare enhancing, or moral. This will at least provide citizens
with a political target if, they in fact believe that the repealed
legislation meets such descriptions. Conersely, unless and until
Congress repeals those goals, citizens should demand additional
measures to reduce the transition costs in order to achieve purported-
ly efficient, social-welfare enhancing, or moral policies that are
reflected in the federal goals.330 And in making these political
judgments, we must always consider the role that the values of
unelected federal judges play in shaping the public's values and in
designing efficient transition regimes.33'
IV. THE CONTINUING FEDERAL REGULATORY "IMPERATIVE"
The previous sections have demonstrated: (1) that states possess
no rights to specify their own policies or to implement federal ones;
(2) that value disputes among the citizens of different subsidiary
(state) jurisdictions are resolved through national political processes;
(3) the continuing validity of the numerous theoretical rationales to
support preemptive federal legislation; (4) the tremendous normative
disputes that underlie application of these rationales in the absence
of empirical information; (5) how those rationales grounded enact-
ment and implementation choices for federal environmental regulato-
ry policy; and (6) the tremendous resistance to implementation of
329. See-supra notes 61, 166 and accompanying text,
330. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
federal policy that results when states do not share normative
commitment to the federal regulatory goals. Given the high costs of
federal regulation and of normative conflicts, it is worth asking again
whether federal regulation is justified and who makes that judgment.
A. Current Political Preferences
To reiterate, any determination of the relative value of federal or
state regulation and implementation will necessarily be a political
judgment evaluated by national evaluative norms. These judgments
must be made in national political processes that impose or rescind
preemptive legislation subject to supermajoritarian representation
requirements. The critical questions are: (1) what information exists
to reveal the preferences of all relevant citizens; (2) whether those
preferences are honestly and intelligently held; and (3) what philo-
sophical analysis can be provided to demonstrate that honestly and
"intelligently" held preferences are rational and moral. 32 We must
therefore ask first whether the federal regulations that exist and
provide the measure of value currently reflect widely shared evalua-
tive norms and whether the evaluative norms reflect value errors.333
Because we lack self-evident measures of value, it is common to
ask whether the initial determinations underlying federal legislation
were based on erroneous political assessments of public values and
whether values or conditions have dramatically changed. Our
empirical indicators of past and present political norms are the self-
reported statements of citizens in public opinion polls (contingent
valuations of policies and politics) and "market" preferences
expressed through voting for federal legislators and the President.3"
Public opinion polls regarding the environment show a remark-
able consistency over time. Thus, they tend to contradict claims that
enactment of preemptive legislation was strategically symbolic due to
the failure of legislators to assess properly citizens' political preferenc-
332. See supra notes 31, 230-31 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 201-17 and accompanying text.
334. See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 27, at 1192-93 (discussing the requirement of
economic theory for markets or imputed market proxies to reveal preferences or valuesl. I
focus here on the two most direct measures of citizen preferences for legislation, i.e., their self-
reported statements and the products of their voting behavior. Other "market proxies" exist,
such as substitution effects from ecolabelling, boycotts, and organized political protests, etc.
Even labelling such actions as "market proxies," however, may do injustice to the inherently
political nature of value.
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es.3 They also fail to demonstrate that the current populace no
longer supports existing federal laws. 36
The remarkable stability of federal environmental laws, notwith-
standing the 1994 election, also contradicts claims that public opinion
has significantly changed.337 Following widespread resistance to
implementing the federal controls, highly significant provisions of the
1970 Act were eliminated. But the basic provisions were supplement-
ed with additional controls to achieve the goals, subject to temporal
delay. Had even a significant minority of states opposed the federal
goals, Congress should not have been able to impose the extremely
burdensome additional control measures in 1977 or 1990. Particularly
in 1990, after twenty years of experience, it would be hard to argue
that the costs of such legislation came as a surprise.
The rhetoric of the challenges to federal environmental regulation
also suggests an underlying purpose to lead rather than to follow
citizen preferences?38 On this account, there are good reasons to
think that existing preemptive, federal environmental legislation was
not symbolic and continues to reflect efficient, welfare-enhancing
policies for the nation. That is, it will reflect such policies if the
liberal conceptions of value based, on public preferences are applied.
But a legitimate argument to the contrary can also be construct-
ed, focusing on the paternalistic conception that federal legislators
should have viewed the expressions of their citizens as failing to
reveal their "true" preferences. By 1973, the moral fervor of the
public for environmental sacrifices began to cool. 39 This suggests
that individual preferences were not legitimately held in 1970,
notwithstanding the apparant stability of public opinion. Further,
Congress never devoted sufficient resources to accomplish its goals
335. A distinction must be made between whether large numbers of citizens honestly held
their views and whether they intelligently did so. Cf. Melnick, supra note 320 (arguing that
federal legislation was enacted based on the narrowly concentrated interests of national
environmental groups); supra note 26.
336. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 162, 261-317 and accompanying text.
338. Cf. Percival, supra note 1, at 1179-80 ("Current efforts to reduce the size of government
and to return greater power to the states have not been driven by any principled articulation of
a methodology to determine which level of government is best suited to perform which
functions. Political factors have been more influential in generating the movement toward
devolution . . . . Giving states greater responsibility for environmental protection does not
guarantee better performance. Indeed, history counsels that it may be a prescription for
lowering environmental standards and reducing enforcement effort.").'
339. See supra notes 31, 322, 335 and accompanying text.
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and through other legislative means directed agency activity to avoid
accomplishing the goals.3 ° Congress repeatedly delayed the dates
by which attainment was to be achieved (conveying the symbolic
message that the attainment dates were not real), removed critical
control measures necessary to assure attainment, and preserved the
goals and remaining controls only because "the statute's promise of
a risk-free environment became too powerful a political symbol to
discard casually."34' Of course, one can add to this argument the
more overtly paternalistic claim that if citizens legitimately preferred
the federal goals, their values were simply misguided.
B. Federal Courts Ultimately Must Resolve The Value Disputes
Under existing judicial doctrine, EPA is presumed to be the best
interpreter of ambiguous Congressional intent.342 EPA has often
viewed federal preemptive legislation as symbolic and has thus been
unwilling to sanction states or otherwise to impose burdensome
controls.3 43 By treating the legislation as symbolic, however, EPA
has legitimized current attacks on the legislation and has undermined
the values of honesty and, more debatably, of democracy."
Academic criticism attempting to justify EPA's practice is itself based
340. See supra note 233.
341. Dwyer, supra note 27, at 250.
342. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843-
44 (1984) (holding that federal courts must defer to any "reasonable" agency construction of an
ambiguous statute); cf. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Adminis-
tration, 94 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1994) (presuppositions about the meanings of text may
color interpretation more than illuminate intended meaning; interpretation of the text and
structure of the Constitution must therefore begin with historical analysis).
343. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 27, at 254-55 ("EPA adopted this construction of section
112 because it believed that strictly following the language of the statute was wholly
inappropriate for regulating the health risks posed by airborne carcinogens .... EPA's position
was that the legislative history did not indicate that Congress intended such drastic
results .... ).
344. This is because EPA must dissemble to the public and to courts when it avoids
implementing the overly prescriptive commands of legislation that it believes is symbolic. See
Dwyer, supra note 27, at 234, 277-82. Such dissembling provides little opportunity for
democratic participation in rulemaking, which is further limited due to the lack of consensus on
values. See supra note 230; cf. Dwyer, supra note 27, at 282-83 ("By taking an uncompromising
stance toward hazardous airborne chemicals in section 112, Congress was able to claim credit
for protecting health and the environment while avoiding difficult policy questions and shifting
the political problems to EPA.").
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on disputed normative beliefs regarding the best organization of our
governmental decisionmaking structures.
345
Given the difficulties of discerning citizen preferences and
legislative intentions, the dispute over literal interpretation again
becomes a moral question regarding the costs and benefits of
paternalism. Wholesale deference to administrative interpretations
poses serious value-error risks, without reference to the underlying
values of particular disputes."4 Further, even strategically symbolic
legislation that does not reflect public values or that legislators do not
intend to be interpreted literally may not be disfunctional if literally
construed. Strict construction may force governmental and private
actors to achieve their best performance in the service of the
nation347 and may create an institutional structure in which federal
legislators will improve their products at lower cost to the public.
348
Because public and legislative intentions may often be ambigu-
ous, retail deference to administrative interpretations also poses
serious value-error risks. Even under current doctrine, courts must
and will impose their undemocratic values through interpretation
345. Compare Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1244 ("[A]dministratively promulgated law can
be sustained by congressional inaction or modified by informal action by a committee or
'individual member .... [C]ontroversial choices can be made without votes being taken and
responsibility being publicly assumed by members of Congress .... ") (emphasis in original)
with Dwyer, supra note 27, at 286 ("To label the agency as undemocratic when it avoids a literal
interpretation of symbolic legislation is to miss the point of this type of statute: the statute means
less 'do it this way' than 'we're serious, do something now."'). How does the agency know what
Congress really means and how does the public know who is responsible for imposing or failing
to impose policy?
346. Compare DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILTY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 131-33 (1993) (explaining that public choice
analyses of legislative decisionmaking wrongly assume that Congressional values are not stable
and thus wrongly suggest that delegation is necessary to achieve rational policies) with Dwyer,
supra note 27, at 282-83 ("[L]iteral interpretation of symbolic legislation would be a mistake and
... the Agency should be allowed to reformulate symbolic legislation because rational
policymaking involving volatile social issues is more likely to be done by an agency than by the
legislature, particularly where statutes are difficult to amend and enacting symbolic legislation
is an accepted means of doing business.") (emphasis added).
347. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
348. See Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1232-33 (discussing the relationship of judicial
doctrines addressing delegation of legislative power, vagueness concerns, and due process
constraints on the Congressional failure to resolve the normative disputes); Schoenbrod, supra
note 105, at 807-18 (discussing the benefits that would be obtained if the federal courts enforced
a nondelegation doctrine that required Congress to specify the goals with precision and to
allocate the costs of achieving those goals); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 385, 390-91 (1989) (discussing why the
nondelegation and void-for-vagueness doctrines lack content due to ambiguity over values and
why constraints are and must be provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
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when reviewing interpretations of EPA, which also is not an elected
body.349 Whether courts should do so is commonly referred to as
the countermajoritarian dilemma.35
It remains highly significant that the federal judiciary has not
treated the Clean Air Act as establishing disfunctional symbolism, but
rather has routinely interpreted the goals literally to impose remedial
requirements. Congress did not reverse these decisions.3 ' The
judiciary has thus imposed values (either those of the public, of
Congress, or of themselves) on governments and regulated enti-
ties.352 Are the imposed values good ones?
349. See supra notes 232, 342; cf. Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach To Statutory
Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist? Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better Than
Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1232-67 (1996) (describing how both
textualist appoaches to interpretation of statutes and the Chevron doctrine determinations of
ambiguity have been manipulated); Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1233 & n.54 (describing how
the Supreme Court has "strained" to reach its results regarding serious disputes over value
under the Chevron doctrine rather than the nondelegation doctrine). The Chevron doctrine
exacerbates the problem of value disputes in the (re)interpretation of statutes. If the Court finds
the agency's policy choice to be reasonable, it must uphold the rule and will not discuss whether
the statute excessively delegates policyrnaking discretion. If the Court finds the agency's policy
choice to be unreasonable, it will invalidate the rule and again will not discuss the scope of the
delegation. In contrast, if required to address the scope of delegation, the Court will likely feel
compelled to explain why an "intelligible principle" to guide agency decisions and judicial review
does or does not exist. The Court's decision thus will more transparently, reveal its own
policymaking role, by focusing on its own choice of the level of generality rather than on an
agency's purported reasonableness in choosing among competing policies. Delegation analysis
more directly provides a basis to discuss whether the Court has adopted rational or arbitrary
distinctions, and whether the Court's policy preferences are widely shared or deprive the public
of the "remedial purposes" of the legislation.
350. See Gonzales, supra note 75, at 100 ("American constitution builders of the late 1780s
came to believe that courts ought to be afforded discretion in shaping law, even statutory law.");
id. at 106-37 (courts should reject "honest-agent" statutory-construction approaches to
interpreting legislation in favor of "public-regarding" common-law approaches). The Framers
of the Constitution did not make a final institutional choice separating legislative from other
powers, but rather created "'a government of separated institutions sharing powers."' Strauss,
supra note 75, at 604 (quoting RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER-THE PoLTIcs OF
LEADERSHIP FROM FDR TO CARTER 26 (1980)); see Amar, supra note 69, at 225,226 & n.81,
227-28 (noting that the federal Congress and state courts were not in 1789 sufficiently
independent of state legislatures for the Framers to rely upon these institutions to cabin state
legislative excesses). Consequently, the constitutional dispute again requires the Supreme Court
to resolve the competing values.
351. See Fisch, supra note 88 (Congressional acquiescence in judicial interpretations creates
settled equilibrium expectations, raising fairness concerns and higher transaction costs for legal
change).
352. Cf. SCHOENBROD, supra note 347, at 157 (common lawmaking may have supermajori-
tarian support like legislation and "judges are insulated from day-to-day politics" preventing
narrow interests from dictating policies).
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CONCLUSION
We have spent over twenty-five years trying to get states and
EPA to attain the levels of environmental quality that our nation
desires and it looks like we will have to wait a lot longer still. If
many states have not achieved and will not achieve compliance with
federal goals in the presence of federal incentives and the potential
for sanctions, it defies credulity to believe they will achieve the goals
on their own. 3  Because most citizens seriously believe that the
goals are appropriate, as indicated by the few empirical indicators that
we possess, the concept of federal regulation remains justified on any
of a number of theoretical grounds. As a practical matter, federal
regulation is here to stay3 4
Given the history of resistance to the legislative goals and the
pervasive desire to retain local control through supermajoritarian
legislative and constitutional enactment requirements, we are likely to
retain an enormously coitly federal regulatory structure that imposes
legislative goals that many states and EPA will vigorously avoid
implementing. We are unlikely to repeal such legislation and are
unlikely to effectively implement it, absent additional legislation that
removes even more discretion from state and federal officials and
imposes even greater control costs. Arguments that Congress should
provide states or EPA with "flexibility" to adapt policies to local
conditions or unforeseen circumstances should thus be viewed as open
invitations to further waste, dispute, and delay?55  As a nation, we
should either impose the controls necessary to achieve our federal
policies or should cheerfully return policymaking to the states because
we lack the courage of our national political convictions. 56  But
353. See States Neglecting Pollution Rules, White House Says, N:Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, at
Al.
354. See Rubin, supra note 112, at 1-2 ("We are much more likely to turn the clock back 500
million years by bombing ourselves into the protoplasmic slime than we are to turn it back 120
years to the pre-administrative state."). See generally James Wilson, the Rise of the Bureaucratic
Stat4 reprinted in ROBERT RABIN, PERSPECIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 16 (1979)
(correlating the rise of bureaucratic government to specific historical forces, which are unlikely
to disappear).
355. See Lee, supra note 5, at A4 ("'There are some in Congress who believe that the Clean
Air Act should be repealed,' Browner said. 'By giving the states flexibility in enforcing the law,
we hope to avoid a congressional fight over the act."'). The national and international value
consensus is increasingly unstable and may neither be equilibrating nor efficient. See supra note
55. The potential for domestic and foreign unrest should be promptly addressed.
356. See Schoenbrod, supra note 105, at 748-51 (noting that Congress' failure to achieve its
goals has resulted from its continuing desire to have states and localities implement, and federal
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due .to supermajoritarian enactment requirements, the inexorable
progress toward integration, and the strength of supermajority
preferences for environmental protection benefits, we will be stuck
with the federal goals for the foreseeable future.
The existing federal regulatory structure has resulted, moreover,
from the willingness - indeed the express desire - of citizens to
impose their moral beliefs on their fellow citizens in the selfish or
altruistic desire to benefit themselves and their fellows. It will thus
be more productive to discuss the explicit moral basis for our political
judgments when arguing about federal regulation than to argue about
why those who disagree with our values should be free to avoid their
imposition. At the least, such explicit moral debate may make
political discussion more civil. But it also provides the only hope for
resolving the intractable social problems and regulatory questions with
which we are faced, by bridging the normative chasms about which we
so profoundly disagree. 57
administrative agencies define, federal environmental policy); but see Dwyer, supra note 26, at
1216-19 (describing as inevitable the need for state implementation, based on limited federal
resources, traditional state prerogatives to regulate the environment and related matters,
diversity of local conditions, and the controversial nature of the controls which impose
concentrated costs at local levels).
357. Cf. Massaro, supra note 166, at 48-108 (suggesting that "calls to reason" and "calls to
empathy" may receive greater judicial recognition when doctrine is based on moral views); id.
at 92, 102-03, 107 ("What, other than direct experience, is most likely to modify a view twisted
by defects in reason and empathy? That is, how do people change their minds?... [Empirical
and social constructivist critique] undermines [the] assumption that moral questions are too
complex to be handled by claims of irrationality.... [A]rguments from reason also demonstrate
how and when reason and moral theory become inadequate .... The argument is even more
effective when it is complemented by a countemarrative that deploys parodic reversal ....
[N]arratives drawn from different cultures ... may display to the judicial audience ways in which
what seems universal is actually local, and thus may 'forcefl us to ask whether we have good
reasons for what we legislate and judge' ... . [But t]o know all is simply not, in every case, to
forgive all. Nor, add many modem moralists in a stem voice, should it be.") (citation omitted).
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